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This dissertation examines how international development agencies and American 
philanthropic organization collaborated with the new Indian and Pakistani states in 
undertaking unprecedented interventions in the agricultural and nutritional sciences after 
Partition in 1947 and into the early years of the Cold War. Contrasting with existing 
scholarship on the changes that swept the world food economy in the mid-twentieth 
century, my work uncovers the linkages between late colonial and post-independence 
understandings of famine, population growth, and economic development in South Asia. I 
propose a broader framing of the Green Revolution of the 1960s, examining the resonance 
of eugenic theories within population control efforts and tensions between the nutritional 
and agricultural sciences through decolonization. To that end, I track the influence of the 
Rockefeller and Ford foundations, the Population Council, and UN agencies, such as the 
WHO and the FAO, in inaugurating programs of rural development, nutritional research, 
and resource management. I argue that efforts led by Indian nationalists, British colonial 
officials, and American philanthropists in the context of the global population 'crisis' of the 
1940s and 1950s generated scientific institutions, networks, and ideas vital to the later 
Green Revolution. 
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Introduction: Foreseeing the Future 
 
“I do not want to foresee the future. I am concerned with taking care of the present. God 
has given me no control over the moment following.”         –Mohandas K. Gandhi, 19241 
  
“The future is always obscure. The most reasonable predictions about trends in human 
affairs are apt to be falsified by events.”            –The Famine Inquiry Commission, 19452 
 
“[T]he future of India depends on reversing the dictum of the administrator and 
recognising that the scientist must be on top and not on tap.”   –P. C. Mahalanobis, 19613 
 
These three distinct visions of change over time — Gandhian, colonial, and 
developmentalist — reflect the fluid notion of progress in mid-twentieth-century India. 
During this period of global upheaval that brought tremendous economic and political 
change to South Asia, scientists, philanthropists, and government officials turned 
increasingly to the task of forecasting future trends in the growth and health of populations. 
Unlike Walter Benjamin’s famous “angel of history” — gaze fixed upon the continuous 
wreckage of the past while blown forward by a storm called “progress” — these scientists 
and planners believed they could turn ahead and see where the wind would take them.4 
Indeed, many believed they controlled the storm itself. Yet this confidence was by no 
means uniform and faith in the ability of science to assuage the fears of the present and 
meet the needs of the future grew haltingly over time.  
                                                
1 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Young India, 1924-1926 (New York: The Viking Press, 1928), 448. 
2 Final Report of the Famine Inquiry Commission,  (Delhi: Government of India Manager of Publications, 
1945), 87. 
3 P. C. Mahalanobis, Talks on Planning, Indian Statistical Series (Calcutta: Asia Publishing House, 1961), 
110. 
4 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 257-8. 
Benedict Anderson also references Benjamin’s chapter, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in the 
posthumously-published Illuminations. See, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 147.  
 2 
Gandhi, for instance, vehemently rejected the bold promises of western science and 
medicine, writing the above passage as he attempted to heal a rift within the Congress Party 
after the violence of Chauri Chaura incident in 1922.5 His reluctance to forecast India’s 
political future, he reflected, turned him to the spinning of khadi as a means of building 
national unity through self-improvement and work-discipline — a simultaneous rejection 
of mechanization and the technological future it heralded.6 Two decades later, the colonial 
government’s Famine Inquiry Commission similarly abstained from the business of 
prediction. The context, however, was jarringly different. Written largely by the Anglo-
Irish nutritionist W. R. Aykroyd, the final report of the commission of Indian and British 
scientists examined the causes of the 1943-44 Bengal Famine. The famine had left over 
three million dead, shocking colonial medical officials who believed such crises had been 
relegated to the Victorian past.7 The Commission refused to forecast an approaching 
Malthusian catastrophe, placing the blame for the famine squarely on a historical 
“underdevelopment of resources” in rural Bengal and not on overpopulation, as other 
analyses at the time suggested.8 Demanding a break with the laissez-faire past of 
colonialism, the commission called upon the ailing colonial state to launch a broad program 
of “nation building” to generate economic and social development in India.9  
Sixteen years later, statistician P. C. Mahalanobis, encouraged the independent 
Indian state to place scientists at the helm of development efforts, stressing: “I have a deep 
conviction that scientists must supply the leadership in national development. It is 
                                                
5 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) 203. 
6 Gandhi,  Young India, 449. 
7 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), 52. 
8 Final Report of the Famine Inquiry Commission, 73. 
9 Ibid., 331. 
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necessary that they should take the initiative.”10 The accomplished Bengali statistician had 
himself designed India’s Second Five-Year Plan, from 1956 to 1961, in which he had 
emphasized rapid industrialization and the expansion of public sector programs.11 In 
striking contrast to Gandhi’s spiritual dedication to matters of the present, Mahalanobis’ 
thinking resembled the Western-style approach to development promoted by Jawaharlal 
Nehru, for whom the United States, the Soviet Union, and, later, Japan and China, were 
models of industrial progress. As India’s first prime minister, Nehru staunchly advocated 
a combined strategy of growth promotion and inequality reduction that enabled the new 
state to sustain the fragile ‘Gandhian-socialist consensus.’12 In spite of his support for rapid 
industrialization, Mahalanobis also advocated for a scientific reorganization of the nation’s 
agricultural sector along cooperative lines, with detailed targets for farm outputs extending 
ten to fifteen years into the future.13 Naturally, agronomists, nutritionists, and social 
scientists would be placed at the helm of this renewed effort to establish Indian self-
sufficiency in food production and end the cycle of famine that had defined British 
colonialism. 
This dissertation centers on the work of a handful of nongovernmental institutions 
that assumed influential roles in public health and agricultural development across South 
Asia during the 1940s and 1950s I show that, in the course of decolonization, these 
institutions — including the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, the Population Council, the 
World Bank Group, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) — formulated ideas and practices that became 
                                                
10 Mahalanobis, 110. 
11 Francine R. Frankel, India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 122. 
12 Ibid., 17-18. 
13 Ibid., 128. 
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central to international development discourse in the postwar world. The scientists, 
economists, and other experts affiliated with these organizations collaborated closely with 
the governments of independent India and Pakistan, as well as their imperial predecessor, 
undertaking scientific research and rural development initiatives aimed at transforming 
landscapes and reordering populations.  
Crucially, however, I argue that nationalist and colonial era concerns over public 
health, population management, and rural extension also shaped the agendas of the 
philanthropic organizations and international agencies that entered South Asia after 
independence. Indeed, the careers of many Indian and British imperial scientists spanned 
Partition as they shifted from roles in colonial institutions to positions in new international 
ones. Further, local interests guided how these global nongovernmental organizations 
conducted research and attempted interventions in population control, nutritional health, 
and agricultural development. In this way, my dissertation places the later Green 
Revolution in the context of a long period of South Asian decolonization, speaking to both 
colonial and postcolonial historiographies. This analysis shows that the ideas, institutions, 
and global networks that enabled the global Green Revolution emerged as scientists, 
philanthropists, and government officials worked to regulate rural populations and 
reorganize South Asia’s food economy after Partition and into the 1950s and 1960s. 
During the two decades following independence in 1947, visions of a national 
future marred by persistent food shortage and runaway population growth reflected postwar 
fears of global overpopulation.14 The 1951 Census of India, the first after independence, 
gloomily projected that India’s food production capabilities would not keep up with a 
                                                
14 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2008), 145. 
 5 
population of 361 million expanding at an annual rate of four to five million.15 The census 
commissioner, R. A. Gopalaswami, wrote that Indian agriculture needed a “near-miracle” 
to feed an estimated 520 million Indians by 1981. As to whether that miracle would come, 
Gopalaswami was not optimistic, particularly considering India’s lack of a large-scale 
family planning initiative.16 That said, the demographer’s grim calculations did not go 
uncontested. For instance, the agronomist P. C. Bansil wrote that while Gopalaswami had 
accurately assessed the nation’s low agricultural production levels, he had failed to see the 
ample room for improvement. As he wrote: “The Neo-Malthusians find support in their 
theories in the exhausted land and prolific motherhood of India. The wisdom of such 
findings are [sic], however, questionable.”17 Instead, Bansil predicted that innovations in 
the agricultural and nutritional sciences would secure India’s welfare in time.  
This analysis explores how, when taken together, the fear of the future described 
by Gopalaswami, and the faith in science professed by Bansil, drove India toward the 
Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, in which high-yielding wheat and rice varieties, 
chemical fertilizers, and other technologies deployed in South Asia by American 
philanthropic organizations doubled food production.18 Defined and driven in part by the 
work of these American foundations, South Asia’s Green Revolution would build upon 
their earlier investments in agriculture in Mexico and the United States during the interwar 
years and through the 1940s. The high-yielding grain varieties generated by these initial 
experiments led American agricultural scientists to emphasize increased production over 
issues of food distribution nutritional and quality in their efforts to combat hunger. This 
                                                
15 R. A. Gopalaswami, Census of India, 1951 (Part 1-a – Report), vol. 1 (New Delhi: Government of India 
Press, 1953), 181. 
16 Ibid., 191. 
17 P. C. Bansil, India's Food Resources and Population (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1958), 1. 
18 Raj Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," The Journal of Peasant Studies 40 (2012): 6. 
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focus upon production increases would become the hallmark of the Green Revolution 
lauded by American philanthropic organizations and international development agencies 
through the late 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, and as Raj Patel and others have 
shown, the Green Revolution constituted a global phenomenon that spanned much of the 
twentieth century, representing broad changes in agricultural science and practice, 
harnessed at various times to respond to varied economic and social demands and to 
accomplish a wide array of political ends.19 Within that patchwork of justifications and 
contexts, decolonization in South Asia played a central role in setting the pace and purpose 
of the broad scientific changes underpinning this long Green Revolution. 
SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF DECOLONIZATION 
Through the narratives of scientific and social change I examine here, I seek to 
improve our understanding of how decolonization in South Asia influenced global health 
priorities, shaped the evolution of the agricultural sciences, and facilitated the rise of an 
international development discourse. To that end, I examine attempts to reconfigure society 
and to regulate human bodies in a longer era of South Asian decolonization. Beyond 
offering an analysis of the changes wrought by Partition and its immediate aftermath, I 
work within a wider historical frame that extends roughly from the time of the First World 
War to the early 1960s — the eve of the Rockefeller Foundation’s initial introduction of 
high-yielding wheat varieties commonly associated with the food production increases of 
the Green Revolution. Covering the height of the Indian nationalist movement and late 
colonial attempts to retain power in South Asia, this period of analysis also captures much 
of the life of the Rockefeller Foundation in India, from the organization’s early funding of 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
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medical efforts to combat hookworm disease and malaria beginning in 1913.20 I pay 
particular attention to the planning stages of the Population Council and the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s initial interventions in India in 1952 and 1956, respectively, as well as the 
Ford Foundation’s first work in community development beginning in 1952, coordinated 
through the Point Four initiative of the Truman Administration. These early planning 
efforts prove telling because they expose the limitations built into efforts by philanthropic 
organizations, international agencies, and national governments to reshape South Asia’s 
food economy from the very beginning. This strategic planning, and the story of the earliest 
explorations made by these organizations into the agricultural sciences and rural extension 
in colonial and post-Partition India, have been frequently overlooked within histories of 
the Green Revolution. 
In addition to setting a temporal frame of analysis that includes both the late 
colonial and early post-independence periods in South Asia, this work pays close attention 
to what can be learned from the careers of the scientists, physicians, and economic experts 
whose careers spanned Partition. For instance, the correspondence of W. R. Aykroyd, the 
Anglo-Irish director of the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor who went on to 
direct the Nutrition Division of the FAO in Rome, offers tremendous insight into 
nutritionists’ views of the postwar drive to grow more food through investments in the 
agricultural sciences. Strikingly, the “conquest of famine,” as Aykroyd would later refer to 
the international efforts of the 1960s to eliminate global hunger, often stood as a secondary 
objective in the initial planning phases of scientific intervention.21 Instead, the striking of 
an abstract balance between population growth and food production represented the highest 
                                                
20 Gary R. Hess, “American Philanthropic Foundations in India,” in Soma Hewa and Darwin H. Stapleton, 
eds., Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society: Toward a New Political Culture in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Springer, 2005), 55. 
21 W. R. Aykroyd, The Conquest of Famine (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1975), 4-5. 
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goal of the non-governmental organizations that entered South Asia after Partition. In turn, 
the subsequent Green Revolution emerged, not from a purely humanitarian quest to prevent 
famine and hunger, but from a broader, longstanding effort to reorganize and manage 
India’s population on many fronts — including family planning initiatives, community 
development projects, rural extension trainings, and laboratory and clinical investigations 
of the physiological experience of malnutrition. Placing their histories into conversation 
with each other and carrying their narratives across the temporal divide of 1947 brings the 
relationship between European imperialism and postwar developmentalism into sharp 
focus. 
Understanding the impetus for innovations in the agricultural and nutritional 
sciences in independent India requires examining the ways in which the institutions of the 
late colonial era promoted — and failed to promote — public welfare. Here again, the work 
of colonial-era scientists like V. N. Patwardhan, Muktha Sen, and Albert and Gabrielle 
Howard demonstrates that nutritional health became a concern of colonial science much 
later than more lucrative scientific efforts to improve agricultural yields. Political pressure 
from Indian nationalists, as well as the material realities of the Great Depression, the 
Second World War, and the Bengal Famine, compelled the imperial state to attend more 
seriously to agricultural development and public health issues. The declining colonial 
administration strengthened the Imperial Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) and 
established the Central Rice Research Institute in 1944.22 Both institutions worked through 
the late 1940s and 1950s to produce high-yield grain varieties and improve methods of soil 
fertilization for the Indian agricultural sector. Both also established close relationships with 
                                                
22 Amanda Carroll Waterhouse, Food & Prosperity: Balancing Technology and Community in Agriculture 
(New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 2013), 141. 
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the Rockefeller Foundation after it shifted its attention to the agricultural sciences in India 
after 1956.  
At the same time, as this dissertation shows, the Indian Medical Service (IMS) and 
imperial institutions, such as the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor and the All-
India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health (AIIH&PH) in Calcutta, extended research 
into human dietary needs and diseases of nutritional deficiency in coordination with the 
Rockefeller Foundation. For instance, I track the narrative of the AIIH&PH’s Singur Study 
Unit — a collection of villages in the Bengali countryside that began as a venue for 
nutritional research funded by the Rockefeller Foundation just after the Bengal Famine, 
and slowly evolved into one of the Population Council’s first testing grounds in South Asia 
for teaching methods in birth control and family planning. My work also sheds light on the 
competing interests that fueled the nutritional and agricultural sciences, as well as 
population control efforts, as they pursued surprisingly disparate agendas. As I 
demonstrate, experts from each of these fields interpreted the major challenges of postwar 
international development differently. Nutritional research generally attended to concerns 
over the economic and social causes of malnutrition and diseases of deficiency; agricultural 
scientists and population control advocates focused more strictly on achieving a balance 
between human fertility and food production through scientific innovation and knowledge 
dissemination. 
This dissertation also frames the scientific and rural development projects launched 
in cooperation with American and international organizations in the context of political 
debates over the proper course of development in India. At the core of these arguments 
stood a debate over whether to jettison imperial institutions and technologies, as advocated 
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by Gandhi, or to integrate them into a modern social democracy, as Nehru argued.23 
Nehru’s position won the day and his government moved rapidly through the 1950s to 
expand agricultural infrastructure and scientific research through a series of five-year plans 
coordinated by a central Planning Commission. Appointed by the Interim Government in 
1946, the permanent Planning Commission shifted the Indian state’s approach to economic 
development, moving from the social change-focused First Five-Year Plan of 1951 to 1956 
to the industrialization-driven Second Five-Year Plan of 1957 to 1962 that, as Francine 
Frankel has shown, still relied upon sustained investments in agricultural development.24 
Emphasizing the interventions of American philanthropic organizations and new 
international agencies over the well-studied discussions of the Planning Commission, I 
investigate the extent to which the new, development-oriented state altered the old 
objectives of imperial science in agriculture, nutrition, and population regulation on a 
practical level. To that end, I assess how Partition and subsequent, contentious 
rehabilitation programs contributed to broader investments in rural extension and 
community through the 1950s and 1960s.  
With the wheat and rice-growing provinces of Bengal and Punjab divided and 
partially integrated into East and West Pakistan, India faced an unprecedented challenge in 
feeding its growing population. As I show here, Partition and its aftermath generated a 
political impetus for much wider investments in agricultural and community development 
across India. The borders drawn in 1947 disrupted agricultural production — cutting 
irrigation canals off from their sources, disrupting the flow of commodities across the 
subcontinent, and permanently displacing hundreds of thousands of agricultural laborers. 
                                                
23 An exposition of Nehru’s thought on this issue is found within Jawaharlal Nehru, Nehru on Science and 
Society (New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1988). 
24 Francine Frankel, India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 111-112. 
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Subsequently, Indian and Pakistani officials, along with representatives of the World Bank, 
turned to agreements governing resource-sharing and irrigation development in the 
Americas as models for settling disputes with Pakistan over irrigation rights in the Indus 
River Basin. In investigating these social and scientific changes through the first two 
decades following Partition, I show how India engaged with new international 
organizations to establish permanent legal and economic arrangements intended to secure 
improvements in hybrid seed development, soil fertility, and agricultural productivity. 
In framing global efforts to transform agriculture during the postwar era within the 
context of South Asian decolonization, this dissertation charts the emergence of American 
philanthropic organizations such as the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, as well as the 
Population Council, in influencing Indian food and population policy. While scholars have 
documented the work undertaken by these organizations during the Cold War across Asia, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean, less attention has gone to their earlier efforts beyond 
North America before the end of the Second World War. I show that the influence of such 
organizations grew haltingly, long before the end of empire in South Asia. In 1935, for 
instance, the Rockefeller Foundation established a field office in Delhi to coordinate an 
array of public health projects they had been developing across colonial India since the 
1910s. Following independence, the foundation shifted from supporting medical research 
and public health institutions in India toward heavier investments in the agricultural 
sciences and rural development.25 During the interwar years, however, representatives of 
the Rockefeller Foundation also investigated the potential for investments in rural 
extension and agricultural development, long before the official launch of the foundation’s 
Agricultural Research Program (IAP) in 1956. My investigation of these early inquiries on 
                                                
25 For an early first-hand account of Rockefeller Foundation investments in Mexico, see Norman Borlaug, 
The Green Revolution, Peace and Humanity (Mexico City: CIMMYT, 1972). 
 12 
the part of the American philanthropy helps to reveal connections between Rockefeller-
funded rural extension work through the General Education Board (GEB) in the American 
South and the efforts of agricultural experts like Sam Higginbottom and Arthur T. Mosher 
whose work at the Allahabad Agricultural Research Institute had roots in the Presbyterian 
mission movement.  
While Britain’s withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947 allowed American 
organizations a freer hand in funding the sciences, I show that the Rockefeller Foundation 
spent nearly a decade determining exactly what direction to take in South Asia. Though 
the organization’s top scientists and administrators had identified an imbalance between 
population growth and food supply as the chief challenge facing India, they hotly debated 
the foundation’s precise angle of approach. Close attention to this planning phase 
uncovering the nature of the organization’s motivations in South Asia reveals a great deal 
about Rockefeller scientists’ thinking on race, gender, and population growth. In turn, this 
understanding helps to explain how the Green Revolution of the 1960s unfolded as it did. 
Though I take the story of the origins of the Green Revolution in South Asia beyond 
its usual Cold War framing, the broader dimension of postwar geopolitics remains critical 
within my work. In particular, the rise of international development discourse in the context 
of South Asian decolonization illuminates how changes within India reflected the scientific 
innovations and policy recommendations of emerging organizations like the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and World Health Organization 
(WHO). Through those agencies, and in collaboration with American philanthropic 
organizations, Indian and former British colonial scientists became increasingly involved 
in worldwide scientific networks in the 1950s and 1960s. As Matthew Connelly notes: “A 
 13 
transnational network of population experts took up where empires left off.”26 Indeed, this 
phenomenon is as apparent within the agricultural and nutritional sciences as it is for the 
networks employed by global population experts. Guided by American investments and 
shaped in part by Cold War priorities, these networks connected research institutions in 
India with similar institutions in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa. In this way, 
American-led initiatives integrated agricultural knowledge produced in India and across 
the decolonizing and developing world into an important component of Green Revolution 
research. Unlike earlier work by Nick Cullather, John H. Perkins, and others who focus 
chiefly on the Cold War context of the Green Revolution, I seek a more local context to 
the broad narrative of agricultural change that swept the globe during the late 1960s and 
1970s.27 In turn, I hope to show that development initiatives and scientific investigations 
undertaken in South Asia in during a long period of decolonization shaped the theories and 
practices deployed by international development organizations and philanthropic 
foundations on a global scale. 
TRACING THE ROOTS OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 
Whether viewed in a positive or negative light, whether interpreted as reducing 
hunger or exacerbating poverty, the term ‘Green Revolution’ itself is frequently employed 
in vague, catch-all ways that can imply that it is outside history. The term, at least, has a 
definite origin. William Gaud, then director of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), coined the label ‘Green Revolution’ in 1968 to describe the 
substantial increases in global food grain production of the late 1960s. Attributing these 
                                                
26 Connelly, 9-10. 
27 See, for instance, Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) and John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: 
Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For a ‘first-hand’ account of 
the Green Revolution written by a former director of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), see 
H. K. Jain, The Green Revolution: History, Impact, and Future (New Delhi: Studium, 2010). 
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increases to the promotion of high-yielding grain varieties, chemical fertilizers, and 
pesticides advanced by philanthropic organizations like the Rockefeller and Ford 
foundations, Gaud projected the term back over an indeterminate period of the past. Its 
precise historical origins left obscure, Gaud described the Green Revolution in a speech to 
the Society for International Development in Washington, DC. As he observed: 
“[D]evelopments in the field of agriculture contain the makings of a new revolution. It is 
not a violent Red Revolution like that of the Soviets, nor is it a White Revolution like that 
of the Shah of Iran. I call it the Green Revolution.”28 Situated firmly in a comparison with 
political upheaval in Russia and Iran, the term ‘Green Revolution’ immediately took on an 
association with the geopolitical struggles of the Cold War and the longer twentieth-
century battle between communism and capitalism. Indeed, in many ways, these 
associations proved to be warranted. Yet, associating the changes that Gaud described as 
characteristic of the Green Revolution exclusively with American scientific aid and strictly 
in the context of the Cold War inhibits our understanding of important economic and 
scientific phenomena of the twentieth century. 
Recent scholarship on the origins of Green Revolution emphasizes the role of Cold 
War-era technological aid to South Asia in addressing poverty and postwar concerns 
regarding food shortage and overpopulation. In his work on the origins of the Green 
Revolution in the context of the strategic distribution of scientific aid by the United States 
during the Cold War, Nick Cullather rightly highlights the connection between efforts to 
increase agricultural production and an emerging international development discourse. As 
he argues: “Rather than a contingent process unfolding in history by its own rules and on 
its own schedule, ‘development’ by 1948 had acquired a transitive meaning, as a procedure 
                                                
28 Patel, 5. 
 15 
performed by one country upon another.”29 At the same time, this characterization neglects 
the fact that this development was not always “performed” with intention or apparent 
strategy. Instead, it had begun to emerge in the postwar world as a global system in and of 
itself, involving ever-expanding knowledge networks, new international agencies and 
philanthropic organizations, and the sharing of vital economic and demographic 
information through education and training.  
I argue that international development efforts in the immediate postwar period 
involved the exchange of ideas between experts working in multiple contexts around the 
world, working to establish sets of ‘best practices.’ Much like the ‘legibility’ described by 
James C. Scott in efforts to simplify, understand, and control both nature and crop 
production, the postwar investments in South Asian agricultural development and 
extension attempted to compile a central clearinghouse of agronomic knowledge.30 
Whether codified in handbooks or study reports, academic journals or field training 
sessions, these best practices represented theories tested and results recorded in a quest to 
generate a replicable model of social change, agronomic investment, and economic growth. 
Of course, that is not to say that these exchanges occurred in an egalitarian fashion or that 
they did not fall under the disproportionate influence of powerful, self-interested parties 
like national governments or multinational corporations. They clearly illustrate the 
“imperial pretensions of agronomic science” rightly emphasized by Scott.31 At the same 
time, however, the development projects launched in South Asia through the 1950s often 
grew up around existing Indian institutions which had their own nationalist and colonial 
legacies. Their rapid, often haphazard, rise reflects the sense of urgency that prevailed 
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among Indian, American, and British experts who sought to address food shortage and 
overpopulation as the central impediments to economic and political stability in the region. 
Further, by de-emphasizing the ramifications of decolonization and the lingering 
effects of colonial priorities in South Asia, Cullather overestimates the planning acumen 
of American philanthropic organizations. For instance, Mexico did not represent a “staging 
area” for the Rockefeller Foundation’s “conquest of hunger in Asia,” as Cullather puts it.32 
Such a description implies a concerted plan with previously identified political objectives. 
The process unfolded in a far more haphazard way, with Foundation officials frequently 
uncertain as to whether their organization would invest in the agricultural sciences in South 
Asia, much less derive any transferable findings from their on-going work in Mexico. In 
this way, Cullather’s important survey of the Green Revolution’s Cold War origins 
overlooks the sheer uncertainty and capriciousness involved in the philanthropic planning 
process. After all, the Rockefeller Foundation’s interest in independent India began with 
discussions of how to invest effectively in public health. This, in turn, led to a consideration 
of health in the context of rapid population growth, which brought officials to the view that 
South Asia’s central problem was a ‘double crisis’ of overpopulation and food shortage. 
More importantly, the wheat and maize hybridization work undertaken in Mexico by the 
Rockefeller Foundation during the 1940s and 1950s closely resembled the simultaneous 
efforts in grain yield improvement undertaken by Indian and British colonial scientists. As 
this dissertation shows, scientific work to improve grain yields reflected a long, global 
effort involving, among many others, Indian, Mexican, American, and British scientists.  
The Rockefeller Foundation was hardly alone in advancing this agenda and 
certainly did not plan for the combination of innovations that became characteristic of the 
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later Green Revolution. Indeed, Rockefeller Foundation officials began to take interest in 
South Asian agriculture in the 1910s, but this curiosity proved to be as sporadic as it was 
longstanding. As late as 1952, just four years before the foundation launched its agricultural 
program in New Delhi, representatives of the organization continued to debate whether 
their efforts might be more effective if restricted to efforts in public health. Joseph Cotter, 
writing in the context of the emergence of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican 
Agricultural Program (MAP), tracks the improvised ways in which Rockefeller scientists 
cobbled together their projects through the 1940s.33 More importantly, Cotter’s work 
situates the Rockefeller Foundation’s mercurial efforts in the run-up to Mexico’s Green 
Revolution in the context of a broader history of agricultural development concerns within 
the nation. This methodology enables a narrative that is highly attentive to the broader 
context of Mexican history. This attention to local circumstances and concerns is admirable 
and shows how the MAP established close relationships with existing Mexican institutions 
and tailored its scientific investigations to the priorities of Mexico’s federal government. 
In a similar way, as this dissertation shows, Rockefeller Foundation scientists and officials 
working in India paid close attention to the needs and demands of their host government. 
Indeed, this relationship often blurred the lines between the two entities —  with 
Rockefeller sharing extensive information on human subjects gathered during its research, 
and with the Government of India allowing national research institutions, like the IARI, to 
be managed directly by the foundation.  
In contrast with Cullather’s broad, global-level analysis, other scholars have 
engaged with the phenomena associated with the early Green Revolution in the local South 
Asian context. Madhumita Saha, for instance, underscores the importance of domestic 
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innovations in wheat and rice research to agricultural development in India during the 
1940s and 1950s — well in advance of the Rockefeller Foundation’s work on the same 
food grains in South Asia.34 Her analysis demonstrates the cynical nature of American aid 
to India, rightly relieving such overtures of their humanitarian rhetoric and demonstrating 
that the United States distributed aid to retain a vital ally in the Cold War.35 Saha’s work 
shows that research into high-yielding grain varieties on the part of Indian and late colonial 
research institutions was already well underway by the time Rockefeller and Ford 
developed their interest in South Asia. I build upon this assertion, attempting to frame the 
work of both philanthropic organizations in the much wider, long-running work of 
agriculture scientists and institutions the world over. Though less concerned with framing 
an origins story of the Green Revolution, Joseph M. Hodge draws heavily upon colonial 
and environmental historiographies in his work on late colonial agricultural science.36 The 
troubled scientific innovations that Hodge examines in the context of British colonialism 
in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean do, however, similarly demonstrate the 
enduring implications of imperial rule for agricultural development. In turn, Hodge reveals 
the “lingering presence and influence of […] colonial experts,” following formal 
decolonization.37 I find Hodge’s analysis particularly useful to my investigation of how the 
FAO and the Ford Foundation engaged and employed former colonial experts in India 
through the course of their projects in nutritional science and agricultural development. 
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The works of Saha and Hodge thus establish a wider temporal framework within which 
changes and continuities in postcolonial agriculture can be explored. 
Broadening the context in which South Asia’s Green Revolution occurred also 
involves engaging with recent work on global population and the eugenic origins of 
international efforts to counter the perceived postwar overpopulation crisis. Matthew 
Connelly, for instance, examines the “politics of population,” providing an incredibly 
useful context for the motivations behind India’s postcolonial investments in agricultural 
development.38 Deeply relevant to the concerns of this dissertation, Connelly examines the 
interests involved in the rise of the Population Council in the early 1950s, providing a 
window into early assessments of postwar population growth in South Asia. As Connelly 
shows, Population Council officials found a receptive audience for their family planning 
advocacy in India, with nascent efforts in fertility control already in motion.   39 Connelly’s 
work provides a firm context for this dissertation’s analysis of how the nutritional sciences 
and community development efforts intersected with population control interests in India 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. I contribute an investigation of specific family planning 
‘action research’ initiatives funded by both the Population Council and the Rockefeller 
Foundation in rural West Bengal and East Punjab. Here again, I show that demands for a 
reordering of India’s rural society following Partition opened the door to initial forays in 
population research and control on the part of American philanthropic organizations. These 
initiatives reflect the broader context of population management in which agricultural 
research and rural extension education unfolded. 
Similarly, Alison Bashford’s work provides a detailed assessment of the historical 
origins of neo-Malthusian concerns regarding postwar population that motivated new 
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efforts in the agricultural and nutritional sciences in independent South Asia. In addition 
to a wide investigation of the eugenic thought that influenced international thinking on 
population growth, Bashford highlights connections between biological notions of soil 
science and population health.40 In this way, she clearly shows that nutritional and 
agricultural sciences as they emerged through the mid-twentieth century concerned 
themselves directly with thinking on population health and fertility. In showing the 
importance of soil conservation within the agendas of population control advocates such 
as the British biologist John Boyd Orr and the Indian demographer Sripati Chandrasekhar, 
Bashford’s broad analysis demonstrates that the nutritional and agricultural sciences grew 
up through the mid-twentieth century in direct conversation with the politics of population 
control. My dissertation draws upon Bashford’s analysis to investigate these intimate 
connections further, revealing the extent to which scientific thinking on soil and plant 
fertility in India emerged alongside concerns over nutritional quality and bodily health. 
Tracking these broad social and scientific changes in the context of decolonization 
and an emerging international development discourse also requires a brief examination of 
the concept of a ‘Green Revolution,’ assessing its place within the historical narrative. Raj 
Patel has rightly critiqued the Green Revolution’s social and environmental consequences, 
proposing a useful notion of the ‘Long Green Revolution’ that spans the twentieth 
century.41 That said, Patel’s analysis does not delve deeply into the local contexts and 
histories in which the policies and scientific research associated with the Green Revolution 
unfolded. Further, Patel leaves the door open for further examinations of the connections 
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between the science of agricultural development, rural extension, nutritional health, and 
population control programming in what might be termed a ‘broad’ Green Revolution. 
 If only to avoid contorting the analytical frame even further, I prefer to approach 
the Green Revolution as a rhetorical product of wider changes within scientific and social 
thinking during the twentieth century rather than a coherent event or a broad epoch. The 
term serves as a short-hand for both the scientific efforts directed at agricultural 
‘modernization’ during the 1940s and 1950s, as well as their material ramifications as they 
were deployed globally during the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, these efforts came 
in the context of wider work to initiate social and economic change through scientific 
intervention across the developing and decolonizing world, in particular. By examining 
agricultural development in isolation from broader concerns over postwar population 
growth, economic development and public health, scholars have inadvertently reinforced 
a misleading notion of the Green Revolution as an external, monolithic force that entered 
India exclusively in the service of Cold War interests. The term has thus been used to 
describe certain types of science originating from specific geographic locations. 
Consequently, the important historical context of decolonization in South Asia is lost, the 
relationship between science and international development is understated, and, most 
critically, the human consequences of a wide array of often-misguided social experiments 
go uninvestigated. 
PARTITION AND THE PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT  
In place of rigid temporal and thematic barriers, this dissertation assumes a long 
period of decolonization in South Asia, in which political, economic, and environmental 
change proceeded intermittently through the mid-twentieth century. At the same time, 
Partition, as a discrete event, played a powerful role in justifying later efforts by the 
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governments of India and Pakistan and international organizations to reorder populations 
in the new borderlands between India and the two wings of Pakistan. In seeking to 
understand how decolonization affected subsequent efforts in agricultural science and 
community development, this dissertation employs frameworks proposed by recent 
scholarship on Partition. Yasmin Khan’s work, for instance, tracks the bloody division of 
a “society only partially emerging from long years of war.”42 She shows that the memory 
and aftermath of the division of the subcontinent endured for decades, shaping the 
economic institutions and political priorities of South Asia for decades to come. Similarly, 
Vazira Zamindar makes use of the concept of a “long partition” to explore the enduring 
experience of decolonization and its wider ramifications for the families and communities 
directly affected by it.43 This notion proves particularly useful for understanding 
decolonization as the motivating force for the social and scientific interventions of the 
1950s and early 1960s. Indeed, many of the nutritional and agricultural experiments 
conducted by Indian institutions supported by international agencies and American 
philanthropic organizations took place in two of the states most directly affected by 
Partition and its aftermath: West Bengal and East Punjab. Further, the community 
development and rural extension initiatives that gathered momentum across India through 
the 1950s drew directly from the Ministry of Rehabilitation’s halting work in converting 
Partition’s refugees into farmers. In these ways, Partition’s aftermath had lasting, durable 
effects upon rural India, providing an impetus for both central government and 
international organizations to attempt a broad reorganization of agricultural production 
and, by extension, village life. 
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A transnational analysis is critical in interpreting the related phenomena of Indian 
nationalism, decolonization, and the emergence of the ideas that shaped independent South 
Asia’s political economy. This approach builds upon political scientist Srirupa Roy’s 
model for comprehending Indian nationalism’s consolidation behind a program of national 
development following independence.44 Roy shows that independent India fashioned its 
national identity by pulling together seemingly disparate ideas and institutions derived 
from societies beyond the subcontinent. This understanding of India’s emerging 
postcolonial political identity is useful to my analysis of the scientific and economic ideas 
prevalent within efforts to reshape rural India through the 1950s. Manu Goswami’s 2004 
work, Producing India, also influences my examination of how postcolonial notions of 
development in South Asia took shape in a broadly transnational context while 
simultaneously constructing a distinctly national space.45 If Indian nationalism generated 
an economic space distinct from a transnational context, then perhaps the same holds true 
for postcolonial thinking on agricultural development, population regulation, and 
nutritional welfare that emerged during the late 1940s and 1950s.  
Along those lines, Partition and its aftermath created an impetus for the rural 
rehabilitation and community development initiatives that would be supported by the Ford 
Foundation and the United States Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) through 
the 1950s. Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya have shown that post-Partition 
rehabilitation played a vital role in reshaping rural East Punjab — territory that today 
constitutes much of the state of Haryana. They argue that this restructuring of rural society 
contributed in part to the substantial wheat production increases of the ‘Green Revolution’ 
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of the late 1960s and 1970s.46 Earlier work by Kudaisya meticulously charts the economic 
reconfiguration of East Punjab’s agricultural sector in the aftermath of Partition.47 The 
significant role played by American philanthropic organizations in this restructuring, 
however, remains unclear. In the context of West Bengal, Joya Chatterji has also shown 
how the post-Partition plan of rehabilitation generated unrest and mistrust through the state 
government’s sluggish and inequitable resettlement efforts. Her work reveals that the 
Indian state coordinated with United Nations agencies to find the causes of ‘social tensions’ 
among West Bengal’s Hindu refugees. Such inquiries framed refugees as subjects of social 
scientific investigation, justifying state and philanthropic efforts not merely to resettle, but 
to integrate these displaced peoples into a national community development program.48 A 
very similar pattern can be observed in the experience of East Punjab and efforts supported 
by the Ford Foundation to organize refugee townships into model villages in a broader 
community development program. 
More recently, Nicole Sackley and Daniel Immerwahr have shown that community 
development emerged as a contentious global movement of communitarian organizing, 
rural extension, and democratic empowerment from the 1930s through 1960s.49 It 
represented a widely-replicated model of local-level interventions informed by social 
scientific inquiry, at times influenced by the Cold War priorities of the United States, and 
championed by a small cohort of international agencies and American philanthropic 
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organizations, including the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. While vividly 
demonstrating the global dimensions of the community development movement, this work 
has done less to explore its relationship to local post-Partition rehabilitation efforts, 
situating such projects in the specific local context of decolonization. In this dissertation, I 
show that community development and rural extension programming emerged and gained 
traction within India as a means of addressing specific local crises, including the aftermath 
of the Bengal Famine and Partition. These local contexts do not detract from the global 
nature of efforts to reshape village life and rural society, but rather show that specific 
historical circumstances enabled their broad acceptance. In turn, the doctrines of 
development generated through such interventions show that the local experience of 
decolonization played an influential role in shaping the long-term agendas of global 
agencies.  
THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF DEVELOPMENT EXPERTISE 
The era of decolonization that followed the Second World War saw the notion of a 
‘developing world’ enter academic and official parlance as American philanthropic 
organizations and international agencies initiated their first interventions across Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. I attempt to situate postwar efforts in agricultural development 
and population regulation in South Asia in the context of the scientific and economic 
expertise the postwar world inherited from collapsing colonial regimes. As the postwar 
international order took shape, older colonial development concerns helped to inform 
evolving notions of development. As Samantha Iyer argues: 
Because scholars have either failed or refused to connect American development 
theory to colonial precedents, we get the impression that they emerged 
independently as a simple matter of course, during the era of decolonization, from 
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the shared belief that history is progressive or certain peoples are more civilized 
than others.50 
In this way, the theories and practices underpinning British colonial development and 
science policies in South Asia through first half of the twentieth century informed their 
postcolonial successors. Indeed, as this dissertation shows, many of the colonial scientists 
and physicians involved in the agricultural and nutritional research efforts of the British 
Raj assumed influential roles within the new international organizations of the postwar 
world.  
These former colonial scientists and experts — both Indian and British — worked 
alongside representatives of American philanthropic organizations. In their work around 
the globe, the American representatives of these foundations developed their own political 
ethos in the aftermath of the Second World War and into the early years of the Cold War. 
Inevitably, experts who had built their careers as colonial civil servants or as scientists 
deeply involved in the nationalist cause encountered the “organization men” of the small 
world of American philanthropy. As Sackley observes:  
Field representatives shared with foundation leaders the reflexive anti-
Communism and faith in science and expertise that was pervasive among US 
liberals in the mid-twentieth century. Long-term association with a particular 
foundation encouraged an "organization man" ethos, in which foundation officers, 
cycling between New York and field assignments, became inculcated in the 
practices and terminology of their philanthropy.51 
Among this varied collection of ascendant international development experts and 
philanthropists, postwar debates over rural development and global health picked up 
colonial concerns over agricultural productivity and human fertility where they had been 
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left off. As Subir Sinha terms it, the rising ‘developmentalist state’ that such experts 
supported in their work, itself represented an ideal of progress to be achieved through 
political reform, economic reorganization, and the deployment of new technologies across 
industry and agriculture.52 Through the 1950s and 1960s, development discourse also 
enabled postcolonial nation-states to exert economic power and establish political clout. 
As Sugata Bose argues, “Planning for development enabled the postcolonial state to ‘claim 
its legitimacy’ as an embodiment of the ‘will of the nation.’ It was in its ‘legitimising role’ 
that the idiom of planning for national development ‘was to become an instrument of 
politics.’”53 Considering independent India’s rapid move to launch infrastructural and 
agricultural development projects following Partition, Bose argues that development 
served Nehru’s governing Congress Party as a means by which it could deliver on the 
public welfare provision promises asserted during the nationalist struggle.54 This notion of 
employing development to establish legitimacy is useful in understanding why independent 
India launched the wide variety of rural development projects it did through the 1950s. My 
work shows that India’s collaborations with international agencies and philanthropic 
organizations over the same period served much the same purpose, enabling the new state 
both to provide for and police its population.  
Much like the colonial regime that preceded it, the developmentalist state deployed 
power in highly bureaucratic ways, helping to formulate a global discourse of international 
development. Considering the emergence of international development in the wake of the 
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Second World War, Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard identify the central 
assumptions of the discourse: 
It is possible to discern a wide—but far from universal—set of operating 
assumptions considered to constitute a ‘development orthodoxy’: that of foreign 
aid investment on favorable terms, the transfer of knowledge of production 
techniques, measures to promote health and education, and economic planning 
would lead impoverished countries to be able to become “normal” market 
economies.55     
Efforts in rural development, population management, and public health by international 
agencies and American philanthropic organizations operating across South Asia after 1947 
can be comfortably situated within this description. With the objective of stimulating 
economic production, colonial development programs and the independent development 
regimes that succeeded them tended to bring centralized power together with scientific 
resources to accomplish their goals of increased productivity. Collaborations with 
philanthropic organizations and international agencies enabled postcolonial states to 
contribute to ‘development orthodoxy’ as they projected power through increasingly 
sophisticated scientific, educational, and public health apparatuses.  
This dissertation shows that through development’s emphasis on amplifying the 
productive capacity of agriculture, postwar international agencies and philanthropic 
organizations affected millions of lives through collaborations with the new nation-states 
of South Asia. For example, the broad community development and rural extension 
programs launched by the Government of India in conjunction with the Ford Foundation 
and the TCA reveal how ‘transnational development regime,’ as Sinha describes it, 
expanded rapidly across India after Partition.56 Sinha’s work further tracks the lineage of 
this global development discourse — including the institutions, practices, and assumptions 
                                                
55 Cooper and Packard,  2. 
56 Sinha, 57-58. 
 29 
of modern international development — to the earlier rural reconstruction projects of 
Indian nationalists, British colonial officials, and American planners alike. Similarly, my 
work shows that rehabilitation projects in East Punjab and West Bengal, and the national 
community development program they inspired, greatly extended this transnational 
development regime. In this way, I build upon Sinha’s definition of this transnational mode 
of development, showing that community development and rural extension projects across 
India enabled the exchange of information and best practices in agricultural development. 
The community development program that emerged in India in the 1950s definitively 
influenced and shaped an emerging body of development expertise on issues ranging from 
rural education and village governance to family planning and nutritional health. 
NUTRITION IN COLONIAL MEDICINE AND INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
Visions of the colonial past and the immediate experience of the Bengal Famine of 
1943-44 motivated independent India’s planning efforts in securing an abundant future. In 
part a product of recalcitrant imperial administrations and extractive economic policies, 
famine rolled through colonial South Asia on a nearly regular basis from the famous Great 
Bengal Famine of 1770 onward.57 Between 1876 and 1878, monsoon failures triggered a 
collapse of Indian’s agricultural markets. Mass starvation ensued, sweeping Bengal, the 
Madras Presidency, the Central Provinces, and the Northwestern-Provinces, leaving over 
five million dead.58 Twenty years later, at least another five million would die in a string 
of climate-related famines that punctuated the century in the Central Provinces, Berar, and 
much of the Bombay Presidency.59 As Ira Klein argues of the ambivalence of the British 
colonial administration toward the major famines that swept India during the 1870s and 
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1890s: “Millions of lives were sacrificed in the nineteenth century because the pull of 
humanitarianism on the government and the elites was not so strong as the claims of 
Malthusianism and social Darwinism.”60 Indeed, British laissez-faire orthodoxy 
compounded these crises, leaving the price of food grains unregulated and subject to 
speculation. As this dissertation shows, Malthusian concerns persisted with vigor into the 
twentieth century, merging seamlessly with the “humanitarianism” of the population 
control efforts of the 1950s and 1960s.  
As Amartya Sen and others have shown, the famine that devastated Bengal between 
the summers of 1943 and 1944 cannot be adequately described as a strict food shortage nor 
can it be attributed exclusively to wartime disruptions.    Much as the Famine Inquiry 
Commission suggested in 1945, it originated from long-running social and economic 
inequalities and the dominance of an inflexible, unresponsive colonial regime.61 The 
famine was, at once, a public health crisis and a broader social crisis. Along with famine, 
epidemic diseases including malaria, cholera, and small pox ravaged the eastern Indian 
provinces. In conjunction with disease, the deprivations and diasporas of war further 
strained the beleaguered agricultural region and its urban centers of Calcutta, Dacca, and 
Chittagong, and contributed to the initial grain shortages following the Japanese invasion 
of Burma.62 Madhusra Mukherjee argues that the British Empire, along with the economic 
and political reasoning that guided it, played a deadly role in the crisis that swept Bengal. 
In a similar vein, this dissertation inspects contemporary interpretations of the famine, 
showing that British and Indian understandings of its causes drove late colonial and post-
                                                
60 Ira Klein, "When the Rains Failed: Famine, Relief, and Mortality in British India," Indian Economic 
Social History Review 21, no. 2 (1984): 189-190. 
61 Sen, 215-216. 
62 Paul R. Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-1944 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), viii.  
 31 
independence development initiatives, including the Grow More Food campaign and the 
interconnected rehabilitation and community development initiatives of independent India. 
To that end, I examine how, in the wake of the Bengal Famine, Indian nationalists, 
American humanitarians, and even a few prominent British scientists argued for a more 
serious state-led engagement of nutritional health and agricultural development in South 
Asia. I show that this new impetus for establishing India’s self-sufficiency in food 
production played an important role in motivating independent India to launch projects of 
rural extension, population management, and agricultural development after 1947. It also 
drew the new Indian government into close relationships with American philanthropic 
organizations and international agencies promising financial and technological assistance. 
This dissertation also seeks to inform discussions regarding the emergence of the 
nutritional sciences as a discrete field of inquiry and the rise of hunger as a concern of the 
welfare state. To that end, I employ James Vernon’s notion of the “humanitarian discovery” 
of hunger in Britain to understand a parallel realization by Indian and British colonial 
scientists in the 1920s and 1930s.63 Vernon shows that around the turn of the century, 
nutrition, or dietetics as it was then known, “attracted greater attention, as researchers 
investigated the nexus between health, economy, and productivity.”64 I show that a very 
similar range of concerns motivated nutritional scientists working in India during the late 
colonial period and well into the 1960s. This focus on the relationships between nutritional 
health and poverty would generate tensions between nutritionists and agricultural scientists 
as they worked to remedy the chief causes of hunger in India. Following the First World 
War, developments in laboratory and clinical research pushed the emerging nutritional 
sciences toward an explicit investigation of calorie absorption and vitamin deficiency. 
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While less situated in the racial and gender-based categories that defined the thought of 
earlier generations of scientists, the emerging nutritional sciences nonetheless sought to 
categorize and classify populations. As Michael Worboys argues of the emergence of the 
nutritional sciences within the British Empire during the interwar years: “Rooted in the 
basic sciences of physiology and biochemistry, nutritional science allowed a common 
approach to problems worldwide, which subjects like tropical medicine and tropical 
agriculture had previously denied.”65 Evolving rapidly in the interwar years, the nutritional 
sciences spanned a prominent divide between public health concerns and the agricultural 
sciences.  
Similarly, David Arnold observes that, through the 1920s and 1930s, colonial 
demographers and scientists expressed concerns regarding the gap between India’s 
population growth and its food production capacity.66 While skeptical of the notion that the 
colonial state became aware of malnutrition as an object of medical study only late in the 
imperial game, Arnold shows that the nutritional sciences matured on a global level during 
the interwar years.67 Indeed, as Kenneth J. Carpenter has shown, rapid developments in the 
identification of vitamins inspired scientific explorations of deficiency diseases like 
pellagra, scurvy, and rickets across Europe, the Americas, and, subsequently, Asia.68 
Owing to advances in biochemical laboratory analysis and nutritional survey 
methodologies in Europe and the United States, as well as the widening recruitment of 
nutritional scientists around the globe, the 1930s came to be known by later nutritionists as 
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“the golden age of nutrition.”69  Further, as Sunil Amrith argues, “Although the nutritional 
thought of the 1930s touched upon concerns about India’s growing population, the 
emphasis on nutrition and sanitation worked, in many cases, against the popular claims of 
eugenicists.”70 The nutritional sciences thus placed great emphasis upon the resolvable 
nature of diseases of deficiency and departed from racialized notions of martial fitness and 
physique. My dissertation expands upon the analyses undertaken by Arnold, Carpenter, 
and Amrith, showing that the rise of the colonial era nutritional sciences continued through 
Partition, helping to set the agendas of international health agencies like the FAO and the 
WHO. I argue that the nutritional sciences in South Asia placed public health concerns into 
conversation with rising fears of overpopulation through the 1940s and 1950s. In this way, 
nutritional scientists would inform the priorities of the independent Indian state and help 
craft the agendas of international organizations like the FAO and the WHO following the 
Second World War. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Looking ahead, this dissertation unfolds as follows: The first chapter, “Confronting 
the ‘Double Crisis’,” tracks the impetus for increased food production in South Asia as it 
drew upon the work of agricultural scientists and physicians in the late colonial period. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the emerging nutritional sciences and a rising doctrine of 
social intervention in rural communities would influence the agendas of the philanthropic 
and new international organizations entering India after the Second World War. To show 
this influence, I present the narratives of agricultural scientists and rural extension experts 
at work in late colonial India, including Presbyterian missionary Sam Higginbottom, 
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agronomists Albert and Gabrielle Howard, and physicians Robert McCarrison and W. R. 
Aykroyd. I show that, well before formally launching an agriculture program in India in 
1956, the Rockefeller Foundation experimented with rural extension by supporting the 
work of the missionary Higginbottom at Allahabad during the interwar years. Similarly, 
the American foundation supported investigations into malnutrition and deficiency 
diseases undertaken by McCarrison and Aykroyd in the Madras Presidency. In turn, late 
colonial ideas regarding the causes of famine and malnutrition directly informed later 
efforts to energize South Asia’s food economy through rural extension training and 
agricultural education programs. Following the Bengal Famine of 1943-44 and Partition in 
1947, fears of overpopulation and food shortage played a powerful role in driving efforts 
to reshape Indian agriculture. The urgency of this “double crisis” of food shortage and 
population growth, as the British writer Aldous Huxley termed it, justified the efforts of 
the Rockefeller and Ford foundations and the agencies of the United Nations in their first 
development initiatives across South Asia during the 1950s.71 
In the next chapter, “A Road to New India,” I show that independent India’s 
community development initiatives of the 1950s emerged in significant ways from the 
immediate imperatives of post-Partition refugee rehabilitation. Building upon the example 
of the state-funded rehabilitation township of Nilokheri launched by S. K. Dey in East 
Punjab, along with a handful of other colonial-era models, the Ford Foundation and the 
TCA worked closely with the Government of India to launch nationwide community 
development and rural extension initiatives. The extension and training programs 
organized by the Allahabad Agricultural Institute under the direction of Arthur T. Mosher, 
for instance, helped to expand the reach of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations across 
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rural India in the quest to reorder the countryside and regulate the population. Pursuing 
such goals, the Government of India organized rural extension training programs that 
would take urban, college-educated Indians and convert them into village-level workers. 
Financed and lauded by American philanthropic organizations and international agencies 
alike, these ambitious programs of the 1950s show that the quest to address the ‘double 
crisis’ of overpopulation and food shortage went far beyond India’s nutrition laboratories 
and agricultural experiment stations, pursuing broad social interventions across the 
subcontinent. At the same time, the community development methods tested at Nilokheri 
and refined in the rural extension training programs of the TCA and Ford Foundation failed 
to engage women effectively, drawing official scorn for neglecting half of India’s rural 
population. Further, the bureaucratic heft of the new Ministry of Community Development 
complicated matters into the early 1960s. As community development programming 
repeatedly failed to deliver promised increases in food production, American philanthropic 
organizations and the Government of India concluded that direct funding for innovations 
in the agricultural and nutritional sciences would prove a more effective investment.  
 “Nourishing the Body,” the third chapter, examines laboratory and clinical 
research that enabled a survey of the nutritional value of common foods in India. In taking 
laboratory methods into clinics and villages, this research conducted by Indian scientists 
and the FAO during the 1950s tracked the effects of privation upon the human body. I 
argue that this research reflected an intersection between the concerns of development 
economics and the nutritional sciences. In turn, it marked the beginning of an international 
food security discourse that has persisted for over half a century. This chapter also 
examines how investments made in South Asia by the Rockefeller Foundation and the FAO 
following the Second World War redirected and amplified the capacity of the nutritional 
sciences, particularly as funding poured in for the work of the All-India Institute of Hygiene 
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and Public Health and the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor and Hyderabad. The 
subsequent exchange of scientific knowledge and expertise profoundly shaped the global 
health priorities of both Rockefeller and the FAO, enabling the formation of an 
international network for the sharing of the fruits of research in the nutritional sciences. 
Into the early 1960s, nutritionists and agricultural scientists became increasingly engaged 
with one another’s research agendas. The research program laid out by late colonial 
nutritional scientists would both reflect and resist the priorities of the production-focused 
brand of agricultural science advanced by the Rockefeller and Ford foundations through 
the 1950s and 1960s. Just as nutrition researchers approached vulnerable populations as 
their test subjects in postwar Europe and the Americas, FAO and Rockefeller-backed 
scientists in India pursued investigations into childhood and maternal nutrition, as well as 
the dietary needs of agricultural laborers and the rural poor.  
The fourth chapter, “Into the Fertile Future,” engages post-independence debates 
over the relation between agricultural production and population control. It also frames this 
discussion within the eugenic thinking of the 1920s and 1930s and the perceived global 
population crisis of the 1950s. It shows that Indian and American scientists associated with 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Population Council connected notions of seed and soil 
fertility to wider concerns of overpopulation as they advanced down the road to the Green 
Revolution. Eugenic ideas of fertility regulation played an important role within the 
planning efforts of the agricultural scientists of the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
physicians of the Population Council as their operations in India commenced in the 1950s. 
Rockefeller’s new Indian Agricultural Program (IAP), launched in 1956, immediately 
began work on improving South Asia’s seed stocks in maize and sorghum and invested in 
the hybridization of American and Asian grain varieties to promote better growth. In turn, 
rural extension work and nutritional research assumed subsidiary roles within efforts to 
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improve South Asian grain yields and to restrict human fertility. Tensions subsequently 
emerged between these sciences, as well between scientists and administrators countering 
a perceived dual crisis of food shortage and overpopulation. Rockefeller’s top officials and 
strategists, interpreted India’s ascendant community development and rural extension 
initiatives with skepticism. In their view, neither food shortage nor overpopulation could 
be satisfactorily addressed through complex and often expensive social restructuring 
programs. Only unprecedented innovations in the agricultural sciences could provide the 
tools necessary to rectify the underlying imbalance between population growth and food 
production. Yet, Rockefeller-funded organizations pursued social interventions of a 
different, more invasive sort into the early 1960s. The new emphasis on the agricultural 
sciences in India represented a social experiment itself, transplanting the model that had 
successfully increased Mexican grain yields into a much larger national context. Further, 
the Population Council supported projects aimed at rural fertility restriction, but 
camouflaged as simple demographic research. This chapter shows that in both cases, the 
Population Council and the Rockefeller Foundation worked closely with Indian scientific 
institutions and the Government of India to pursue two rural agendas influenced by eugenic 
thinking — one to restrict human fertility, the other to augment the fertility of crop plants. 
The fifth chapter, “Pursuing Permanent Growth,” examines efforts undertaken by 
the Government of India, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the World Bank to cement 
structural changes within the agricultural sector. First, it examines hydro-politics in post-
Partition Punjab through the Indo-Pakistani water resource disputes of the 1950s and the 
negotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 by the World Bank. I argue that World 
Bank economists and hydrological experts focused their efforts on creating a permanent 
settlement of water rights in the Indus River Basin focused upon the prospect of restoring 
and increasing the region’s agricultural productivity. As such, their work involved 
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investigations of the soil quality of the divided Punjab and whether the region’s farmlands 
were exhausted and hence, infertile. These concerns played a central role in the 
negotiations between India and Pakistan that resulted in the final treaty, which has now 
governed water rights between the two nations for over half a century. Just as World Bank 
officials attended to the productivity of north India’s farmlands, the Rockefeller 
Foundation collaborated with the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) in 
promoting the expanded use of chemical fertilizers by cultivators. Working the IARI, the 
Rockefeller Foundation invested in tests of high-yielding wheat varieties at experiment 
stations across Punjab. At the same time, the foundation also assumed a powerful role in 
its work with the IARI and advocated vigorously for the establishment of graduate 
programs in the agricultural sciences, most notably the Punjab Agricultural University in 
Ludhiana. These institutions established on the model of the land-grant universities of the 
United States generated successive cohorts of agricultural experts to attend to the demands 
of modernized and capital-intensive farming for decades to come. In this way, these global 
institutions coordinated with the Indian and Pakistani states to create a permanent system 
governing the water supply, reverse the ravages of soil exhaustion, and ensure that 
increases in the productivity — and profitability — of Indian agriculture would be 
permanently sustained. Only after the inauguration of these efforts in radically 
restructuring South Asia’s agricultural economy did the Rockefeller Foundation’s IAP 
begin dedicated efforts to improve the yields of the most widely-consumed food grains 
across the subcontinent: wheat and rice.  
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Chapter One: Confronting the ‘Double Crisis’ 
Less than three years after Partition, Dr. Wallace Ruddell Aykroyd introduced 
himself to a national audience in a broadcast carried by All India Radio on March 8, 1950. 
As head of the new nutritional division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), the fifty-year-old Anglo-Irish scientist described his long 
professional connection to India. From 1935 to 1945, he had directed the Nutrition 
Research Laboratories at Coonoor. Aykroyd also noted that he had helped to prepare the 
final report of the commission that investigated the Bengal Famine of 1943-44 that had left 
upwards of three million dead. His work on that report, he added, resulted in measures for 
improving nutritional standards throughout India. With his listeners across the 
subcontinent now apprised of his credentials, Aykroyd addressed the related problems of 
food shortage and malnutrition facing the young nation and much of Asia: 
It is in South and East Asia that such problems are most formidable. They differ, 
of course, from country to country. In India and China, for example, the question 
of obtaining enough food to meet the needs of the population is of primary 
importance. “Enough food” takes precedence over the “right kind of food.”72 
Critiquing the disconnect between efforts to produce more food and policies to improve 
nutritional health, Aykroyd further emphasized that deficient diets caused by food 
shortages contributed directly to persistent malnutrition. By the same token, improvements 
within the nutritional sciences could enable nations to maximize limited food supplies. Yet 
only by enlarging food supplies could independent India truly escape the lingering specter 
of famine. As Aykroyd observed: “That can be achieved only through such means as 
extended irrigation, the greater use of fertilizers, the introduction of high-yielding strains, 
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the elimination of pests and parasites, and numerous other methods.”73 He stressed, 
however, that there was reason to believe that India could accomplish that goal. 
Aykroyd explained that, in the chaos of the Second World War, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) had risen to coordinate global 
efforts to combat malnutrition and disease on multiple fronts. To that end, the FAO and 
other UN agencies would train regional specialists to attack the problem of hunger at the 
local level. Formed in 1943 at an international conference of economists, scientists, and 
diplomats at Hot Springs, Virginia, the FAO built upon the expertise and institutional 
framework developed by the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA).74 Under the 
leadership of reputed British physician John Boyd Orr, a detailed mapping of the world 
food situation had formed its initial task.75 Now, in the midst of the first wave of 
decolonization, Aykroyd told his Indian radio listeners that the recently-launched U.S. 
Technical Assistance Program would expand the FAO’s work into nutritional and 
agricultural research and training.76 Familiarly known as the Point Four Program owing to 
its roots in U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, this ambitious though 
amorphous American initiative offered scientific funding and technical expertise “for the 
improvement and growth of the underdeveloped areas.”77 Coming in the early years of the 
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Cold War, the Point Four Program also paved the way for American philanthropies to 
launch their own public health and agricultural development projects across Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia.78 It remained to be seen exactly how the populations of new nations like 
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon would fare under these broad new plans to improve the human 
condition. 
This chapter tracks the impetus for increased food production in India as it evolved 
from the work of agricultural scientists and physicians in the late colonial period to shape 
the agendas of the philanthropic organizations and new international agencies that entered 
India following the Second World War. As will be shown here, the American philanthropic 
push to expand South Asia’s food supply emerged from late colonial ideas regarding the 
causes of famine and malnutrition, as well as the efforts of Christian missionaries and 
imperial economic botanists to reshape agricultural and nutritional education and research 
across South Asia. Following the Second World War, these efforts intersected with rising 
fears of overpopulation in the decolonizing world. The urgency of this double crisis of food 
shortage and population growth, along with tensions between the nutritional and 
agricultural sciences, framed the efforts of the Rockefeller and Ford foundations and the 
agencies of the United Nations in their initial development interventions across the 
subcontinent. 
OF MISSIONARIES AND MILLIONAIRES 
Born in Manchester, England on October 27, 1874, Sam Higginbottom saw his 
family slip from relative prosperity to the brink of poverty before he had reached 
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adolescence.79 This early experience of hardship pushed him toward the Christian notion 
of becoming “a living sacrifice” for God and kindled a deep interest in the teachings of 
American evangelist Dwight Moody who preached across the British Isles during the 
1890s. By August 1894, the nineteen-year-old Higginbottom had scrounged up enough 
money to sail for Boston from Liverpool to enroll at Moody’s Mount Hermon School in 
Northfield, Massachusetts.80 The young Englishman’s time at Mount Hermon sent him 
down a path toward scholarships at Amherst and Princeton, where he considered joining 
the seminary and studied jurisprudence under Woodrow Wilson, all the while working with 
the Board of Foreign Missionaries of the Presbyterian Church.81 Through that organization, 
Higginbottom developed a close relationship with Lindus Cody of the Gospel Church of 
Cleveland, Ohio. Cody possessed both the Christian zeal and the small fortune needed to 
send the twenty-eight-year-old Princeton graduate abroad as a missionary to British India 
in 1903.82  
Upon arrival in India, Higginbottom took up a placement as an instructor of 
economics and biology at the Presbyterian Mission’s new Allahabad Christian College. 
Though still ambitious to work directly in converting the people of India to Christianity, 
he reluctantly accepted his teaching assignment as the will of God. Two years later, 
Higginbottom was joined by his patron’s daughter Ethelind Cody, whom he married. 
Around the same time, he developed an interest in the agricultural economy of the 
surrounding countryside of the United Provinces and determined that inadequate training 
in the agricultural sciences kept farmers’ yields low and the potential for famine high. He 
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was frustrated that neither the Government of India nor the Christian missions seemed 
dedicated to improving agricultural methods. As Higginbottom concluded:  
In view of the present condition in India and the great need for more food and 
education, surely, if Government and missions are justified in carrying on any 
kind of education, establishing that kind of education which most directly meets 
the needs of the great majority of the people of India.83 
To that end, Higginbottom would work over the next two decades to develop an 
independent Department of Agriculture at the Allahabad Christian College, focused on 
training both Indian farmers and European and American missionaries in scientific farming 
methods.84 To support his project, he returned to the United States periodically, completing 
his training in agricultural science at Ohio State University in 1909. During his stay in the 
United States, the crisply-dressed Higginbottom spoke to congregations and audiences 
about his Presbyterian mission work and his plans for reshaping Indian agriculture. More 
importantly, he also began to lobby American philanthropies and Christian organizations 
for donations through the 1910s, amassing more than $100,000 for his missionary work in 
Indian agriculture.85  
Chief among the targets of Higginbottom’s persistent and effective solicitation was 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., chair of the Rockefeller Foundation established in 1913 with an 
endowment from his father’s Standard Oil fortune.86 In addition to a fortune, the younger 
Rockefeller had also inherited his father’s religiosity, with both active members of the 
Northern Baptist Church throughout their lives.87 In the United States, Europe, and China, 
the early Rockefeller Foundation focused on funding medical research and public health 
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intervention. That said, a subsidiary organization, the General Education Board (GEB), 
operated across the American South under the initial leadership of Seaman Asahel Knapp 
who championed farm demonstration methods to relay new developments in agricultural 
science to farmers.88    Though active in preventive work on hookworm disease and malaria 
in India from 1920 onward, the Rockefeller Foundation would not establish a permanent 
office in New Delhi until 1935 and, even then, its focus remained exclusively on medicine 
and public health. By and large, the foundation operated as a grant-making institution for 
public health institutions in India prior to Britain’s withdrawal in 1947.89 Beginning in 
1915, however, the missionary Higginbottom’s contact with the Rockefeller Foundation 
would inform its assumptions about and frame its later interventions in Indian agriculture.  
Higginbottom’s long correspondence with John D. Rockefeller, Jr., for instance, set 
the stage for the foundation’s first abortive foray into the agricultural sciences in India in 
early 1915. Submitting a grant request to the Rockefeller Foundation for a demonstration 
farm adjacent to the recently-renamed Ewing Christian College, Higginbottom’s proposed 
experiment in agricultural education would involve “teaching scientific, modern farming 
as a missionary method.”90 In particular, his newly-formed Department of Agriculture, an 
independently-managed offshoot of the main missionary college, would take the “very 
poor and difficult to cultivate land” on the hills above the Yamuna River and convert it into 
a productive example of Western agricultural methods.91 For the missionary Higginbottom, 
the infertile soil there would help to underscore exactly what American tractors, fertilizers, 
and seed varieties could do for Indian fields. Further, the proximity of the demonstration 
farm to the site of the Kumbh Mela pilgrimage at the confluence of the Yamuna and the 
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Ganges would help to transmit the image of the productive farmlands to millions of Hindu 
pilgrims.92  
In his correspondence, Higginbottom enthusiastically told representatives of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the GEB that he took the work of the latter institution as the 
inspiration for his emerging farm demonstration project at Allahabad. Indeed, 
Higginbottom wrote to Wallace Buttrick, the secretary of the GEB in New York, in 
November 1915, to say that he was “praying that the day may soon come when you can 
send a man like Dr. [Seaman] Knapp to us to investigate and work out for India in similar 
fashion to what was done in the Southern United States.”93 He further explained that he 
had shared the reports of the GEB with British officials in the United Provinces who were 
supportive of his blend of missionary work and agricultural development. As he wrote: 
“When the British official in charge of the district […] read of what had been done in the 
southern states of America by the Rockefeller Foundation […] he arranged that every 
school should have a fenced-in school garden.”94 Through 1915, Buttrick received similar 
reports from Higginbottom, sharing many of the missionary’s letters with an interested 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. For his part, Rockefeller told Buttrick that he was impressed with 
the broad impact of the reports of the GEB, reaching as far as Higginbottom’s mission in 
Allahabad.95  
Despite Higginbottom’s enthusiasm for the GEB’s work and his own ambitious 
agricultural research institution taking shape in the hills outside Allahabad, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s board of trustees declined to fund Higginbottom’s application on May 26, 
                                                
92 Ibid., 61. 
93 Sam Higginbottom to Wallace Buttrick, November 29, 1915, Folder 2014, Box 209, Subseries 1.2, 
Series 01, General Education Board Records (GEB), RAC. 
94 Ibid. 
95 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to Wallace Buttrick, May 6, 1915, Folder 2014, Box 209, Subseries 1.2, Series 
01, General Education Board Records (GEB), RAC. 
 46 
1915. This rejection came, however, with a caveat. The board resolved to “keep in view 
the close relation between the agricultural, industrial, educational, and health betterment of 
the tropical countries” and maintain regular correspondence with Higginbottom in 
Allahabad.96 This seemingly preferential treatment on the part of the Rockefeller 
Foundation would enable Higginbottom to sustain the interest, if not the direct investment, 
of the organization over the course of two decades. In this way, Higginbottom’s proposal 
had piqued the foundation’s philanthropic interest in Indian agriculture. Less than a year 
later, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. himself wrote to Higginbottom of the board’s plans for a 
survey of agricultural conditions in India to ascertain the “full knowledge of the facts.”97 
True to their promise, the board authorized a survey of the subcontinent’s agricultural and 
nutritional problems in June 1916, contingent upon the approval of British colonial 
officials.  
Organized by trustee Jerome D. Greene and Wickliffe Rose of the GEB, the survey 
committee would travel to India to investigate the potential for the “adaptation to India of 
general principles of agricultural demonstration.”98 Whether the Government of India 
would have consented to Rockefeller’s first inquiry into Indian agricultural conditions 
remains unclear as the foundation abruptly cancelled its plans in October 1916, owing to 
war conditions.99 Nevertheless, the proposal had planted Higginbottom and the recently-
rechristened Allahabad Agricultural Institute firmly on the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
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map.100 During the war and through the food emergency that swept India in its aftermath, 
Higginbottom regularly requested funds from the foundation to support his agricultural 
education programs, but did not receive formal support owing to Rockefeller’s focus on 
public health issues and continuing lack of an organizational structure in India.  
At the same time, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. met personally with Higginbottom at his 
New York office in 1920 and pledged $50,000 of his own money for the purchase of land 
and buildings in Allahabad for the expansion of the institute.101 In January 1921, 
Rockefeller revisited the possibility of adjusting his foundation’s work in India to 
accommodate agricultural research. The foundation’s secretary reported that 
Higginbottom’s requests over the past five years had centered on proposals to investigate 
higher crop yields at the Allahabad institute, to create a replicable model of farm 
demonstration work for India, and to support relief work in response to the “emergency 
situation created by the famine of 1918-19.”102 Once again, however, Rockefeller’s board 
of trustees hesitated to formally support Higginbottom’s work. This reluctance stemmed, 
not from the nature of Higginbottom’s missionary efforts or British opposition to such 
philanthropy, but rather from Rockefeller’s own concerns over diverting resources from its 
nascent public health initiatives in British India.103  
Despite his failure to convince the Rockefeller Foundation’s board to finance an 
immediate venture into Indian agriculture, Higginbottom continued to expand the 
Allahabad Agricultural Institute through the interwar years. He wrote and spoke 
extensively in the United States on what he believed to be the social causes of India’s low 
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levels of agricultural production. In 1938, for instance, he wrote an article in the Christian 
missionary journal, Women and Missions, elaborating upon the ways in which he believed 
caste had affected rural life. As he noted:  
The village woman in general has been ascribed a very lowly position. Today she 
is the personification of the inferiority complex. It is difficult to arouse her to a 
sense of her own worth and importance. Not one percent of the village women of 
India are literate. Yet this inferiority-complex-ridden woman, illiterate, slave to 
her fears and superstitions, passes on to her children what she has.104 
As such, Higginbottom noted that he had initiated a program at the Allahabad Agricultural 
Institute that focused on recruiting local Indians who had converted to Christianity to serve 
as liaisons to lower caste women, offering them courses in homemaking, sanitation, and 
nutrition. Patience was needed in converting these women into effective agents of change 
within their households, as “the village woman is as shy as a deer.”105 In addition to his 
attempts to address the plight of village women through instruction in homemaking, 
Higginbottom also challenged aspects of the caste system that he believed kept Indian 
farms inefficient. During a lecture at a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 
1942 in Quebec, for instance, the aging Higginbottom delivered a lively description of his 
efforts to push back against the caste system through the missionary zeal of the Allahabad 
Agricultural Institute. He argued that if Indian farmers were not “not handicapped by caste” 
then they could cultivate a wider variety of fruits and vegetables to supplement staple 
grains.106 Through a rejection of a caste structure, they could also make more effective use 
of waste and dramatically improve soil fertility. The caste-bound farmer also found himself 
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unable to “kill the pests which so greatly reduced his crop yields,” Higginbottom argued.107 
In these ways, Higginbottom frequently cited Indian society — especially caste and gender 
dynamics — as the chief culprit behind the perceived backwardness of South Asian 
agriculture. His argument implied that while scientific agricultural methods could go so far 
in improving rural welfare, only a wider embrace of Christianity could enable the social 
change he believed India truly needed.   
With Higginbottom’s devoted fundraising efforts across North America and 
Europe, occasional support from the Government of India, and an income drawn from 
consulting work for the Maharajah of Gwalior, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute evolved 
into a major center for agricultural education and farm demonstration during the interwar 
years.108 During that period, the institute continued the Ewing Christian School’s practice 
of training missionaries from Europe and the United States to be dispatched across the 
subcontinent, though with extensive training in agricultural practices in addition to their 
knowledge of scripture. In this way, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute remained first and 
foremost a Christian mission, with agricultural development work and rural extension 
serving the deeper purpose of evangelization. In 1933, the American agronomist Arthur T. 
Mosher arrived in Allahabad, fresh from a master’s degree in agricultural economics at the 
University of Iowa, though yet to complete his Ph.D. in economics at the University of 
Chicago under the supervision of economist Theodore Schultz.109 Through his work as a 
missionary and agronomic specialist at Allahabad during the 1930s and 1940s, Mosher 
would rise within the ranks of the institute to become its main representative to the 
Rockefeller and Ford foundations after the Second World War as both organizations would 
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provide the Allahabad Agricultural Institute with direct financial support. As 
Higginbottom’s successor at the helm of the Institute, Mosher would pioneer independent 
India’s rural extension program during the 1950s, advocating for a more social scientific 
approach to reengineering rural society in the quest for greater agricultural productivity.110 
As will be seen in the next chapter, however, the agricultural education agenda of the 
Allahabad Agricultural Institute would prove nearly inseparable from its original purpose 
as a Christian mission. 
A VAST UNDEVELOPED ESTATE 
Though unique in India for its missionary focus on reshaping agricultural education 
with demonstration farms and training, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute was not alone 
in its pursuit of greater food production and improved nutritional outcomes in late colonial 
India. The Government of India’s Board of Agriculture had commissioned a botanical 
survey of wheat varieties in the subcontinent in 1906, with the object of identifying 
varieties prime for improvement.   111 The survey helped to overturn the commonly-held 
scientific belief that Indian wheat varieties were of such poor quality that they were 
incapable of improvement. Through wheat research at the Imperial Agricultural Research 
Institute (IARI) at Pusa, Bihar, colonial botanists had identified the higher quality, high-
yield Pusa 12, Pusa 4, and Punjab 11 varieties by 1912.112 Once identified, the IARI worked 
to market these and other grain varieties to Indian farmers, emphasizing the need for 
varieties to be cultivated separately to increase yields.113   
Albert Howard helped to spearhead these efforts in the improvement of wheat and 
rice varieties at Pusa as Imperial Economic Botanist to the Government of India from 1905 
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to 1924. Born in Shropshire and educated at Cambridge, Howard worked with his wife, the 
plant physiologist Gabrielle Matthaei, to champion the early organic farming movement in 
India and Britain.114 From Pusa, Howard and Matthaei published separately and jointly on 
their research into identifying and breeding disease-resistant wheat and vegetable 
strains.115 A fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge, Matthaei worked extensively on 
crop improvement through over two decades at the IARI, co-authoring the comprehensive 
survey, The Development of Indian Agriculture, with her husband in 1927. In the book’s 
preface, Howard and Matthaei observed that their efforts to identify and reproduce high-
yield varieties of food grains and cash crops had been limited by colonial India’s 
fragmented agricultural institutions. Indian agriculture, they wrote, now stood at a 
crossroads: 
On the one hand, a great step forward is possible, provided the various 
independent departments working in the villages can be welded together into a 
single efficient agency, dealing with rural India as a whole. On the other hand, 
very modest progress can be achieved with the present means. It is for India to 
decide by which of these two roads she intends to travel.116 
For Matthaei and Howard, India represented “a vast undeveloped estate” in desperate need 
of a concerted program of rural reconstruction and mass agricultural education. Simple 
changes in the habits and methods of small cultivators advocated by such program could 
“at least double” Indian agricultural yields over the course of a few decades.117 To that end, 
the economic botanists detailed the demonstration and training work of the Rockefeller-
funded General Education Board (GEB) in the Southern United States as a model for South 
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Asia.118 Within India, beyond the work of the IARI, the British botanists specifically held 
up the work of Sam Higginbottom at Allahabad as a replicable model for agricultural 
experimentation and knowledge-sharing.119 Rather than lamenting the prospect of famine, 
Matthaei and Howard believed that the duplication of experimental stations like the ones 
at Pusa and Allahabad, the extension of efficient farming methods, and the simple 
coordination of agricultural education across the subcontinent could amplify the seed, soil, 
and organic farming research they had advocated for years.120  
Howard and Matthaei’s investigations into high-yield, nutritious crop varieties 
paralleled Robert McCarrison’s contemporaneous efforts in the nutritional sciences at 
Coonoor Research Laboratories in the Madras Presidency. Like Howard and Matthaei, 
McCarrison also helped to pioneer the early organic farming movement in India and 
Britain.121 After Gabrielle’s death in 1930 and his prompt marriage to Matthaei’s younger 
sister, Louise, Howard’s work through the 1930s and early 1940s focused on increasing 
crop yields through organic composting and improving soil fertility.122 By emphasizing 
soil quality and, by extension, the operations of the entire farming enterprise, Howard 
aimed to maximize the nutritional quality of food grains and vegetables.123 In much the 
same way, McCarrison gained influence within the organic farming movement through his 
work on identifying connections between soil quality, plant health, and the resulting 
nutritional value and vitamin content of foods.124 In a 1936 lecture delivered to the Royal 
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Society of Arts in London, McCarrison defined nutrition in relation to soil quality and 
farming methods: 
Impoverishment of the soil leads to a whole tram of evils: pasture of poor quality; 
poor quality of the stock raised upon it; poor quality of the foodstuffs they provide 
for man; poor quality of the vegetable foods that he cultivates for himself; and 
faulty nutrition with resultant disease in both man and beast.125 
In this way, farming methods and practices featured prominently in McCarrison’s 
evolving thoughts on nutrition. Beyond using nutritional science as a tool for disease 
prevention and offering a “new measure of the ‘value of food’,” as Sunil Amrith has 
suggested, McCarrison’s work traced nutrition back to soil health.126  This aspect of 
McCarrison’s thinking, in turn, represented a rising connection between nutritional science 
in its promotion of public health and agricultural science in its endeavor to increase food 
production. With a practical emphasis upon agricultural production and laboratory research 
into nutrition’s role in human health, McCarrison urged the Government of India in 1927 
to devote its attention to malnutrition as a major malady facing India’s population.127 In 
1935, fresh from his assignment as Health Secretary of the League of Nations, Wallace R. 
Aykroyd arrived in India to take the helm of the Coonoor Nutrition Research Laboratories 
upon McCarrison’s retirement.128 In light of his pioneering role at the League of Nations, 
the British Nutrition Foundation later dubbed him the “first international nutrition 
worker”.129 In his time at Coonoor, Aykroyd would expand upon McCarrison’s influential 
conception of malnutrition and clarify the critical connections between the nutritional and 
agricultural sciences. 
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While Howard and McCarrison worked to forge connections between agricultural 
improvement efforts and nutritional research, colonial science experienced a shift back to 
the Malthusian pessimism that had dominated official thinking on famine through the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Through the 1920s and 1930s, as David Arnold 
observes, colonial demographers and scientists expressed increasing concern regarding the 
gap between India’s population growth and its food production capacity.130 Indeed, even 
the usually optimistic Howard and Matthaei noted in familiar Malthusian terms that, “In 
many parts of the country the pressure of the population, both human and bovine, is intense 
and but for the high infant mortality and periodical waves of pestilence the position would 
become desperate.”131 Howard and Matthaei's concerns over the "pressure of the 
population" in India came just as the eugenics movement in North America was expressing 
similar concerns for the effect of growing populations upon the natural environment. As 
Alexandra Minna Stern has shown, eugenicists in the United States during the first decades 
of the twentieth century advocated for conservation and established overpopulation as a 
major threat not merely to humanity, but to the broader natural world. As she writes of 
these eugenicists:  
They turned toward neo-Malthusian arguments about zero population growth and 
pushed for immigration restriction and mandatory birth control, including the 
implementation of sterilization in less developed countries. Now the burden of 
saving nature was tied to the regulation of reproduction, child spacing and the 
adoption of the nuclear family model.132  
For imperial agricultural scientists like Howard and Matthaei, the apparent abundance of 
the opening decades of the twentieth century and reduced mortality rates in India might 
have been positive for human society, but such developments also threatened to upend the 
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natural balance upon which productive agriculture depended. These concerns over resource 
conservation that derived in part from eugenic thinking, would fuel emerging discussions 
of the prospect of family planning initiatives during the 1920s and 1930s.  
Meanwhile, W. R. Aykroyd, in his new role as director of the Nutrition Research 
Laboratories at Coonoor, also reflected upon the apparently fading legacy of famine in late 
colonial India and its implications for population growth rates. In an unpublished paper, he 
stressed the need for the Government of India to reform the Famine Code that governed 
relief policies in times of food crisis. In particular, he believed that the practice of requiring 
labor from famine victims in return for aid should be abolished because such work-for-aid 
schemes were inhumane and inevitably proved financially inefficient in any case. Though 
he emphasized that standards of living across India remained so low as to leave millions 
susceptible to malnutrition, he remained hopeful that progress had been made in protecting 
large swathes of the population from famine through improved living standards.133 As he 
wrote in 1941:  
The population […] appears to possess very scanty reserves to carry it through 
seasons of scarcity in which its resources are still further reduced. Nevertheless it 
may be that the present economic level of the people, low though it is, is higher 
than at any previous time in the history of India. There certainly appears to be 
some evidence that the power to resist famine conditions is increasing.134 
From this standpoint, the long-term implications of India’s advances in public health during 
the first decades of the twentieth century remained ambiguous for colonial scientists and 
physicians. Though India’s interwar population growth to some extent testified to effective 
public health policy, Arnold cites India’s population increase of 33 million in the decade 
following the First World War as “heralding the start of a Malthusian nightmare” for 
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colonial scientists across South Asia.135 This nightmare would become all too real 
following the start of the Second World War and the return of mass starvation to India in 
Bengal in 1943.136 
THE RETURN OF FAMINE AND WAR 
In the midst of India’s independence struggle and into the Second World War, 
scientific concerns regarding food shortage and overpopulation in South Asia continued to 
build. Wartime supply pressures and the Bengal Famine of 1943-1944 compounded these 
fears, paving the way for significant philanthropic investments in agricultural research and 
development in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Rockefeller Foundation officials nonetheless 
continued to agonize over their organization’s relationship with colonial India’s embattled 
regime. As Alan Gregg, the Harvard-trained physician who directed the foundation’s 
Medical Sciences Division, wrote in early 1941: 
I’ve wondered whether we as Americans could do much effective work in India 
until they have solved their relations with the British. […] Whenever the British 
control is turned over to the Indians we can enter and on a very large scale. Until 
then we are either pro British or anti British in Indian eyes on the old “he that is 
not for me is against me” basis.137 
Even in view of this tension over the lingering colonial administration, interest in 
expanding programming in India strengthened, particularly considering the turmoil in 
Europe and China, Rockefeller’s two principal regions of operation.138 Around the same 
time, Wilbur A. Sawyer, head of Rockefeller’s International Health Division, reinforced 
the foundation’s focus on hookworm disease and malaria control in South Asia.139  
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On August 21, 1941, Sawyer wrote to Dr. William P. Jacocks, the physician who 
had coordinated Rockefeller’s hookworm eradication efforts in Ceylon during the 1920s 
and who now sought to expand all areas of programming as regional director for South 
Asia in New Delhi. Sawyer stressed that Rockefeller’s attention in South Asia needed to 
remain limited to support of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS).140 Even 
with new resources being shifted into India from China, the foundation’s focus was to 
remain on medicine and public health. Despite his enthusiasm for expanding the 
foundation’s scientific efforts in South Asia, Jacocks would soon be replaced in his role by 
the more restrained Marshall C. Balfour, the physician who would ultimately lead the 
Population Council’s efforts in India during the 1950s.141 Balfour’s postwar work in family 
planning programming in India will be examined in Chapter Four. For the time being, 
however, the broader rural interventions encouraged by Sam Higginbottom and haltingly 
explored by top Rockefeller Foundation officials would not bear fruit. The connection 
between public health and agricultural improvement being forged by British scientists like 
Howard, Matthaei, and McCarrison simply could not overcome the American foundation’s 
focus on its medical investments in Asia. Further, and perhaps more immediately, fears of 
overstepping bounds with the colonial administration limited any expansion. Yet, if the 
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foundation’s entry into rural development and agricultural science in South Asia had been 
slowed by concerns over programmatic focus and tensions with the British administration, 
it was postponed indefinitely by the start of war in the Pacific in December 1941. 
With the outbreak of war, the wheels of colonial officialdom ground into action. 
The Government of India launched an ad hoc program of agricultural development to 
compensate for diminished rice supplies following the Japanese invasion of Burma. The 
Grow More Food Campaign marked both a culmination of prior efforts to stimulate food 
production in the subcontinent and a marker of the weakness of colonial economic 
policy.142 Inaugurated by the Government of India’s Foodgrains Policy Committee in 1942, 
the campaign sought to increase India’s food acreage by about seven million acres, or four 
per cent, to achieve a target of 1,700,000 tons more food. This relatively modest goal was 
to be achieved by bringing new land under cultivation, doubling the crop cycle, and 
reallocating land under cash crops for growing food grains. Further, the Government of 
India had promised to increase the water supply by constructing new wells and canals, 
promoting the use of fertilizers, and distributing improved seed varieties such as those 
developed at Pusa earlier in the century. 143 The colonial government’s Grow More Food 
Campaign would run for five years, only to be succeeded by a series of limited initiatives 
under the same banner in the years following independence.  
Reflecting on the colonial era Grow More Food campaign from Beirut while 
coordinating relief efforts for Arab refugees in 1954, Henry Knight described the program 
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as having achieved as much as could be expected under wartime conditions.144 The Famine 
Inquiry Commission proved somewhat less sympathetic to the progress of Grow More 
Food than Knight. Tasked with assessing the causes of the 1943-44 Bengal Famine, the 
Commission went well beyond its remit in its final report, offering a broad survey of India’s 
food and demographic situation during the war years.145 With W. R. Aykroyd of the 
Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor tasked with large portions of the writing, the 
report also placed a strong emphasis on the long-running problems of malnutrition. 
concluding: “The results achieved by the campaign have not been spectacular. This is not 
surprising.”146 The Commission went on to explain that one of the major obstacles 
encountered by the campaign had been a lack of coordination between the various 
provincial governments and the central administration. Additionally, the Government of 
India had done little to assuage the fears of farmers regarding the potential negative effects 
of greater food supplies upon prices.147 As they noted: 
A large increase in agricultural production in India by extension of the area of 
cultivated land and the improvement in the yield of crops through irrigation and 
other measures will not be achieved without intensive and sustained effort on the 
part of both Government and the people. There is, therefore need for laying down 
a clear agricultural policy and providing administrative machinery for its 
execution.148 
All told, the Grow More Food Campaign of the final years of the British Raj did increase 
the strict amount of land under food grain cultivation. It may even have modestly improved 
grain production in India, but as Knight readily admitted, the data collected was so poor as 
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to render statistical interpretation quite difficult.149 That said, and as the Famine Inquiry 
Commission emphasized, food grains alone would do little to combat malnutrition if 
protein and vitamin-rich foods were not mixed in to enable a balanced diet.150 
Turning to the short-run causes of the Bengal Famine itself, the Commission 
observed that the larger part of the population of Bengal “did not suffer from a lack of food 
in 1943.”151 Indeed, the major cause of the famine lay in rising prices brought about by rice 
trade disruptions associated with the fall of Burma; about ten per cent of the population 
had been effectively priced out of food purchasing by the resulting inflation, speculation, 
and hoarding.152 As Indian economist P. C. Bansil concluded in his 1958 critical work, 
India’s Food Resources and Population: “There is nothing to show that food supplies in 
India or even in Bengal itself were short of the average during the last few years.”153 In 
part, Bansil cited the findings of the Famine Inquiry Commission as evidence of the 
“untenable” nature of Malthusian thinking regarding food shortage and overpopulation in 
India.154 The debate over the causes of the Bengal Famine would subsequently spur a 
considerable discussion surrounding economist Amartya Sen’s 1981 work on the subject, 
in which he contended that mass starvation resulted from the failure of the “entitlement 
system” — namely, the rules surrounding the acquisition and exchange of property— and 
not a strict food shortage.155 
In assessing long-term population trends across British India, the Famine Inquiry 
Commission judged that, at more than 400 million people, South Asia was overpopulated. 
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That said, the problem did not lie in sheer overpopulation or even in the limitations of 
India’s resource potential. Rather, the Commission concluded: “While we hold that there 
is a serious population situation, we emphasize throughout that the primary problem is that 
of under-development of resources, both agricultural and industrial, in a wide sense of the 
term.”156  The Commission went on specifically to reject dismal Malthusian explanations 
for the crisis, contending that future famines could be avoided by “the intensive 
development of all resources.” In this way, underdevelopment, and not simply 
overpopulation, had provided the conditions for famine. Nevertheless, the Commission 
conceded that a decrease in the population growth rate was “not only desirable but 
necessary” and recommended the creation of a board of statistical experts to investigate the 
possibilities of emigration, urbanization, and family limitation.157 
In conjunction with the publication of the final report of the Famine Inquiry 
Commission, Aykroyd also submitted his own commentary on India’s postwar welfare just 
before he resigned from his post at Coonoor to become the first director of the FAO’s 
Nutrition Division in December 1944. In his “Note on Food and Nutrition Policy in India,” 
published in 1945, Aykroyd wrote that, in light of the crisis in Bengal and eastern India, 
the issue of nutrition had finally come to the attention of the public at-large as a major 
cause of persistent ill-health.158 The Government of India, he argued, should not waste the 
opportunity to make significant improvements in nutritional policy. First, Aykroyd noted 
that new public interest had emerged in “protective” foods, such as pulses and milk that 
could provide the proteins in which cereal crops were deficient. He urged the government 
to increase the production of these foods and refrain from the “mere propaganda” in which 
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it had previously indulged. As he wrote: “There is no need for ‘Drink More Milk’ 
campaigns to popularise milk. Milk is in fact a rare and precious fluid which everybody 
tries to obtain if he can.”159 Instead of another publicity pitch, Aykroyd pressed for serious 
investments in greater and more equitable food production. He further emphasized that 
campaigns to support nutritional education (particularly among India’s women), consumer 
research, and school-feeding programs would prove essential over the coming years. 
Finally, Aykroyd stressed the need for the training of more nutrition researchers and 
scientists in India. Echoing the complaints articulated by Albert Howard and Gabrielle 
Matthaei nearly two decades earlier, he claimed that nutritional sciences in British India 
lacked both a coordinated structure and sustained investment in research.160 With that, 
Aykroyd left New Delhi for Washington, D.C., where he would help to shape a new 
international institution tasked with achieving similar goals for the entire postwar world. 
At the helm of the FAO’s Nutrition Division through the 1950s, he would also figure 
prominently in the debate concerning the relationship between food shortage and 
overpopulation that would shape an emerging international development paradigm.  
FRAMING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
Following the Second World War and at the height of the Indian independence 
movement, South Asia increasingly drew the attention of American philanthropic relief 
institutions, as well as the rising international development organizations championed by 
the United States. This growing interest would help to clarify the relationship between the 
nutritional and agricultural sciences in their pursuit of development through human welfare 
promotion. W. R. Aykroyd explained this in his “Note on Food and Nutrition Policy in 
India”: 
                                                
159 Ibid., 2. 
160 Ibid., 10. 
 63 
To-day, as the result of the stimulus given by the Hot Springs Conference, and, it 
may be added, because of the steady and persistent pressure on the part of 
nutrition workers in India, the agricultural authorities have become ‘nutrition-
minded’. They have realized the need for planned production based on a scientific 
assessment of nutritional needs.161 
In this way, the launch of the FAO opened an opportunity for closer collaboration between 
the rising fields of agricultural and nutritional science. Building on the colonial expertise 
of physicians like John Boyd Orr, Robert McCarrison, and, most recently, Aykroyd 
himself, the FAO sought to bridge the gap between two discrete fields of scientific 
inquiry.162 That said, while the FAO would be well-equipped as a coordinating network for 
scientific inquiry and data-driven discussion around the world, it would never truly wield 
the resources necessary to launch the direct interventions undertaken by private American 
philanthropies.163 
As the FAO found its footing in Washington and then Rome following the war, 
American humanitarian attention to India’s nutritional situation increased in the wake of 
the Bengal Famine. This new focus continued after the end of the Second World War and 
would set the stage for more geopolitically-motivated concerns after the start of the Cold 
War. An early example of this growing American interest in delivering aid to a hungry 
India came in the form of a pamphlet entitled India’s Hunger, written by University of 
Chicago economist and FAO consultant Theodore W. Schultz. With a foreword penned by 
Pearl S. Buck, the Nobel Prize-winning author and daughter of missionaries whose work 
detailed peasant life in China, the pamphlet represented the summary version of the report 
of the American Famine Mission to India. Indeed, Buck herself had commissioned the 
report as chair of the India Famine Emergency Committee, a group of thirteen scholars, 
public servants, and scientists, including diplomat Sumner Welles, NAACP head Walter 
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White, and Albert Einstein. The group’s stated aim was to ensure that the maximum 
amount of America’s surplus food reached the hungry of the world and that India received 
“an equitable share.”164  
On March 20, 1946, Hazel Whitman of the India Famine Emergency Committee 
wrote to W. R. Aykroyd in his new role as director of the Nutrition Division of the FAO, 
then still headquartered in Washington. Whitman explained that, under the direction of 
Pearl Buck, the committee planned to launch a nationwide food drive for India that would 
encourage “American housewives to make up a package and send it themselves.”165 To 
that end, she asked that Aykroyd visit her and Buck in New York so that he might help to 
compile “a list that housewives may easily purchase or find on their own kitchen 
shelves.”166 To some extent, this seemingly ad hoc plan harkened back to previous 
American relief efforts, such as the individual aid packages for Belgium encouraged by 
Herbert Hoover during the First World War.167 Ever practical-minded, however, Aykroyd 
delicately rejected the idea of shipping thousands of individually-wrapped packages of 
American pantry surplus to India via airmail: “Food parcels generously donated by 
American housewives could not be very appreciable in quantity, in relation to India’s 
needs.”168 Instead, he outlined India’s actual food supply needs: significant amounts of 
bulk grain and not haphazardly compiled packages. That said, he stressed that Indians 
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needed to diversify their diets to include protein and vitamin rich foods that would help 
stave off malnutrition.169  
As M. Srinivas Chary has shown, near-famine conditions across India in the 
aftermath of the Second World War drove lobbying efforts aimed at persuading the Truman 
Administration to extend food relief efforts to British India just as it had offered aid to the 
war-torn regions of Europe and East Asia.170 In his writing on India’s postwar food crisis, 
Schultz, who had supervised Sam Higginbottom’s protégé Arthur T. Mosher in his doctoral 
work at Chicago, argued that British India needed about 750,000 tons of grains directly 
from the United States if it was to stabilize rising domestic food prices.171 Schultz also 
emphasized that, while compounded by the chaos of war, the current precarious food 
situation had been caused in part by the inefficiencies of the village-based, subsistence-
level agriculture. Further, Schultz condemned the ineffectiveness of India’s colonial 
administration in coordinating food production and price stabilization efforts across the 
country — failures which he contended had directly precipitated the famine of 1943-44.172 
Now, in 1946, Schultz wrote in the American Famine Mission to India’s report that 
continuing crisis in South Asia left “opportunities for private relief agencies to assist in 
India’s food emergency.”173 He outlined three specific actions that could be supported to 
remedy both the immediate crisis and the long-term food situation. First, American 
organizations should enable the shipment of “supplementary food items,” such as vitamin 
tablets, cod liver oil, and dried milk in small tins. Second, American organizations should 
coordinate the “development of scientific programs and demonstrations of improved 
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methods” of using substitute foods to fight malnutrition. Finally, the American public and 
humanitarian organizations ought to advocate for “improved methods of agriculture within 
the limits imposed by average Indian farm conditions.”174 In this way, Schultz called for 
humanitarian intervention that would promote the same package of reforms that colonial 
nutritional and agricultural scientists had advocated for decades. 
Meanwhile, for the young FAO, the institutional planning process largely involved 
determining what areas of work would be feasible given the organization’s broad mandate 
and limited resources. Given the relatively short history of nutritional science as a coherent 
field of experimental research, the FAO’s postwar planning phase also involved identifying 
topics and areas in which quality studies had already been conducted. On January 30, 1947, 
for instance, Aykroyd wrote tersely to Boyd Orr concerning the latter’s upcoming planning 
meeting with Julian Huxley, the biologist, eugenicist, and founding director of UNESCO: 
“It is pointed out that India offers remarkable opportunities for research on nutrition and 
deficiency diseases. This point is not referred to in the UNESCO resolution.”175 Over the 
first years of the FAO’s work, Aykroyd would consistently remind his colleagues of the 
existing work of the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor. As will be shown in the 
next chapter, over his fourteen years directing the Nutrition Division, he would 
significantly promote South Asia as a prime venue in which the FAO could support further 
nutritional research.  
Aykroyd’s early work at the FAO also involved visits to Latin America, East Asia, 
and North Africa to determine how the Nutrition Division’s work might more seamlessly 
intersect with on-going efforts in the agricultural sciences and public health. In the first 
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months of 1950, for instance, Aykroyd visited Sindabis, the center of the International 
Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation’s health demonstration work in Egypt’s Nile 
River Delta, to determine how the FAO’s Nutrition Division might collaborate with 
Rockefeller in the region.176 Joined by colleagues from UNESCO and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), Aykroyd complimented the International Health Division’s (IHD) 
long experience in demonstration work and noted the organization’s willingness to 
introduce new methods of public health promotion “such as the use of DDT.”177 As 
Aykroyd noted, Rockefeller was eager to employ the technological developments of the 
preceding decade in its new pursuit of agricultural innovation. 
In Mexico through the 1940s, successful projects in the agricultural sciences 
undertaken by the Rockefeller Foundation, particularly involving innovations in high-yield 
seed varieties, herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers, prompted renewed debate over the 
foundation’s role in South Asia following the war and in the run-up to independence. 178 
Still, tensions lingered between the organization’s commitments to public health — which 
extended lifespans, limited disease morbidity, and reduced childhood mortality — and new 
experiments in agricultural science that seemed to hold the key to vastly increased food 
production. As early as May 1947, Rockefeller representatives had begun to decline 
overtures from Indian public officials and scientists, such as statistician P. C. Mahalanobis, 
requesting that the Rockefeller Foundation expand its programming in India beyond the 
existing International Health Division, which still concentrated its efforts on distributing 
small grants and bringing the fruits of American and European biomedical research to 
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South Asia.179 In the aftermath of Partition, however, Rockefeller Foundation officials 
began seriously to consider intervention on a much larger scale. The only remaining 
question would be whether the foundation would invest more deeply in public health or 
collaborate with new international organizations like the FAO and the rapidly-expanding 
Ford Foundation to translate knowledge drawn from the fields of Mexico into a wider 
agricultural development program for South Asia.  
A STRATEGY OF PHILANTHROPIC INTERVENTION  
At the first All-India Conference of the Family Planning Association in Bombay in 
November 1951, the Indian demographer and economist Sripati Chandrasekhar rose to 
deliver his inaugural address as president of the group. Having earned his Ph.D. in 
Sociology from NYU in 1944, Chandrasekhar would go on to work with Julian Huxley’s 
UNESCO and serve as a controversial cabinet minister under Indira Gandhi.180 Addressing 
India’s food production capabilities, Chandrasekhar began: 
Despite the great advancement of modern science and technological skill, our 
total food production, not to speak of other necessities, has not kept pace with the 
growth of population. On the contrary, our natural resources are not only not 
increasing with the growth of population, but what is worse, they are actually 
dwindling on a global scale, resulting in what Aldous Huxley calls “a double 
crisis.”181 
Indeed, Huxley’s essay, “The Double Crisis,” had appeared in the April 1949 issue of the 
UNESCO Courier journal. As R. S. Deese shows, Huxley’s essay served as a clarion call 
for the postwar population control movement, but its fatalism had caused editors at 
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Harper’s, Life, Foreign Affairs, and the Atlantic to reject its publication.182 At least in a 
rhetorical sense, Huxley was perhaps ahead of his time as fears of a population “bomb” 
would sweep popular publications and scholarly journals through the 1950s and 1960s, 
articulated notably by businessman Hugh Moore in 1954 and biologist Paul Ehrlich in 
1968.183 Either way, Huxley’s warning of an impending ecological crisis brought on by 
overpopulation caught Chandrasekhar’s attention. Postwar population growth rates were 
indeed increasing rapidly, though perhaps not at a rate that would bring the global total to 
9.2 billion by the year 2000, as Chandrasekhar projected in his 1951 remarks to the Family 
Planning Association. Nevertheless, by invoking Huxley, author of the dystopic novel, A 
Brave New World, and the brother of Julian, Chandrasekhar linked India’s challenges to 
the wider discussion surrounding global population regulation.184 He also expressed fears 
of overpopulation and resource exhaustion that were becoming commonplace within the 
global scientific community and the popular press in the postwar years, particularly 
following the publication of the influential article, “The World Demographic Transition,” 
by American sociologist Kingsley Davis in 1945, which contended that industrialization 
itself held the key to fertility decline.185 
When coupled with perceived resource degradation and the apparent causal link 
between strict food shortages and famine, the postwar population boom presented India’s 
policymakers and economic planners with a frightening glimpse of things to come. It was 
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their contention that time was running out and a classic Malthusian catastrophe loomed on 
independent India’s horizon. By Chandrasekhar’s own estimates, only immediate, radical 
advances in developing India’s agricultural sector, encouraging urbanization, and 
promoting family planning could prevent it, guaranteeing a stable future for the new nation. 
Following Partition and into the early 1950s, American philanthropic organizations sought 
to become the heroes of this effort to meet food supply and population pressures with social 
and scientific interventions. Motivated by the promises of financial and diplomatic support 
offered by the Truman Administration’s Cold War-inspired Point Four Program, 
Rockefeller and the heftily-funded Ford Foundation moved almost simultaneously through 
1949 and 1950 to investigate the prospect of launching projects in nutrition, agriculture, 
and community development in independent South Asia.186 While the Second World War 
had postponed the Rockefeller Foundation’s arrival as a force in South Asian agriculture, 
the conflict had also forced the foundation to transfer its institutional investments in China 
and Europe to Mexico, enabling a programmatic shift toward research into high-yield grain 
varieties.187 Through the early 1950s, agents of the Rockefeller Foundation conducted 
extensive inquiries into what role, if any, their organization should play in independent 
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. These discussions reveal the foundation’s intentions in South 
Asia, exposing the ways in which thinking on the relationship between food shortage and 
overpopulation fundamentally steered the philanthropic planning process. 
In early July 1949, the Rockefeller Foundation’s top staff in New York received a 
memorandum entitled, “Relation of the Point IV Program to Population Problems,” 
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outlining federal guidelines for financing birth control programs in target nations.188 The 
unsigned memo suggested that it would be inappropriate for the United States government 
either to promote or oppose projects of population control launched by the governments of 
developing and decolonizing countries. That said, government officials should not 
discourage birth control programs if they were independently making progress abroad. 
After all, the “savings of lives” promoted by public health projects and humanitarian efforts 
would likely raise population growth rates and jeopardize economic development, 
undermining the objectives of the Point Four Program.189 The United States would not, 
however, directly fund birth control measures, and “requests for assistance in such projects 
would normally be referred to private or international agencies.”190 As the memo 
concluded: “The only definitive check on population growth consonant with humanitarian 
ideals is the voluntary reduction of births whether through the postponement of marriage, 
continence, or other forms of family limitation.”191 In this way, the door had been opened 
for private philanthropic organizations to take the lead in the global population control 
movement, though such efforts would not receive the explicit support of the United States 
government under the Point Four Program. It remained now for Rockefeller officials to 
decide how their organization — and the closely-related Population Council that would be 
launched by John D. Rockefeller III in 1952 — would proceed in South Asia. 
For the time being, the task of calculating precisely how to invest Rockefeller’s 
funds in South Asia fell to chief scientific staff at the foundation. Warren Weaver, the 
influential director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Natural Science from 1932 
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to 1955, began his career as a mathematician at the University of Wisconsin.192 During the 
Second World War, he served with the U.S. National Defense Research Committee and 
spent time on assignment in London, supporting Britain’s development of radar and anti-
aircraft systems. For his work, the British Government awarded him the King’s Medal for 
Service in the Cause of Freedom in 1948.193 While visiting Carlsbad, New Mexico in July 
1949, Weaver composed a series of memoranda investigating the foundation’s postwar 
priorities for scientific research. One memo, “Translation,” would become an important 
theoretical text in early computing research into linguistics and the prospect of machine 
translation.194  
Weaver also wrote another memo on that trip, entitled “Food and Population.” It 
circulated widely among Rockefeller Foundation staff and scientists as plans for work in 
agricultural development and nutritional research in South Asia took shape. As Alison 
Bashford notes, Weaver’s influential analysis boiled the global food problem down to an 
issue of efficient solar energy exploitation.195 Weaver calculated that the average American 
required 3,000 calories per day from food and about 125,000 calories per day from carbon-
derived fuels. The global average for each figure stood somewhat lower, however, at 2,400 
for food and 6,000 for fuel.196 In accounting for these average energy needs, a total figure 
for global energy demand could be derived. Weaver argued that considering the food 
problem primarily as an energy problem, Rockefeller’s Natural Science Division could 
more effectively focus on improving the ways human bodies absorb solar energy. More 
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importantly, Weaver rejected Malthusian projections of a coming food catastrophe and 
placed faith in the potential for science to escape the “traditional patterns of the past.”197 
Beyond undertaking such seemingly futuristic and speculative analyses, Weaver 
was also tasked with evaluating the foundation’s basic strategy in India. On January 30, 
1951, he circulated among Rockefeller staff his strategy for the foundation’s proposed 
collaboration in agrarian development with the Allahabad Agricultural Institute under its 
new principal, Arthur T. Mosher. Joseph H. Willits, director of the foundation’s Division 
of Social Sciences, noted his own personal connection to Allahabad; at an intercollegiate 
Y.M.C.A. conference in 1912, he had nearly been persuaded by the charismatic Sam 
Higginbottom to become a missionary in India. As Willits reflected, “The Indians have had 
to suffer many things, but from that, at least, they have been spared.”198 Moving on from 
the mission deferred, the memo detailed Weaver’s thinking on the utility of an expanded 
Rockefeller intervention in India.  
Weaver began by presenting a simple fraction originally conceived by American 
geographer, J. Russell Smith, which placed “Developed Resources” as the numerator above 
the denominator “Population.” Dividing the former by the latter yielded “Average Level 
of Living.”199 With this ratio, Weaver argued that India, with its vast population and 
underdeveloped food resources, presented one of the best platforms from which to improve 
the standard of living for the entire world. Echoing his optimism in the widely-circulated 
“Food and Population,” Weaver explained the practical implications of the ratio he had 
introduced: 
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I assume RF has decided not to try to encourage studies and methods which 
would tend to shrink the denominator of the above fraction, but, rather, to increase 
the denominator (in my judgement quite properly) by continuing work in public 
health. The shrinkage of the denominator would be left for nature “to take her 
course” by the century-long processes of modernization, urbanization, and 
education.200 
In the face of those assumptions, Weaver concluded that, given the foundation’s existing 
investments in public health, Rockefeller’s best course of action in India would be to work 
toward increasing the food supply “faster than Indians breed.”201 He offered a note of 
caution that such efforts would inevitably “provide the world with a lot of additional 
Hindus, Moslems, and Untouchables, of which we already have a fair stock of samples.”202 
Strikingly, this racialized commentary echoed Mosher’s own assessment of India’s 
agricultural situation. As he concluded in a 1950 solicitation pamphlet that emphasized the 
Allahabad Agricultural Institute’s Christian mission: “The greatest obstacles to progress 
for the masses of India are certain basic beliefs which have been inherited from Hinduism. 
Hindu culture is so interwoven that no problem — economic, social, political, or religious, 
— can be solved successfully in isolation.”203 In this way race — and religion — featured 
prominently within the categorizations of Indian agriculture as ‘backward’ on the part of 
Rockefeller Foundation agents. For these experts, the need to balance the equation between 
population growth and food production rested upon the assumption that the Indian ‘masses’ 
were intrinsically inclined to reproduce uncontrollably. On the same token, Indians were 
also completely incapable of revising their cultivation practices without the help of white 
Christians and their modern methods. 
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For Mosher, and Higginbottom before him, Christianity, science, and whiteness 
went together seamlessly, informing one coherent gospel of rural development. Within 
such an analysis, British colonialism received little to no attention as a purveyor of 
inefficient, exploitative practices. Certainly not at odds with such a worldview himself, 
Weaver proposed a fact-finding mission to India to consider investments in agricultural 
research and to evaluate the rural extension agenda of the Allahabad Agricultural 
Institute.204  
In December 1951, owing in part to the consistent attention it had received from 
Rockefeller officials, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute received one of the first grants 
enabled by the Ford Foundation’s inaugural appropriation of $3,725,000 for community 
development and rural extension work in India.205 With the eager support of Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Surendra Kumar Dey’s emerging Ministry of Community Development 
also received extensive support in this first funding initiative.206 Over the coming decade, 
Ford’s support would situate the Allahabad institute in a central role within the broader 
network of community development and rural extension work. With Mosher now in the 
lead at the institute, Higginbottom’s missionary project stood poised to become a center 
for village worker training and research into agricultural practices over the next decade. As 
David Nally and Stephen Taylor show, Mosher, influenced in no small part by his mentor 
Theodore W. Schultz, would advance an agenda of rural modernization in his later role as 
president of the Rockefeller-funded Agricultural Development Council (ADC).207 In the 
shorter term, however, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute served as a conduit through 
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which the Ford and Rockefeller foundations could disseminate the materials and methods 
that would come become hallmarks of the later Green Revolution.  
That same month, the Rockefeller Foundation’s board of trustees sent a group of 
scientists and top program officers to India to investigate the potential for programmatic 
investments in the subcontinent. For some, visiting independent India underscored the 
overpopulation crisis about which they had previously only theorized. From Bangalore, for 
instance, Alan Gregg relayed a dispatch, entitled “Precarious Welfare,” back to 
Rockefeller’s New York office on December 10, 1951. Now vice president of the 
foundation, Gregg pondered his organization’s potential role in India. 208 Like Weaver, 
Gregg asked his colleagues to indulge him in a thought experiment to clarify his concerns 
about Rockefeller’s coming intervention in South Asia. “Imagine an uninhabited island 
with a population of about 1,000 head of deer,” he began. On the island, the deer faced 
three factors which restricted their numbers: an inadequacy of parasite-free water, a limited 
amount of forage, and hungry pumas. He continued: “Now what will happen if you 
construct one clean and steadily flowing water trough or well, hold a successful puma hunt 
every year, and introduce successfully a few new forage grasses?” The deer population 
would increase, Gregg predictably concluded.209  
Corresponding with the forces of pestilence, famine, and war pulled directly from 
the pages of Malthus, the factors limiting the deer population on Gregg’s imagined island 
represented precisely the same elements Rockefeller looked to constrain in India. From the 
heart of South India, the Rockefeller Foundation’s vice president dispatched an urgent 
warning to his more confident scientific colleagues: 
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It seems to me that the main problem for us in India is to teach the Indians how to 
produce locally and by themselves the knowledge and skills now and till now 
furnished to them by the West. Medical science, stability of government, and 
agricultural technology have made possible the growth in population, and on these 
their enormous number now utterly depend.210 
In contrast with Weaver’s cautiously optimistic estimates of the capacity for science to 
manage growing populations, the physician Gregg lamented that Rockefeller’s programs 
might trigger the very sort of Malthusian crisis the foundation hoped to avert. With Gregg’s 
vivid and dehumanizing warning duly noted, the Rockefeller Foundation continued its 
broad investigation of conditions in India, searching for a programmatic opening and 
focusing on the convergences between public health and agricultural science.  
Though striking, Gregg’s concerns by no means represented an outlying opinion 
within Rockefeller officials’ discussions of programming possibilities in independent 
South Asia. Mirroring Gregg’s foreboding evaluation from the previous year, Dr. 
Richmond K. Anderson, assistant director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Biological and 
Medical Research Division and future associate director of the Population Council, wrote 
on March 5, 1952: 
It seems entirely fallacious to say that because public health has done a good job 
in preserving human life, we should therefore now stop our efforts and promote 
economic development and agriculture. […] Giving security and ample food to an 
animal is the best possible stimulus to multiplication and without motivating 
forces toward smaller families, there is no reason to suppose that man would not 
act the same.211 
Again, the assessment of conditions on the ground in India hinged on the idea that exclusive 
support for welfare initiatives in public health and agricultural development might simply 
compound the perceived population crisis facing Asia. In contrast with the optimism 
expressed by Weaver, Aykroyd at the FAO, and even the earlier Famine Inquiry 
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Commission, Anderson and Gregg articulated a common concern among Rockefeller and 
Ford officials that development investments in independent India would merely fuel the 
perceived global population crisis of the postwar era.  
CONCLUSION 
At 5:20 p.m. on November 29, 1956, Renuka Ray, the Minister for Rehabilitation 
of the state of West Bengal, began to speak about the welfare of displaced persons in the 
long aftermath of Partition. Her words were carried across the country from the Calcutta 
station of All India Radio, just as W. R. Aykroyd’s speech on nutritional health had been 
six years earlier.212 Once again, radio served the important function of disseminating public 
health information and reports of the progress of development projects being undertaken 
by the government in face of a population crisis. Nearly a decade after Partition, Ray 
reported that over four million refugees had entered West Bengal and were continuing to 
arrive from East Pakistan. As opposed to the case of East Punjab, where displaced persons 
had arrived in a relatively short time in what was approximately an equal population 
exchange, Ray argued that Partition had left West Bengal with a population density that 
was “practically the highest in India.”213 On top of that, her ministry struggled to distribute 
aid and assign farmland to incoming cultivators, with many forced to till tracts that were 
“either water-logged or submarginal in character” and scarcely capable of meeting her 
state’s food production needs. This local population crisis, might even demand costly 
drainage and irrigation projects to supply “the overcrowded economy of this State” with 
much-needed farmland. Still, she told her listeners, there was hope: 
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Yet, while the increasing influx is affecting us adversely, it cannot be denied that 
the large numbers of displaced persons who have come in earlier years are an 
asset in many ways. Due to their endeavor, large tracts of land that were lying 
fallow have been cultivated and they have helped in the increase of food 
production in the state.214  
In this way, Ray’s broadcast revealed the social dimension of government efforts to stem 
the tide of the perceived ‘double crisis’ of overpopulation and food supply shortage. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, officials of the independent Indian state coordinated with 
American philanthropic organizations through the 1950s, launching programs in refugee 
rehabilitation, rural extension, and community development. These projects had clear roots 
in the late colonial assumptions of missionaries, humanitarians, and scientists who 
cultivated a keen interest in the relationship between population growth and food 
production. 
In no small measure, the vision of the population crisis ahead had been shaped by 
the experience of recent crises. India’s return to famine and war in the 1940s played a direct 
role in the emerging vision of food shortage and overpopulation in the 1950s and beyond. 
The Partition of India in 1947 generated mass migrations and humanitarian emergencies 
that would be used to justify social and scientific interventions on the part of the Indian 
state and American philanthropic organizations alike. Further, just as late colonial ideas 
about the improvement of agricultural education, the development of high-yielding grain 
varieties, and the improvement of nutritional outcomes grew up in conversation with one 
another, they would continue to evolve together after independence.  
In turn, optimistic notions of scientific innovation and knowledge-sharing ran up 
against Malthusian visions of impending demographic catastrophe. At the meeting places 
between a dismal vision of food shortage and overpopulation and a self-assured vision of 
science in the service of human welfare, philanthropic organizations and new international 
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agencies focused their planning efforts in the early postwar period as colonialism 
unraveled. Following Partition, these institutions would attempt to address what was 
popularly viewed as global population crisis and set down the assumptions of international 
development as a discrete field of theory and practice. The Rockefeller Foundation’s first 
fact-finding mission to investigate a potential intervention in Indian agriculture would 
present its assessment in New York in early 1952. As will be shown in Chapter Four, its 
conclusions would inform the assumptions of the Rockefeller Foundation and the newly-
created Population Council as they launched their operations in India in 1956 and 1952, 
respectively.215 In the meantime, however, similar assumptions about the relationship 
between South Asia’s dwindling food supply and its burgeoning population would set the 
stage for interventions in refugee rehabilitation, rural extension, and community 
development, as will be examined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two: A Road to New India216 
Though an ardent secularist averse to religious sentimentality, Surendra Kumar 
Dey discerned a deeper meaning in the place selected for the refugee camp on the highway 
leading to Delhi. As he surveyed the camp at Kurukshetra, East Punjab in late September 
1947, he observed a plain littered with the tents, carts, and scattered belongings of nearly 
three hundred thousand Sikh and Hindu refugees from the newly formed West Pakistan. 
These former residents of western Punjab, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Province had 
been displaced by the violent division of British India at the end of empire. Though 
intended as a “temporary night halt,” they now found themselves stranded on the legendary 
battlefield of the Mahabharata epic, upon which Krishna conversed with Arjuna in his 
chariot. 217 As Dey observed: 
Kurukshetra was the battlefield millennia back to decide whether the brothers 
were right to fight for a speck of land and whether battles did ever decide 
anything at all. She was to receive the first shock of this new flood-tide. […] The 
way of return to the home which belonged to them was for ever closed. A curse 
could be transformed into a blessing. We could resurrect life out of the vault of 
death.218  
Eager to serve the nation and captivated by the symbolism of Kurukshetra, the forty-two-
year-old Bengali engineer who had trained at Purdue and the University of Michigan left a 
management position with the General Electric Corporation and volunteered as technical 
advisor to India’s Ministry of Rehabilitation in New Delhi. He returned to Kurukshetra in 
December 1947 with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s blessing to establish a vocational 
training center. Dey named the initiative Mazdoor Manzil or "Workers’ Destination".219 
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Dey’s initial goals for the Mazdoor Manzil project appeared modest enough. He 
sought, first and foremost, to provide the refugees at Kurukshetra with vocational training 
in artisanal work, including textile weaving and brick making. He emphasized the intrinsic 
value of work and discouraged idleness among Kurukshetra’s dazed refugees. Quickly 
though, Dey, who had himself grown up in poverty in a Bengali village now subsumed into 
East Pakistan, expanded his objectives. He set his sights on forging a model township out 
of Kurukshetra’s ‘inmates,’ as he referred to them. In late 1948, with approval from the 
Ministry of Rehabilitation and the enthusiastic backing of Nehru, Dey resettled about three 
thousand refugees on the swampland adjacent to the evacuated Muslim village of 
Nilokheri, eighteen kilometers south of Kurukshetra. 
Through the early 1950s, Nilokheri shed its legacy as a rehabilitation project and 
emerged as a prime model for community development among India’s economic planners. 
The project garnered attention from national and international press, quickly drawing the 
interest of American philanthropic organizations and international development experts 
eager to test their theories of modernization and generate a replicable model of rural 
development. With support from the Ford Foundation, Nilokheri made a swift transition 
from a ‘rehabilitation township’ to become by 1952 the national hub for rural extension 
and community development training, drawing international expertise to India and 
preparing thousands of village workers to fan out across the subcontinent to lead rural 
reconstruction projects.  
This chapter examines how independent India’s community development 
initiatives of the 1950s emerged in critical ways from the immediate imperatives of post-
Partition refugee rehabilitation. Under Dey’s leadership during the 1950s and through his 
later influence as India’s Minister of Community Development, the initiative that began as 
the Nilokheri rehabilitation township would mark the first substantial state-funded 
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community development and rural extension training project launched by the new nation. 
Building upon the example of the Nilokheri project, and supported by the Ford Foundation 
and the United States Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the Government of 
India’s community development and rural extension initiatives of the 1950s expanded the 
reach and methodologies of international development organizations across rural India. At 
the same time, the community development methods tested at Nilokheri and refined in the 
rural extension training programs of the Ford Foundation still struggled to engage women 
effectively, drawing official criticism for neglecting half of India’s rural population. 
Nevertheless, these models of rural development and knowledge sharing would channel 
state and philanthropic efforts to increase Indian food production, influencing the course 
of the Green Revolution.  
HUNGRY FOR WORK 
Tensions between the central government and East Punjab’s administration over 
the trajectory of post-Partition rehabilitation set the stage for independent India’s first state-
led foray into community development programming. On October 3, 1948, Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dashed off an angry letter to Gopichand Bhargava, a loyal 
member of the Indian National Congress and the Chief Minister of East Punjab: ‘The 
problem which has been troubling us very greatly is that of the people at Kurukshetra 
Camp, more specially the Frontier refugees. This is a very urgent matter requiring 
immediate consideration.’220 Nehru expressed dismay at Rehabilitation Minister Mohanlal 
Saksena’s recent report on the languishing rehabilitation efforts in East Punjab and was 
particularly disturbed by the lack of progress at the overcrowded Kurukshetra site. 
‘Everything is hung up because the East Punjab Government has not yet allotted sites for 
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their rehabilitation,’ continued Nehru in the same letter, placing the blame squarely on 
Bhargava and his administration. 
Almost fourteen months after Partition, and with eight million refugees scattered 
across the Indian portions of Punjab and Bengal, Nehru’s frustrations with East Punjab’s 
rehabilitation initiative seemed justified.221 In both East Punjab and West Bengal, 
rehabilitation failed spectacularly in its initial objective to settle displaced persons on new 
land and in new homes quickly. Conflicts between the central government and the 
administration of East Punjab over the distribution of agricultural lands distracted the 
refugee resettlement process, leaving hundreds of thousands of Hindus and Sikhs in camps 
like Kurukshetra, surviving on meagre government aid and rationed food.222 Over the 
eighteen months following Partition, Nehru’s frustrated correspondence with Chief 
Minister Bhargava underscored the fundamental tension between the stated objectives of 
India’s central government and the actual outcomes pursued by state officials. Rather than 
proportionally redistributing the land of Muslim evacuees to refugees who had held land 
in West Pakistan, Nehru alleged that East Punjab officials had allowed massive tracts of 
land to become consolidated in the hands of a few non-agriculturalists on the basis of 
“communal and personal considerations.”223 Nehru lamented that state officials had 
distributed the abandoned property of Muslim evacuees inequitably, dismayed by the 
prospect of creating a new landholding class just as efforts had begun in the United 
Provinces to dismantle the hereditary zamindari system. Varied state-level legislation 
aimed at land reform proceeded in Assam, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and 
Rajasthan between 1950 and 1954, with proprietary holdings transferred from the vast 
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estates of absentee landlords to state governments themselves.224 At the same time, 
Francine Frankel argues that zamindari abolition "fell far short of an agrarian 
transformation," showing that landlordism did not necessarily end with the legislative 
programs championed by politicians like Chaudhary Charan Singh and others. Further, she 
argues that zamindars were typically well-compensated for the loss of their hereditary 
rights and that the revised proprietary arrangements between those who worked the land 
and state governments did little to immediately improve the lot of the rural poor who simply 
assumed leases from new landholders.225 
Meanwhile, in East Punjab, the major agricultural issue that emerged in Partition's 
wake was less a matter of hereditary land tenure and more a concern over the land rights 
of shifting populations. In his correspondence with Bhargava, the Prime Minister also 
criticized the East Punjab government’s apparent favoritism toward Sikh refugees, as well 
as the systematic persecution of dalits and neglect of refugees from the North West Frontier 
Province.226 While officials in East Punjab had resettled most Punjabi Sikh refugees within 
a year of Partition, Nehru observed that most Hindus and refugees from the North West 
Frontier remained in the camps.227 Further, East Punjab state officials expressed fears that 
the departure of the highly productive Muslim tenant farmers and artisans who had 
populated the East Punjabi countryside would spell the state’s doom, precipitating not just 
an economic slump, but also a food crisis as the East Punjab faced an annual food grain 
production deficit of some 35,000 tons.228 Like a large number of the inhabitants of the 
Kurukshetra camp, many of the incoming refugees had been shopkeepers, clerks, and 
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merchants. With such occupational backgrounds, these Hindus and Sikhs had little 
experience with the crafts and trades characteristic of village life in Karnal District, much 
less actual cultivation.  
Meanwhile, in West Bengal, Renuka Ray’s parallel work in support of the 4.26 
million displaced from East Pakistan between 1946 and 1962 had also begun.229 After 
completing her tenure in the Constituent Assembly of India in 1947, the All India Woman’s 
Conference activist moved quickly to advocate for the women of the independent nation. 
In an article published in the magazine, The People, in July 1951, she connected women’s 
social status to the enduring implications of British colonialism. As she wrote: “In India, 
the conditions that operated in bringing restrictions upon women are closely woven with 
the general degradation that led to the subjugation of the race.”230 Ray went on to write that 
this intimate connection between racial and gender-based oppression implied that women 
now enjoyed equal status with men as citizens of free India.231 This equality, she argued, 
demanded giving “full recognition to the value of the housewife” as the “home is the 
nucleus of the nation.”232 In turn, Indian society must strive to properly equip mothers with 
the education and practical knowledge necessary in “rearing a healthy race.”233 To meet 
that duty, Ray argued, women must be healthy themselves — in mind and body. She 
opposed child marriage and emphasized that women must play active roles in the social 
and political lives of their communities, particularly in India’s villages. As she wrote:  
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It is one of the greatest tragedies of India that in a primarily agricultural country, 
the basic requirements of food itself cannot be met through our own efforts. In an 
attempt to reorient our agricultural system so that that we are able to provide 
sufficient food and also introduce the co-operative endeavour through which 
alone a more just distribution can take place, women can play a very significant 
part.234 
In this way, Ray’s vision of gender equality in independent India intersected neatly with 
rising plans to reshape rural life across the nation. With women expected to play a critical 
role in supporting increased agricultural production, Ray’s argument hinged upon concern 
for a “healthy race.” Further, in supporting the Sarvodaya Plan of the Congress Party’s 
Jayaprakash Narayan, Ray signaled a desire for co-operative ventures, a freer hand for 
cottage industries, and decentralized, community-level planning in agricultural 
production.235 In Ray’s work as the Minister of Rehabilitation for West Bengal from 1952 
to 1957, these concerns featured prominently in her own efforts to facilitate refugee 
rehabilitation and rural community reorganization. The process would, however, prove 
difficult in West Bengal, with the flow of post-Partition refugees persisting through the 
1950s.236 
The daunting prospects for rehabilitation in both West Bengal and East Punjab fed 
into S. K. Dey’s theory that the refugees at Kurukshetra must be resettled, not on the limited 
farming plots formerly held by Muslim evacuees, but on previously uncultivated land. 
There, he believed that his vocational training efforts would provide the basis for a self-
sufficient village of five thousand people that would serve as the hub for a wider block of 
farms. On a swampy swath of wasteland, he could also test his theory that productive labor 
stood as the central cohesive element in a healthy community. Dey found such a place near 
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the 85th milepost on the Grand Trunk Road in Karnal District. Writing in 1961, Dey 
reflected on what drove him toward the challenge at Nilokheri: “I was hungry. One who is 
hungry for work could be much deadlier than one who is hungry for food.”237 Very much 
hungry for food, the refugees at Kurukshetra initially resisted Dey’s proposal to relocate 
three thousand of them to the swampland to build up a town from scratch. However, as 
control over the Kurukshetra camp shifted back and forth between the hapless state 
government and Nehru’s frustrated central Ministry of Rehabilitation through 1949, 
permanent resettlement appeared unlikely. A small group of refugees decided to try their 
luck with Dey and his vocational and agricultural training experiment.238 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS  
Under Dey’s supervision, the rehabilitation township at Nilokheri rose as a prime 
example of the possibilities of community development in India during the 1950s, 
attracting attention and funding from the American Ford Foundation. Nicole Sackley and 
Daniel Immerwahr have shown that community development emerged as a contentious 
global movement of communitarian organizing, rural extension, and democratic 
empowerment from the 1930s through 1960s.239 It represented a widely-replicated model 
of local-level interventions informed by social scientific inquiry, at times influenced by the 
Cold War priorities of the United States, and championed by a handful of international 
agencies and American philanthropic organizations, including the Ford and Rockefeller 
foundations. While admirably demonstrating the global dimensions of the community 
development movement, this work has done less to explore its relationship to local post-
Partition rehabilitation efforts, situating such projects in the context of decolonization. As 
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it emerged under Dey’s leadership through the late 1940s and into the early 1950s, the 
former rehabilitation township would become an international model of the community 
development ethos at work. 
Through the winter of 1948 and into the spring of 1949, Nilokheri’s first five 
hundred residents remained housed in tents. Aside from a handful of workshops set up in 
temporary sheds, the Nilokheri site seemed little more than a swampy suburb of the still 
bustling refugee camp at Kurukshetra. The transplanted vocational training center, holding 
fast to the Mazdoor Manzil slogan, sat at the heart of the new site. Training unskilled 
refugees how to make productive lives for themselves remained at the core of the project 
and closely resembled efforts being taken, on paper at least, to situate refugees in homes in 
jobs in urban areas across East Punjab.240 Despite Nilokheri’s ramshackle state, Nehru 
visited the village in April 1949 to check on Dey’s progress. Significantly, he was 
accompanied by Countess Edwina Mountbatten, British India’s last vicereine.241 
Instead of welcoming Nehru and Mountbatten with countless garlands as had 
become customary in villages across India, the residents of the “rehabilitation township” 
surprisingly greeted the distinguished visitors with little more than muted respect. Dey 
assured the Prime Minister that this restraint reflected the refugees’ eagerness to show 
themselves hard at work in “building a home for themselves and the road to the India of 
tomorrow.”242 The former engineer then led Nehru and Mountbatten on an inspection of 
the village of tents, sketching out plans for setting the concrete foundations of Nilokheri’s 
houses, schools, and workshops during the spring of 1949. 
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Providing able-bodied refugees with training for artisanal work represented the 
central goal of Dey’s efforts in Nilokheri. As he wrote: “If work is there, home follows; so 
do clothing, schooling for children, medical relief and other amenities of life. If work is 
not there, everything looks dark, doles and kindness notwithstanding.”243 This work-
focused philosophy sprung from a desire on the part of officials to move refugees away 
from the ‘doles and kindness’ Dey mentioned. Rather than representing a utopian effort to 
reconfigure rural India from the start, the project at Nilokheri began as an ad hoc, necessity-
driven attempt to move refugees out of the overcrowded camp at Kurukshetra. At the same 
time, a clear ethos of hard work and self-improvement quickly overtook the basic 
humanitarian concerns at Nilokheri. The township born of necessity was quickly becoming 
an experiment in village organization and rural development. 
Nehru, for one, plainly saw a conditional relationship between relief assistance and 
work. As he wrote to incoming Finance Minister John Matthai on August 18, 1949, ‘They 
[the refugees] should be made to accept, if they are willing, a semi-military regime of 
discipline and work. If they are not prepared to accept this, then they can shift for 
themselves and our responsibility ceases.’244 In this way, displaced populations could earn 
the aid that they received from the central government in food, shelter, and small 
agricultural loans.245. By Nehru’s reasoning, the refugees could then pull themselves up 
and out of the camps still scattered across East Punjab. From his perspective, the 
responsibility for the situation had shifted from recalcitrant state-level officials and onto 
the refugees themselves. 
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Through S. K. Dey’s emerging doctrine of self-help, the rehabilitation township of 
Nilokheri provided the sort of ‘regime of discipline and work’ that Nehru envisioned. By 
early 1950, the cottage industries established at Nilokheri had grown large enough to 
employ about 625 refugee families.246 With financial support from the Ministry of 
Rehabilitation, Dey and his colleagues helped to set up industries and trades in the 
township, ranging from woodworking and brickmaking to dairy farming and sheep 
breeding. Seemingly little was planned for engaging and training the township’s women, 
but Dey noted the establishment of a large secondary school to educate their children.247 A 
printing press ran in the town as well, rolling out the first issues of a journal devoted to 
rural life and farming practices in 1953. Fittingly, the journal bore the name Kurukshetra 
and carried news and information from India’s Ministries of Health, Agriculture, 
Education, and Rehabilitation. As community development took off in India, Kurukshetra 
also featured first-hand accounts of village work from across the subcontinent, serving as 
a sort of clearinghouse for best practices in rural extension and development. Kurukshetra’s 
editors also worked in good humor to assure readers of Nilokheri’s market motives, at 
times even dispelling rumors that Nilokheri was a Communist stronghold thriving in the 
heart of Karnal District.248 Dey's politics, however, were more closely aligned with the 
pragmatic democratic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru, whom he greatly admired. As Dey 
wrote of community development:  
It is the common goal of all who believe in the doctrine of the Socialist society, 
whatever the pattern or form. The joint family was a model of the living concept 
of socialism in India. Community Development is but the expansion of the Indian 
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joint family till it grows organically to encompass the Village, Block, District, 
State and the Nation.249 
In this way, Dey's political vision remained both sufficiently vague and all-encompassing 
to carry broad appeal. In his rhetoric, he closely associated community development 
projects with families, projecting the image that such programming was organic and merely 
a natural liaison between the individual household and the new Indian state. 
Nilokheri was not the first model community to spring up in rural India. As Nicole 
Sackley has shown, Nilokheri’s contemporaries included Etawah, a pilot rural development 
project in the United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh) designed and managed by the 
American urban planner and architect Albert Mayer.250 Mayer’s work in Etawah began in 
1946, predating Nilokheri, and independent India, for that matter. Dey cited Mayer as an 
influence on his early thinking on village development in the Mazdoor Manzil project, but 
the two did not collaborate extensively. The Etawah rural organizational model gained the 
support of the Ford Foundation and would be replicated in later rural reconstruction efforts 
sponsored by Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister G. B. Pant. Etawah’s roots, however, did not 
lie in refugee rehabilitation, nor did the project there evolve into a dedicated training center 
for village-level workers. While not the first model village in north India, Nilokheri proved 
unique in that it represented a complete, self-sufficient town built by Partition’s refugees. 
Nilokheri marked independent India’s first state-led experiment in community 
development. As one of the new nation’s principal centers for rural extension training, it 
also appeared uniquely placed to teach effective rural development practices to the nation 
and the world. 
Further, Dey’s project at Nilokheri directly addressed the notion of reshaping 
individual citizens from within, instilling in them the knowledge and independence to work 
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ceaselessly in improving the community as a whole. Generally, the refugees who came to 
Nilokheri from the camp at Kurukshetra were of a class that Dey described with thinly-
veiled disdain as ‘the middlemen,’ meaning those unskilled in a manual trade or 
cultivation.251 He demanded that the citizens of the township should learn a trade and, with 
the help of generous loans and a constant stream of orders from the central government for 
its workshops, the project provided work for every resident during its first few years. Full 
employment, expansive public education facilities, and ambitious architectural plans for a 
central market designed by architect B. D. Manda left Nehru lamenting the project’s 
unsustainable expenses.252 Still, Nilokheri captured Nehru’s imagination for precisely 
these reasons, regularly luring him back for official visits through the 1950s. He also 
frequently directed foreign dignitaries from other nations to visit the township. For 
instance, the King and Queen of Nepal paid a visit to Nilokheri in late 1955 to inspect the 
central government’s Extension Education Institute. 253 The same royal trip included a visit 
to the new planned city of Chandigarh, the state capital of East Punjab planned by the 
renowned architect Le Corbusier, with a little help from Albert Mayer. 
 Beyond being showcased to the world, the growing township drew Nehru back on 
22 February 1950. Speaking to the people of Nilokheri, the Prime Minister labelled the 
rehabilitation town ‘a model to India’ and expressed hope that its growing fame would 
spread the model across the country and around the world. Shifting his tone, he also 
cautioned against “idlers” within the population: “Idlers are of two types. Poor displaced 
persons spend something but cannot produce. The others, called rich, spend and yet do not 
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produce. Both are idlers and live on the toils of others.”254 Nehru was quick to clarify that 
Nilokheri’s own citizens had proven themselves beneficial to the nation. Inspecting the 
township that same day, however, Nehru noted that while he had observed many men 
engaged in trades, he had seen few women in training. He warned the crowd that if “the 
other half does not join hands” in work, the nation could not hope to pull itself up from 
poverty Nehru’s remark foreshadowed a recurrent criticism of Indian community 
development programs that experts would struggle to address.255  
By the end of 1950 Dey’s work at Nilokheri had attracted the attention of Paul 
Hoffman, president of the Ford Foundation and former chief of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, which had implemented the Marshall Plan in Europe following the Second 
World War. Hoffman visited New Delhi in the spring of 1951, announcing a new, broadly 
international focus for the Ford Foundation’s philanthropic endeavors to halt the feared 
advance of Communism.256 Douglas Ensminger, the Ford Foundation’s new representative 
in India, also spent the year laying the groundwork for the inauguration of mass training in 
rural extension and agricultural development that the Foundation would coordinate with 
the Government of India during the coming year. This training marked the start of Ford’s 
broader initiative with the United States Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) to 
transmit agricultural expertise and deliver on an American promise to bring development 
to rural South Asia. Nilokheri, boasting a population of nearly six thousand rehabilitated 
refugees, would provide an ideal venue in which to train brigades of rural extension 
workers and administrators. 
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A MODEL OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT FOR THE WORLD 
On 5 January 1952, Prime Minister Nehru and United States Ambassador Chester 
Bowles met in New Delhi to sign the Indo-American Technical Agreement. As a product 
of President Harry Truman’s Point Four Program to share American ‘know-how’ and 
counter Soviet influence in the ‘underdeveloped’ world, the accord emphasized 
investments in agricultural development and rural reconstruction through the promise of 
$54 million (US) in technical assistance to India.257 That same week, Douglas Ensminger 
formally opened the Ford Foundation’s offices in New Delhi with the aim of building the 
close relationship between the two countries promised within the agreement. Ford had 
agreed to take the first step in that relationship by facilitating the training of six thousand 
new village-level workers to help organize and revitalize India’s 700,000 villages.258 
The case of Nilokheri and the broader community development efforts it inspired 
reveals how the ‘transnational development regime,’ as Subir Sinha terms it, expanded in 
north India in the wake of Partition.259 Sinha traces the lineage of this global economic 
phenomenon — including the institutions, practices, and assumptions of modern 
international development — to earlier rural reconstruction projects of Indian nationalists, 
British colonial officials, and American planners alike. Dey’s Nilokheri project and the 
national community development schemes it inspired built upon this heritage, but its 
unique origins in refugee rehabilitation and resettlement distinguish it from these 
predecessors. Like Jawaharlal Nehru before them, the Ford Foundation’s development 
experts took notice of Nilokheri precisely because of its origins as a vocational training 
initiative for unskilled refugees. 
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In July, Ensminger, along with agricultural and community development experts 
from the Ford Foundation and the TCA, travelled to Nilokheri to take part in the three-
week-long training of India’s first cohort of community “project executive officers.” From 
July 22 to August 16, 1952, several hundred trainees attended seminars and training 
workshops at the recently constructed Government Polytechnic. The rigorous training 
schedule represented the informal start of the national Community Development 
Programme officially launched by Nehru and Ensminger on October 2, 1952, the 
anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth.260 From the helm of the new Community Projects 
Administration, Dey would spearhead the movement, with the hundreds of project 
executive officers trained at Nilokheri overseeing extension efforts in their ‘development 
blocks’ of one hundred villages each. This hierarchy of expertise would form the core of 
the National Extension Service, with the goal of rapidly spreading the knowledge and 
practices of the community development movement across rural India.261 
This first cohort of Indian trainees at Nilokheri would organize wider rural reform 
efforts, serving as a critical link between the theory of community development and the 
farmers and villagers who constituted over eighty per cent of India’s population. At a 
higher level, Dey’s coordination with Ensminger in shaping India’s community 
development program served as a two-way street by which abstract thinking on village 
work might be tested and best practices could be determined. This intermingling of foreign 
interests and domestic priorities during the nascence of India’s community development 
program complicates interpretations of it as a predominantly external movement that 
entered South Asia following independence.  
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Inherited in part from the Rockefeller-funded work of the GEB in the southern 
United States, the American expertise surrounding community development and rural 
extension arrived in Nilokheri in the form of the first project officer training in the summer 
of 1952.262 With the trainees attending seminars on topics as varied as communicable 
disease prevention, social psychology, and cattle breeding, each topic representing a field 
of knowledge that both American and Indian farming experts equally deemed essential to 
improving agrarian life.263 The records of the proceedings compiled by the Community 
Project Administration show that representatives of India’s own agricultural universities, 
polytechnics, and government ministries made up the bulk of the rural extension trainers. 
Rather than representing an injection of foreign doctrines and methodologies, the Nilokheri 
training appears to have been more a gathering and sharing of India’s domestic expertise, 
at least to the extent that such expertise had received the Ford Foundation seal of approval. 
Contingents from the Ford Foundation and the TCA remained on-hand to observe and 
periodically offer lectures on rural life, public health, and the workings of government in 
the United States. They also fielded questions regarding the new Indo-American Technical 
Agreement, reminding the trainees of the generosity of the Ford Foundation and the new 
friendship being forged between the two democracies.  
On 15 August 1952, the fifth anniversary of India’s independence and the 
penultimate day of the training session, Dey delivered an address entitled, “A Road to New 
India,” to this first cohort of trainees. In his speech, he underscored the connection between 
the post-Partition refugee crisis, the potential of the community development movement, 
and the urgent need for the nation to expand agricultural production to compensate for the 
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losses of Partition. He observed that India’s fields could yield about one-third of the crops 
that could be grown in the fields of other nations. Dey attributed this shortcoming, not 
merely to soil exhaustion and the cultivation of low-yielding varieties of grains, but more 
specifically to the poor farming methods employed by India’s cultivators and resistance to 
modernizing improvements among the nation’s villagers. At the same time, Dey remarked 
that villagers could not themselves be entirely blamed for their lack of knowledge: “A 
hungry man who has no work to do has time hanging on him. In sheer self-defence, he 
builds an artificial world within himself from which he bolts the world without.”264 The 
task of the rural extension workers trained at Nilokheri, he argued, would be to bring reason 
and scientific knowledge into this artificial world of obstinate tradition. To support that 
work at the national level, the Government of India launched the National Extension 
Service in October 1953.265 This strategy, of course, closely resembled the late colonial era 
prerogatives of British agricultural officers and rural extension experimenters like Sam 
Higginbottom. In conversation with the continuing work at the missionary's Allahabad 
Agricultural Institute under the direction of Arthur T. Mosher, a doctrine of agricultural 
change would emerge from the combined efforts of India's community development and 
rural extension initiatives of the late 1950s. 
RECRUITING EXPERTS, TEACHING EXPERTISE 
A woman narrates the dramatic scene of her husband looming over her, demanding 
that she remain by his side in an Uttar Pradesh village. Crouched on a cot below him, she 
looks up toward the camera over his shoulder in desperation and pleads with him: “‘There’s 
a wall between us and the village people! Do you not understand that I cannot stay here?’ 
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But then, my husband spoke angrily and said, ‘It is my will.’ … It was his will.”266 
Produced by the Ford Foundation, and directed by Austrian-American filmmaker Ernest 
Kleinberg, the 1953 film Gaon Sathis (Friends of the Village) tells the story of a young, 
college-educated couple from Calcutta who volunteer to serve in the National Extension 
Program.267  
The pair receives training from a group of rural extension officers at the Ford-
funded Allahabad Agricultural Institute, modelled upon the training regimen that had 
become routine at Nilokheri. Their instructors represent the diversity and truly global 
nature of the community development movement, including two Indian men and an 
American woman known to the couple simply as ‘Molly.’ During their month at Allahabad, 
they train in improved farming methods, animal husbandry, and the basics of home 
economics. After their study is complete, the young couple cycles to the village site where 
they will share their newfound wisdom with the local farmers and their wives.  
Shot in color and intended as a recruitment tool for community project volunteers 
across South Asia, Gaon Sathis emphasized the challenges and rewards of community 
development work.268 Through collaboration with the Ford Foundation, Dey’s Community 
Projects Administration adopted an approach of training volunteers, typically educated 
city-dwellers with no prior experience in agricultural work, and dispatching them to India’s 
villages as rural extension workers. In support of that national project, Gaon Sathis 
communicated a message of determination and persistence in village work, even when 
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social barriers appeared impassable and when arduous labor yielded paltry results. The 
woman featured in the film represented the comfortably urban Indian, dragged along to the 
village by a more inspired husband and forced to learn harsh lessons of self-reliance and 
national service.  
In the end, she submits to her husband’s will and remains committed to the task of 
converting an unwelcoming village into a model of self-sufficient productivity. Strikingly, 
her submission contrasted with the sort of empowerment described in Renuka Ray's vision 
of an egalitarian India that revered women for sustaining both home and community. 
Almost magically, her decision to stick it out prompts the villagers to suddenly embrace 
the deeper-cutting plough, improved well technology, and reading lessons that the couple 
had been pitching to them for months. Gaon Sathis communicated the transformative 
potential of the methods and work ethic of Nilokheri, representing an effort to convert 
urban Indians into dedicated village-level workers, or gram sevaks. It also signified an 
evolving interplay between India’s Community Development and National Extension 
programs and the objectives of the Ford Foundation as they shifted toward a concerted 
push for greater food production.269 Further, Kleinberg’s film echoed contemporaneous 
efforts by independent India’s Films Division to define development as the ultimate civic 
goal of the new nation. As Peter Sutoris has shown, the Films Division’s post-Partition 
efforts sought to enlist public participation in development schemes while asserting a 
vision of modernity defined and directed by government experts.270 In much the same way, 
Kleinberg’s Gaon Sathis portrays official expertise steering a dutiful citizenry toward 
progress, albeit with initial resistance from the female character in the film.  
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As depicted in Gaon Sathis, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute served as the main 
center through which the Ford Foundation launched its rural extension initiative in India in 
1952. Under the direction of Arthur T. Mosher, the institution continued under the banner 
of Christian missionary work, even placing the slogan, "A Christian Institute of Rural Life 
— Founded by Sam Higgnbottom," on its letterhead.271 At the same time, Mosher geared 
the Allahabad Agricultural Institute toward projecting the image of serious research at the 
intersection of the agricultural and social sciences. To that end, Mosher and his successor, 
J. B. Chitambar, established undergraduate and graduate courses in Agricultural 
Economics and Home Economics to cater to rising Indian students who represented the 
nation's  next generation of rural extension officers and administrators.272 To accomplish 
these goals, Mosher and Chitambar pushed the institute into closer financial and 
programmatic relationships with the Ford and Rockefeller foundations through the 1950s. 
Beyond  hosting rural extension trainings for the new recruits to India's National Extension 
Service, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute also became involved in discussions 
surrounding India's population growth and food supply situation. As early as 1950, for 
instance, Mosher drew up pamphlets for circulation among the farming communities of 
Uttar Pradesh, offering simple farming advice as well as warnings against inadequate crop 
production in the face of rising populations. One poster for instance, bore a warning in both 
Hindi and English: "Bahut se muha, khana kam (Too many mouths, not enough food)."273 
Above the text, an illustration of several farm animals and a smiling baby hovered over the 
image of a farmer sitting down to enjoy a meal. The text continued below:  
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You know many people in our country are starving. Where does the food go? 
Cows eat some, parrots eat some, rats and wild animals eat some. Our babies do 
not get enough. What shall we do?274 
Rather than offering a clear answer to the question, the poster appears to have been more 
an advertisement for the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, encouraging farmers to avoid 
wastage and also to visit the institute itself for more information on improved agricultural 
methods. In this way, Mosher's institution worked to build both its programming and its 
profile in Allahabad, engaging concerns over food shortage and population growth to 
advocate for the fertilizer-fed and tractor-driven agriculture demonstrated within its rural 
extension programs. 
Through the early 1950s, Mosher also developed a regular correspondence with J. 
G. Harrar and Warren Weaver of the Rockefeller Foundation — a continuation of the 
connection his predecessor Higginbottom had cultivated with John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 
Mosher, who was also affiliated with Cornell University, informed the Rockefeller 
Foundation that he planned to expand the institution at Allahabad in February 1956.275 
Building off financial support from the Ford Foundation, Mosher wrote that he hoped to 
raise a further $1 million to improve the rural extension training courses held at Allahabad. 
He encouraged Rockefeller to help him in the quest to increase attendance at his institution 
and to begin with a $300,000 donation to create a reserve fund that could be called upon in 
the future to expand the reach of extension work across Uttar Pradesh. In his diary, Harrar 
recorded his skepticism of the project, noting that he could not find the logic in turning 
over so much money to Mosher to be held in reserve.276 Harrar did, however, believe that 
Mosher's underlying plans for amplifying his institution's work in rural extension were 
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sound and Rockefeller continued to support the institute's education programming through 
smaller grants into the early 1960s. 
The model of expert-driven agricultural development being driven by simultaneous 
programs at Allahabad under Mosher and Nilohkeri under Dey pursued the objective of 
stimulating vas food production increases through social intervention and rural education. 
By the middle of 1953, the Nilokheri project’s initial goal of refugee rehabilitation merged 
with state and philanthropic efforts to increase grain yields, shifting strategy to help pick 
up the slack of the unsuccessful Grow More Food program.277 Beyond converting displaced 
persons into model villagers through the lessons of hard work, vocational training, and 
improved farming methods, the Ford Foundation’s brand of community development now 
sought to establish India’s self-sufficiency in food production. The methods of rural 
extension training elaborated at Nilokheri’s education centers would prove vital in this 
effort, converting urban Indians into village workers and program executives. Along the 
same lines, the May 1953 issue of Kurukshetra attempted to resolve the broad social focus 
of India’s community development push with increasing demands from Nehru and the 
Planning Commission for tangible results in increasing food production. For instance, V. 
T. Krishnamachari, deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, drew a direct 
connection between rural unemployment and food production deficits.278 Considering the 
issue a “human problem” and citing the limited success of the Grow More Food 
Programme, Krishnamachari advocated for increases in rural employment coupled with the 
introduction of “scientific agricultural methods.” While agricultural science and new 
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fertilizers, seeds, and farming technologies could increase grain yields over time, 
Krishnamachari argued that only the promotion of “self-help and self-reliance” could 
organize rural Indians into a truly productive agricultural labor force.279 The broad social 
objectives of community development and the knowledge network building of the rural 
extension program could thus be harnessed to achieve concrete economic ends. 
Along with regular issues of the journal Kurukshetra, the government printing press 
at Nilokheri published a wide array of training guides and manuals intended for the 
education of prospective village-level workers and program executives. One such manual 
written by Douglas Ensminger, A Guide to Community Development, rolled off the presses 
at Nilokheri in January 1957. Containing a glowing preface by Dey who had recently been 
elevated by Nehru to the post of Minister of Community Development, the guide served as 
a handbook for training extension worker who would in turn educate village-level workers 
and villagers themselves. Dey and Ensminger’s handbook represented the accumulated 
development training expertise of the first four years of the Community Development and 
National Extension Programs. To clarify the aims of the community development 
movement, Ensminger introduced the ‘Philosophy and Basic Principles of Extension 
Education’ in notably vague terms: “Extension is changing attitudes, knowledge and skills 
of all the people,” he wrote. “Extension is ‘learning by doing’ and ‘seeing is believing.’”280 
On that note, the guide turned to describe the best methods that rural extension 
workers should employ to impart their knowledge to villagers. Ensminger suggested that 
extension workers introduce new concepts of improved farming methods and sanitation 
through the use of visual aids such as film strips, flash cards, puppets, and 
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“flannelgraphs.”281 The flannelgraph, he explained, was a Ford Foundation innovation 
employing strips of flannel felt on a bulletin board. The strips could be arranged into pie 
charts and bar graphs along with drawings and photographs to illustrate numerical data 
regarding crop yields and budget management in an accessible way. Ensminger waxed 
poetic concerning the proven effectiveness of the method in communicating critical 
information, but he cautioned meticulous extension trainees: “YOUR FLANNELGRAPH 
DOES NOT HAVE TO BE PRETTY.”282 With these teaching tools in-hand, Ensminger 
and Dey dispatched newly-minted village level workers across rural India as 
representatives of the National Extension Service. 
The community development handbooks distributed by Dey’s Ministry of 
Community Development also stressed strategies and techniques expanding India’s food 
supply through a broader engagement of village populations. Published in October 1958, 
The Gram Sevak’s Guide for Increasing Agricultural Production offered a condensed, print 
version of the training exercises being perfected at Nilokheri. In particular, the guide 
emphasized instruction in the use of insecticides, chemical fertilizers, and high-yield seed 
varieties within development blocks. To that end, the official handbook encouraged village 
workers to provide visual instruction to farmers, following up with verbal tests to confirm 
comprehension.  
Perhaps addressing concerns over the shortcomings of community development 
initiatives, The Gram Sevak’s Guide also devoted an entire chapter to the engagement of 
village women. As the handbook indicated: ‘Each mother wants the very best for her 
children. You must use this interest to bring about the changes necessary for improved 
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agriculture which will then improve family living.’283 Further, the guide instructed village-
level workers to encourage local mothers to alter their cooking practices to maximize the 
nutritional value of certain foods and to add milk and vegetables into meals, thus relieving 
the reliance upon food grains. In this way, village-workers could appeal to motherhood to 
advance the cause of increased agricultural production for the nation. Community 
development’s engagement of village women represented a means to the end of ensuring 
India’s food security, but such training texts remained largely silent regarding the education 
or empowerment of women as agricultural experts or primary cultivators themselves. 
TERMINATING THE EXPERIMENT 
With Dey’s Ministry of Community Development reaching over 200,000 of India’s 
580,000 villages through rural extension efforts by 1957, the humble program begun at the 
Kurukshetra camp attained almost unrecognizable bureaucratic dimensions (Ensminger 
1957, i). Nevertheless, the wide community development collaboration between the 
Government of India and the Ford Foundation remained grounded in the principle that 
vocational training and work were all that India’s villagers needed to thrive. Anyone could 
be trained and educated in this optimistic model, be they refugees from West Pakistan, 
farmers from Uttar Pradesh, or bureaucrats from Calcutta. That said, internal criticisms of 
India’s community programs had already begun to build. 
In 1955, for instance, the Planning Commission’s second annual review of the 
initiatives of the Community Projects Administration found that the community 
development push had failed to engage village women in any meaningful way: ‘In most 
places, lack of clear-cut programs for women is the main reason why they remain more or 
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less untouched by these [community development] activities.’284 Although generally 
positive about the community development concept, the Planning Commission concluded 
that dedicated resources for village women remained rare in most development blocks, 
resulting in their exclusion from programming. This limited approach, the Commission 
found, could promote gender inequities and social injustice on a large scale. 
Two years later, the Government of India enlisted Balwantrai Mehta, the Gujarati 
politician who would design the decentralized framework of Panchayati Raj, to assess 
India’s Community Development and National Extension Service programs. Mehta and 
his team concluded that the programs had largely neglected practical improvements in 
agriculture and had focused far too heavily on welfare provision in the villages. More 
importantly, Mehta contended, community development had evolved over four years to 
become a scheme of bureaucratic centralization with the program’s chosen experts 
wielding far too much local decision-making power.285 
The 1957 Mehta Report marked the beginning of a shift in public and official 
opinions of community development in India, prompting calls for the decentralization of 
rural development projects. With the community development initiative requiring frequent 
reports from its local representatives and decisions filtering down from the Ministry of 
Community Development’s central office, the report explained that the ministry had drawn 
too much power into New Delhi. As Mehta wrote: “There has to be an act of faith in 
democracy.”286 Further, Dey himself conceded that overlapping responsibilities to various 
government agencies and ministers compelled many village-level workers to file nearly 
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three hundred reports on the most basic aspects of their work per year.287 In this way, even 
the founder of India’s community development program recognized its bureaucratic 
tendencies. As official interest waned in the wake of the Mehta Report and the actual 
impact of India’s community development push came under further scrutiny, funding for 
such programming wound down through the early 1960s and the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture ultimately absorbed Dey’s Community Development Ministry in 1966. 
CONCLUSION 
For Nilokheri, the end of community development’s heyday in India during the 
1950s and early 1960s did not necessarily spell its doom. Dey’s direct oversight of the 
project ended by the mid-1950s as his official career at the Central Secretariat in New Delhi 
gained traction. By early 1961, over eight thousand people lived in the township, no longer 
an exclusively refugee population. As Dey recalled, with the withdrawal of direct 
government funding for artisanal and agricultural production, unemployment rose to over 
seventy per cent, approximately matching average figures for the surrounding 
countryside.288 Despite torrential floods in 1957 and devolution of town management to 
the state government of Punjab and then to Haryana, the town remained a national hub for 
rural extension training and education. Nilokheri continued to host the Extension Education 
Institute, the Social Education Organisers’ Training Centre, the Orientation and Study 
Centre, and the Punjab Polytechnic into the early 1960s – three of which remain important 
regional institutions today. 
With its legacy in post-Partition refugee rehabilitation, national extension efforts 
and the community development movement in India contributed to the systems of 
knowledge sharing and rural organization associated with the Green Revolution of the late 
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1960s and 1970s. As Abid Hussain, Indian economist and ambassador to the United States, 
wrote of the ‘technological model’ that characterized the Green Revolution: 
What has been forgotten by most commentators is that this technological model 
would not have successfully diffused in the country were it not for the 
infrastructure built so carefully by S. K. Dey and his dedicated band of followers 
in the 1950s. It is village and block-level infrastructure built up under the 
community development program that has served as a delivery system.289 
The origins of the post-independence push toward agricultural development and rural 
extension drew significantly upon the crisis management work of India’s Ministry of 
Rehabilitation. Over the decade following Partition, the Government of India’s emphasis 
on community development would shift toward a focus on increasing food production, 
through social and then scientific and technological investments.  
As the sheer bureaucracy of the new Ministry of Community Development 
hampered its progress in the early 1960s, the Ford Foundation’s own philanthropic 
priorities shifted toward funding direct innovations in agricultural science and agronomy 
to pursue the coveted goal of exponentially greater grain yields.290 Nevertheless, S. K. 
Dey’s national community development program influenced the evolution of Panchayati 
Raj — modern India’s system of decentralized village governance — and established 
lasting institutions of agricultural knowledge sharing and rural extension training. These 
efforts had been informed and shaped by the experience of rehabilitation.  
The entry of American philanthropic organizations, planners, and scientists onto 
the scene during the 1950s accelerated the process of reshaping rural India along lines 
geared toward ever greater production of food grains. Further, they connected India into a 
growing global networked focused upon addressing the perceived postwar population crisis 
through wide-ranging community development initiatives. As Andrew Zimmerman has 
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observed of the earlier promise of agricultural modernization forwarded by the scientists 
of the American Tuskegee Institute as they sought to extend cotton production in German-
administered Togo in 1901: “Agriculture had always involved modification through 
selection, and the global commodities markets of the nineteenth century expanded this 
ancient element of agriculture into a means of labor coercion.”291 Much the same could be 
said of food grain cultivation in the mid-twentieth century. Further, given the influence on 
the GEB’s work in the American South upon the agenda of the Allahabad Agricultural 
Institute under Sam Higginbottom and later Arthur T. Mosher, rural extension efforts 
descended from an impetus to make cash cropping more productive and, in turn, more 
lucrative. Transcending both racial and political boundaries, the economic imperative for 
a regimented agricultural labor force to meet the needs of production emerged in East 
Punjab and West Bengal in the 1950s, just as it had in Togo in the early 1900s and in the 
American South before that. 
The trajectory of community development in India and its legacy in the contentious 
interventions of the later Green Revolution can be more fully understood in the specific 
context of Partition, independent India’s refugee crisis, and the perceived pressures both 
placed upon the new nation’s ability to feed its growing population. The Nilokheri 
experiment began under the banner of Mazdoor Manzil at the Kurukshetra refugee camp 
in the direct aftermath of Partition. Dey’s conception of Mazdoor Manzil as an ideal of 
cooperative learning, hard work, and self-reliance transplanted easily from the chaos on 
that epic battlefield into the fertile ground of the global community development 
movement. Yet, for all the optimism of subsequent community development initiatives and 
the ambition of India’s nationwide effort to transform average citizens into extension 
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experts, state-led community development in the vein of Nilokheri began first and foremost 
as an effort to convert Partition’s refugees into productive agriculturalists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112 
Chapter Three: Nourishing the Body 
Born in Calcutta to a prominent family of educators, civil servants, and Brahmo 
Samaj reformers in 1904, Renuka Ray became a devoted follower of Mahatma Gandhi at 
the age of sixteen. At Gandhi’s urging, she read for her B.Sc. at the London School of 
Economics and returned to India in 1921 to begin her work with the All India Women’s 
Conference. After representing India’s women in both the Central Legislative Assembly 
and the Constituent Assembly of India during the final decade of British rule, Ray 
dedicated herself to the millions of refugees displaced from East Pakistan.292 As Minister 
of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Government of West Bengal from 1952 to 1957, she 
worked to secure homes and employment, effectively managing the state’s transition from 
rehabilitation to community development programming.293 Now a member of the Lok 
Sabha and chair of the Ministry of Health’s 1960 School Health Committee, Ray turned 
her attention to ensuring that children received nutritious daily meals in schools across 
India. In addition to Ray, the committee included the nation’s top nutritional scientists and 
dietitians, including C. Gopalan of the Nutrition Research Laboratory in Hyderabad, 
Muktha Sen of the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta, and M. 
Swaminathan of the new Central Food Technological Research Institute in Mysore. 
Decades of research at their respective institutions left the solution to the problem of 
malnutrition among India’s schoolchildren abundantly clear. As Ray wrote in an article in 
the Illustrated Weekly of India in October 1961: 
A school meal must necessarily make use of locally available food-stuffs and 
should provide approximately 1/3 of the dietary and nutritional requirements of 
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the child. This is the opinion of the nutritional experts who have been working in 
different experimental centres and laboratories.294 
Indeed, Ray continued, nutritional scientists at the Nutrition Research Laboratories had 
determined that daily meals at a cost of only twelve new paise could provide schoolchildren 
with the minimum calories needed to support healthy growth.295 At just over one-tenth of 
one Indian rupee per day, the sum seemed a small price to pay to see India’s schoolchildren 
into adulthood. Further, Ray’s advocacy for school meals in India reflected a broader global 
trend in attending to the nutritional needs of children in an educational setting. In Britain, 
for instance, the Education Act of 1944 required that local authorities provide resources for 
school meals.296 This innovation came as an echo of what James Vernon has called the 
“humanitarian discover of hunger” and served as a vital site of nutrition planning in 
postwar Britain and the United States.297 
In addition to humanitarian imperatives, Ray emphasized a higher motive behind 
the need for state intervention in feeding the nation’s youth. As she wrote: “Once our 
children are given the opportunity to build up healthy minds and healthy bodies, it will be 
through their effort that we shall be able to generate wealth and welfare for our nation.”298 
In conceiving of India’s children as the offspring of the entire community, Ray cast the 
young themselves as an economic resource, a vital means by which the nation could ensure 
its prosperity and security for decades to come. Ray’s association of the nutritional welfare 
of vulnerable populations—including children, pregnant women, and the poor—with the 
overall material progress of the young nation echoed the concerns and findings of 
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nutritional scientists and dietitians working across South Asia during the two decades 
following the Second World War. During this period, the Government of India collaborated 
with the Rockefeller Foundation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) to deploy the nutritional 
sciences in the quest to both identify and eliminate the chief causes of malnutrition across 
the nation.  
These efforts built upon a colonial scientific legacy, drawing directly from the 
investigations and methods pioneered in India by D. McCay and Robert McCarrison 
through the 1910s and 1920s at Calcutta’s Medical College and the Nutrition Research 
Laboratories at Coonoor, respectively. McCay’s work offered a “scientific, nutrition-based 
rationale for the martial races theory” that effectively identified dietary proteins—and not 
heredity, race, or climate—as the primary driver of differences in human physique.299 In 
South India, McCarrison’s efforts identified vitamin deficiency as the cause of beriberi and 
goiter and also corroborated McCay’s earlier theories through experiments with laboratory 
rats.300 As David Arnold rightly notes of the nutritional sciences as they grew up during 
the late colonial era, “Although developments in India were obviously contingent upon 
metropolitan concerns […] the uses to which nutritional ideas were put and the contexts in 
which they were examined and applied owed much to local circumstances and 
perceptions.”301 Much the same could be said of the intellectual descendants of these 
nutritional notions as they matured in South Asia during the Second World War, past 
independence, and through the 1950s.  
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This chapter examines how investments made in India by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the FAO following the war transformed and amplified the capacity of the 
nutritional sciences in India, while interacting with specific local concerns and contexts. 
The exchange of scientific knowledge and expertise that followed profoundly shaped the 
public health priorities of both Rockefeller and the FAO. Into the 1960s, the laboratory 
unfolded into the field as nutritional and agricultural scientists became increasingly 
engaged with one another’s efforts. Beyond financing wider investigations into the diseases 
of deficiency-related malnutrition, Rockefeller and FAO helped to draw India’s nutritional 
research institutions further into a widening global network of scientific expertise. The 
research agenda set out by late colonial nutritional scientists would come to interact closely 
with the priorities of the production-focused brand of agricultural science advanced by the 
Rockefeller and Ford foundations through the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, scientists 
at the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor and the All-India Institute of Hygiene 
and Public Health in Calcutta vigorously pursued a focus on childhood and maternal 
nutrition, as well as the dietary health of the rural laborers and the poor. Bolstered by the 
financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation and the FAO, these inquiries converted 
vulnerable populations into unwitting subjects upon whom new notions of nutritional 
health could be tested.302 
SURVEYING NUTRITIONAL HEALTH 
Gathering physiological, socioeconomic, and dietary data on India’s population 
was a central priority of the nutritional scientists from their first dedicated explorations of 
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diseases of deficiency in India in the 1910s and 1920s. As Kenneth J. Carpenter has shown, 
rapid developments in the identification of vitamins (or “vital amines” as they were first 
labeled by Polish biochemist Casimir Funk in 1911) propelled scientific explorations of 
deficiency diseases like pellagra, scurvy, and rickets across Europe, the Americas, and, 
increasingly, Asia.303 Owing to rapid advances in biochemical research and nutritional 
survey methodologies in Europe and the United States, as well as the burgeoning 
recruitment of physicians, chemists, and biologists into the nutritional sciences around the 
globe, the 1930s came to be known by later nutritionists as “the golden age of nutrition.”304 
Indeed, in colonial India, the British administration established the Indian Research Fund 
Association in 1911 to coordinate and finance medical research across the subcontinent. 
The Association would come to play a central role in coordinating nutritional research 
across India during the interwar years and beyond, itself receiving regular financial support 
from the Rockefeller Foundation.305 Through the 1930s, the Indian Research Fund 
Association contributed a lakh of rupees annually toward emerging nutrition research at 
two institutions: the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta and the 
Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor in the southern reaches of the Madras 
Presidency.306  
Well into the 1940s, the two institutions represented colonial India’s only dedicated 
centers for laboratory and field research in the nutritional sciences. Both drew upon the 
legacies of the physiologist McCay and the physician McCarrison, with the All-India 
Institute emphasizing field research and the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor 
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focusing on laboratory and clinical investigations.307 While McCay pursued field 
investigations of diets and nutritional health in Bengal’s jails, laboratory research stood at 
the center of McCarrison’s influential vision of the emerging nutritional sciences. 
Beginning in the mid-1940s with increased colonial funding for evaluations of India’s 
health status, the use of surveys featured prominently within the efforts of nutritional 
scientists and dietitians at the All-India Institute. Scientists employed nutrition surveys, in 
which the physiological states of patients were assessed—whether through physical 
measurement, visual observation, or biochemical analyses. Diet surveys were also 
employed to determine not just what kinds of food Indians ate, but when and how much 
they consumed of them and how they prepared their meals.308  
Though based in Calcutta, the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health 
(AIIH&PH) maintained an expansive research unit in the countryside, just twenty miles 
northwest of the city. Termed the Singur Health Unit, the area was not a discrete “unit” of 
any explicit design, but rather a swath of the Bengali countryside, consisting of eight 
distinct villages separated by rice paddies and marshes—an ideal sample area in which to 
conduct rural health research.309 In 1944, the Singur Health Unit covered a population of 
about 63,000 and consisted of the four Union Boards of Singur, Balarampati, Bora, and 
Begumpur.310 Established in December 1943 as a joint venture of the colonial Government 
of India and the provincial Government of Bengal, the Health Unit provided the physicians, 
biochemists, and public health experts of the All-India Institute with a dedicated venue in 
which to train, practice medicine, and conduct large-scale surveys and experiments in rural 
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health. Incidentally, AIIH&PH investigators noted that while the Singur study area did not 
suffer disproportionately from the effects of the famine that devastated the eastern Bengali 
countryside, the food crisis did prompt institute officials to introduce a system of rationing 
in rice, atta, salt, and sugar for the residents of Singur, Balarambati, Bora, and 
Begumpur.311  
In 1949, R. B. Lal, director of the institute, and S. C. Seal, the institute’s secretary, 
described the Health Unit’s primary purpose as the “coordination of curative and 
preventive functions under a single administration in order to achieve the maximum 
results.”312 In this way, the Singur Health Unit offered an ideal venue in which the experts 
of the All-India Institute could develop practical medical skills and train in the observation 
and experimentation methods associated with preventive medicine. As Lal and Seal noted:     
The Singur Health Unit provides […] a controlled rural community field for 
investigation and for teaching of public health analogous in function to the 
provision to pre-clinical sections of a medical college their own laboratories and 
to clinical sections of their own teaching hospitals. In addition, it provides the 
opportunity to investigate the best ways of applying the results of medical 
knowledge to the requirements of rural units of population within existing 
economic practicability.313  
More than enabling a convenient convergence of curative and preventive methods, the 
Singur area also offered a set of communities that could be demarcated as experimental 
and control groups, to enable a clearer scientific understanding of rural India’s health 
challenges and, more specifically, the relationship between rural poverty and the 
prevalence of diseases of deficiency.  
In theory, experiments conducted upon Singur’s “controlled rural community” 
would illuminate how dietary deficiencies could affect whole populations within India. 
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With the rising prominence of the nutritional sciences through the 1940s, malnutrition and 
diseases of deficiency marked one of the chief fields of study for the All-India Institute 
scientists and physicians conducting their work in the region. Indeed, nutritional health 
played an implicit role in all the scientific investigations carried out within the study area. 
For the purposes of studies conducted through the Singur Health Centre, the study's chiefly 
Bengali investigators defined a family simply as a “unit having a common kitchen.”314 
Whether a family was ‘single’ or ‘joint’ would be determined by the actual relationships 
at-hand, but the kitchen provided the focal point around which All-India Institutes 
surveyors grouped all families. In this way, communal eating and cooking habits proved 
central to researchers’ understanding of how communities functioned and how population 
groups could be compared to one another. Further, the investigators' definition of a family 
as centered around a kitchen — presumably in which women would do the bulk of the 
cooking — seemed to foreshadow Renuka Ray's nationalistic notion of women's 
homemaking as vital to the nation as "home is the nucleus of the nation."315 
The 1944 study of nutritional health in the Singur area concluded that vitamin 
deficiencies were widespread among the villagers.316 Although biochemical analyses 
proved impracticable in the study’s first round for lack of adequate laboratory facilities, 
All-India Institute surveyors relied on systematic clinical examinations to record the visible 
effects of such deficiencies. Employing clinical methods such as weighing and measuring 
bodies, as well examining eyes, hair, teeth, and fingernails, surveyors estimated 
percentages of the population suffering from iron and vitamins A, B, C, and D deficiencies. 
With these rough methods and observation techniques, surveyors concluded that nearly 
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forty percent of the Singur Health Unit’s population suffered from some degree of 
malnutrition.317 With these rough but sobering estimates, Lal and Seal speculated as to the 
causes of each of these deficiencies, particularly among the children of the study area. As 
they wrote: “Racial factors, heredity, etc., may also contribute to their shares, but there can 
be little doubt that a great deal can be done towards bringing the inafnts (sic) and children 
nearer to passable standards...”318 In this way, racial and eugenic thinking regarding the 
causes of deficiencies lingered in the minds of the nutritional scientist of the All-India 
Institute as late as 1949, but the simple notion that much could be done to improve such 
outcomes through changes in diet prevailed. 
In late 1944, the Rockefeller Foundation’s board of scientific directors voted to 
finance the on-going study of nutritional conditions in the Singur Health Unit in the wake 
of the catastrophic famine that swept the province from 1943 to 1944. In cooperation with 
the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, Rockefeller’s earliest venture into 
nutritional surveying in late colonial India centered on the Singur Health Unit. Meeting in 
New York in October 1944, the scientific directors of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
International Health Division (IHD) approved a three-year commitment to this new 
collaboration with the All-India Institute. At just $4,455 with similar contributions over the 
next three years, Rockefeller’s financial contributions to the study hardly represented a 
mammoth investment. At the same time, the move to supplement the ongoing nutritional 
research in Bengal diverged from the IHD’s running focus upon ringworm and malaria 
control in South Asia. Discussing malnutrition as a major under-investigated public health 
concern in colonial India, the directors emphasized that the lessons to be drawn from such 
work could be transferred to other national contexts around the world. As they noted, 
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“Nutrition and malnutrition are probably more significant public health problems in India 
than in any other country. Diet surveys have been carried out in different regions but only 
through the rough techniques of either diet or weighing.”319 Such clinical and dietary 
surveys, Rockefeller’s scientific directors concluded, needed to be complemented with 
further population studies based upon “biochemical and other more refined techniques” to 
provide a standard against which existing data might be assessed.320 Patchy colonial 
measurements could thus be refined and merged with more robust scientific data, enabling 
definitive conclusions about the state of India’s nutritional health. 
To that end, the scientists at the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health 
drew upon a recent precedent in nutritional surveying in an important study recently 
conducted in Britain by Oxford physiologist Hugh Macdonald Sinclair and funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation. The Oxford Nutrition Survey, as it came to be known, represented 
a groundbreaking investigation of the nutritional deficiencies prevalent under Britain’s 
wartime food rationing regime.321 In particular, Sinclair’s survey involved biochemical 
assessments of population groups considered most likely to suffer from malnutrition, such 
as children, pregnant women, the elderly, and the poor. In Oxford, for instance, two groups 
of working-class women and their newborn children were evaluated by researchers in 1942 
and 1944.322 The study involved the distribution of dietary questionnaires and the analysis 
of blood and urine samples. Among pregnant working-class women in particular, 
biochemical analyses indicated significant deficiencies in vitamins A and C, with similar 
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deficiencies in iron and protein. In response to these findings, Britain’s Ministries of Health 
and Food began distributing orange juice and cod-liver oil to pregnant women in 1942. The 
ministries replaced these supplements with vitamin tablets containing vitamins A and D in 
early 1943, and ultimately added in extra rations of milk, eggs, and meat for new and 
expectant mothers and their infants.323 In this way, the Oxford Nutrition Survey offered the 
nutritional scientists and dietitians of the All-India Institute a clear set of best practices, not 
only for conducting large-scale studies among at-risk populations, but for channeling their 
findings into concrete welfare policies. 
While the survey conducted in Singur in 1944 and 1945 by the All-India Institute 
represented the first such project supported by Rockefeller in South Asia, the foundation 
had financed similar initiatives tracking the connection between privation and malnutrition 
during the Second World War and in its immediate aftermath. The majority of such studies 
investigated maternal, infant, and childhood nutrition, as well as clinical cases of deficiency 
diseases such as goiter, rickets, and pellagra. Beyond the Oxford Nutrition Survey, the 
Rockefeller Foundation also coordinated survey-based research into the pre- and postnatal 
nutrition of mothers at the Tacuba Health Center in Mexico City.324 Through the IHD, 
Rockefeller also financed nutritional health surveys of schoolchildren in North Carolina 
and Tennessee during the war years. Finally, as the First Canadian Army fought to expel 
German forces from the Netherlands in the early months of 1945, the Rockefeller 
Foundation moved in to collaborate with the Netherlands Military Administration in an 
extensive survey of famine-stricken areas of the country.  In the Netherlands, Rockefeller 
supported the establishment of street clinics to ascertain average caloric intake values 
among the population—the figure stood between 800 and 1,000 calories per day in April 
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1945.325 Strikingly, the work of such street clinics in the war-torn Netherlands provided 
researchers with a wide population sample, permitting a rare expansion beyond nutritional 
scientists’ usual focus upon maternal, infant, and childhood nutritional health. 
UNFOLDING THE LABORATORY INTO THE FIELD 
Determined to build upon the methods pioneered in the Oxford Nutrition Survey, 
the Rockefeller Foundation enthusiastically endorsed the methodologies of the Singur 
Nutrition Survey in 1945. A Rockefeller-financed study launched in 1942 in the working 
class, industrial towns of Accrington in Lancashire, Merthyr and Tydfill in Wales, and the 
Borough of Chesterfield in Derbyshire provided the conceptual basis for the nutrition 
survey of Singur.326 This survey had gathered and assessed nutritional data from 50 
families, or roughly 200 individuals, and corresponded with an investigation into the 
socioeconomic and housing conditions of each family.327 All-India Institute surveyors also 
collected biochemical samples (urine and blood) across the study area to permit 
physiological comparisons between different socioeconomic groups. In the Singur Health 
Unit, careful studies of the living conditions and financial considerations of the 
impoverished farmers and villagers who made up the bulk of the sample enabled Lal and 
Seal to create the profile of an ‘average’ villager living in the study area. As they wrote: 
Food absorbs nearly 90 per cent of the total money value available for 
consumption and little is left for other expenses. Of the main items other than 
food, fuel and lighting, interest on loans and taxes take away the major part. 
Money spent on education is negligible, but medicines and medical advice claim 
an appreciable share in the family budget. No comments are necessary to 
emphasise the point that sheer necessities to keep body and soul together take 
away all that the poor man can manage to spend on himself.328 
                                                
325 Ibid., 75. 
326 “Proposals for Survey of Nutritional Conditions in Selected Area of Singur Scheme,” November 1944, 
Folder 1, Box 1, Series 464, RG 1.1, Projects, RF, RAC. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Lal and Seal, 96. 
 124 
With this profile derived from the basic questions regarding the living conditions in the 
study area, the Rockefeller-funded All-India Institute began to forge a more holistic 
understanding of the causes of nutrition-related illness. Scarcely able to purchase enough 
food, villagers could hardly be expected to procure the right kinds of food with which to 
stave off deficiencies and malnutrition.329 Beyond providing methodological inspiration 
and prompting the inclusion of an emphasis upon material living conditions within the 
Singur nutrition studies, Sinclair’s Oxford Nutrition Survey also lent the All-India Institute 
and the Rockefeller Foundation the tools necessary to field a comparable study in rural 
India. In October 1944, Rockefeller’s board of scientific directors specifically referenced 
the work of A. P. Meiklejohn, an Oxford-trained dietitian who collaborated with Sinclair 
in developing the mobile scientific units deployed during the survey.330 The mobile unit 
model would be employed in Singur to enable the All-India Institute’s researchers to more 
effectively collect biochemical samples in rural settings, thus transporting the nutrition 
laboratory into the field.  
Scientists working on the nutritional surveys of the Singur Health Unit at the end 
of the Second World War referred to extensive laboratory research conducted over two 
decades in South India, exploring the connections between diet and diseases of deficiency. 
The assumptions and conclusions of the body of laboratory work pursued at the Nutrition 
Research Laboratories at Coonoor would significantly shape nutritional surveying in 
Indian in the postwar era. Seemingly a world away from Singur and the alluvial plains of 
rural Bengal, the Nutrition Research Laboratories sat high in the Nilgiri Mountains of the 
southern Madras Presidency in modern-day Tamil Nadu. Beginning as a one-room unit of 
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the larger Pasteur Institute of Southern India, the Nutrition Research Laboratories 
originated with Robert McCarrison’s initial studies of beriberi in 1918.331 The institution 
grew haltingly through the 1920s as a research division dedicated to the study of beriberi 
and then of deficiency diseases more generally, including goiter and other thyroid 
disorders. By 1927, McCarrison’s division had grown large enough to justify its separation 
from the Pasteur Institute as an entirely new institution.332 With financing from the 
government of the Madras Presidency and the Indian Research Fund Association, 
McCarrison formally dedicated the new institution to the investigation of nutritional health 
across India, including “the study of the Agricultural aspects of Nutrition” and “the 
determination of the food values of various food materials in general use in India.”333 First 
and foremost, however, the Nutrition Research Laboratories would be dedicated to the 
identification of the causes of malnutrition across India.  
While the emergent nutritional sciences acknowledged concerns regarding 
overpopulation, nutritionists like McCarrison remained optimistic that dietary changes — 
and not necessarily radical increases in the food supply — would best promote public 
welfare. Providing testimony to the field team of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in 
India that visited Coonoor in 1927, McCarrison defined malnutrition as “the impairment 
of the normal physiological processes of the body consequent on the use of a food which 
is deficient in quality although it may be abundant in quantity.”334 This notion of correcting 
deficiency, both in diets broadly and particular food items more specifically, guided 
successive investigations at the Nutrition Research Laboratories through McCarrison’s 
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tenure as director of the institution and long after his retirement in 1935.335 As Sunil Amrith 
argues, “Although the nutritional thought of the 1930s touched upon concerns about India’s 
growing population, the emphasis on nutrition and sanitation worked, in many cases, 
against the popular claims of eugenicists.”336 The nutritional sciences placed great 
emphasis upon the resolvable nature of diseases of deficiency. Cases of rickets could be 
prevented with sufficient vitamin D; instances of stunting could be averted with adequate 
maternal and infantile nutrition. Indeed, nutritional surveys commissioned between 1935 
and 1945 by McCarrison’s successor, W. R. Aykroyd, lent further credence to emerging 
theories regarding the dietary origins of the physiological differences between Indians. 
Such hypotheses seemingly undermined eugenic notions of race and environment as crucial 
factors in determining differences in stamina and physique. 
Viewed as essential to correcting the deficiencies and malnutrition that threatened 
the health of India’s population, the Nutrition Research Laboratories worked to compile a 
bulletin of common Indian foods and their corresponding nutritional values. Originally 
written by Aykroyd in 1939 and based upon the laboratory investigations performed at the 
Coonoor facilities, The Nutritive Value of Indian Foods and the Planning of Satisfactory 
Diets offered both a long list of tables including detailed biochemical information for 
common food items and straightforward explanations of the significance of each known 
vitamin and nutrient.337 The bulletin also provided extensive expositions of exactly what 
laboratory research in India had revealed about the connection between particular 
deficiencies and related diseases. Though highlighting the intrinsically poor quality of 
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certain foods and the detrimental effects of particular cooking processes upon nutritional 
values, Aykroyd’s bulletin revealed that the study of deficiencies also proved particularly 
optimistic concerning the ability of science to improve the quality of India’s food supply. 
In studies conducted at the Nutrition Research Laboratories, McCarrison found in 1928 
that rice grown by the dry crop method was superior in nutritional quality to rice grown in 
water.338 At the same time, his colleague A. Sreenivasan concluded through tests on albino 
rats conducted in 1942 that his esteemed former director had been wrong and that “wet 
rice” was indeed superior, containing greater amounts of protein and minerals and 
prompting an “immediate growth response” in the test animals.339  
Through laboratory investigations into rice quality, Aykroyd evaluated specific 
methods of cooking India’s primary staple grain, pushing McCarrison and Sreenivasan’s 
work even further. Tests conducted at the Nutrition Research Laboratories revealed that 
the common practice of parboiling rice, that is, steaming the raw grain under pressure to 
split the husks in preparation for drying and milling, did not greatly affect the nutritional 
quality of the grain as scientists had earlier speculated. Instead, the parboiling process 
enabled the remaining grain to absorb many of the vitamins contained in the nutritious husk 
that, as in the case of polished or white rice, was immediately stripped away.340 Indeed, 
laboratory analyses directed by Aykroyd through the late 1930s confirmed that the 
parboiling process enabled the rice to maintain much of its thiamine, thus making it an 
ideal method of countering the deficiencies underlying cases of beriberi.341 To supplement 
these laboratory investigations into the nutritional content of common food grains, 
Aykroyd also launched a series of regional surveys of consumption habits and 
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physiological outcomes across India.342 These studies concluded that “the diet of the poor 
rice eater is much the same all over India…ill-balanced and does not contain enough of the 
non-cereal foods rich in the nutrients needed for health.”343 As such, Aykroyd commented, 
proper milling and preparation methods proved essential to retaining the nutritive quality 
of the staple grain. Confirming the explanatory power of the broad surveys conducted by 
the Nutrition Research Laboratories, the biochemist Vinayak Narayan Patwardhan wrote 
that Aykroyd’s surveys of study groups selected from a diverse set of locations across India 
“obtained a fairly representative sample of Indian dietary habits, and by their investigations 
showed up the basic similarity in the pattern which the dietary of the poor Indian followed 
whether he was from Kashmir, Bengal or Madras.”344 In this way, while the emergent 
nutritional sciences acknowledged concerns regarding overpopulation, nutritionists like 
Aykroyd and Patwardhan remained optimistic that dietary changes—and not racialized 
efforts at population control — would best promote public welfare. 
At Singur, the practical implications of the laboratory-driven survey work perfected 
at Coonoor had proved invaluable in assessing levels of malnutrition in the Health Unit. In 
their training in fieldwork methodologies, nutrition researchers learned to spot the iron and 
vitamins A and C deficiencies prevalent across the Health Unit — knowing that such 
conditions were closely associated with low metabolic activity which resulted in “lowered 
resistance to infectious diseases”345. Such work, however, proved less effective in changing 
the dietary habits of the Bengali villages surveilled by AIIH&PH scientists both in the 
villages and at the Public Health Laboratory set up to perform biochemical analyses of 
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collected specimens in Singur in 1944.346 In their guide for health investigators from the 
All-India Institute, Lal and Seal stressed that, in delving into the lives and dietary habits of 
the members of the family units within the Singur area, nutritional scientists and 
investigators would first need to “probe, even though superficially, into their 
psychology.”347 New developments in the nutritional sciences, Lal and Seal observed, 
provided an “intelligent guide” for Indians making daily decisions about their health. That 
said, the two Calcutta-based nutritionists argued that the practices of even the best-
informed of India’s villagers hindered progress in improving the nutritional health of the 
broader community. Health investigators and physicians working in the survey area should 
thus be wary of deviations from prescribed nutritional regimes among the subjects of their 
investigations. As Lal and Seal wrote: 
[T]he investigator should be able to judge whether the light of newer knowledge 
of nutrition is beginning to enlighten thought and behaviour in supercession of 
tradition and prejudice. Thus, for instance, a man with knowledge may not select 
the correct article of food when both the right and the wrong types of food are 
available…348 
In this sense, the nutritional sciences simply fell short in motivating the strides in public 
health that Lal, Seal, and other investigators believed necessary to radically improve rural 
welfare. Ultimately, “tradition and prejudice” derailed efforts at improving nutritional 
health as new scientific knowledge about healthy eating could not overcome villagers’ 
habits. In their report, Lal and Seal also stressed that “community sense” proved inadequate 
across the Singur Study Unit. This social deficit, they wrote, displayed itself in the 
uncleanliness of living spaces and the unsanitary conditions prevalent in communal 
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areas.349 In that, officials of the All-India Institute encouraged their investigators to be 
skeptical of information provided to them by their subjects and confirm their visual 
assessments with laboratory tools like katathermometers and basic chemical tests.350 In this 
way, the anthropometric measurements, diet histories, and spot assessments that had 
dominated nutritional survey work could now be complemented by ostensibly more 
accurate laboratory methods.  
UNIFYING LABORATORY AND CLINIC  
Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and organized by the All-India Institute of 
Hygiene and Public Health, the Singur nutrition survey of 1944-1945 placed an explicit 
emphasis upon identifying nutritional deficiencies among schoolchildren and other groups 
at risk of malnutrition. Though designed to evaluate school children and vulnerable 
populations, nutrition indices developed in Europe and the United States, such as Raymond 
Frazen and George Palmer’s Arm, Chest, Hip Index (ACH) and the Knudsen-Schiotz 
index, proved less useful in India owing to deficits of necessary equipment and staff.351 
Nevertheless, the bulk of nutritional data collected in India up to 1945 had been drawn 
from successive height and weight surveys of schoolchildren across the subcontinent.352 
To maximize the experimental power of their inquiry at Singur, researchers coordinated 
their investigation with a new Government of Bengal scheme that provided supplementary 
lunches to school children in Singur.353 Over the course of the year, survey workers from 
the All-India Institute distributed multivitamin pearls donated by the American Friends 
Service Committee to school children at schools in three of the four union boards in the 
                                                
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid., 264. 
351 Patwardhan, 154. 
352 Ibid. 
353 “Singur Nutrition Survey – Estimates 1946,” October 26, 1945, p. 45154, Folder 1, Box 1, Series 464, 
RG 1.1, Projects, RF, RAC. 
 131 
study area of the Singur Health Center. The schools in the fourth union board served as the 
control group and thus did not received the multivitamin supplements. As Rockefeller 
officials noted the following year: 
The object was to obtain a more definite idea of the extent and nature of 
prevailing undernourishment, the composition of the diet consumed by families of 
the school children, their socio-economic conditions and the effect of 
multivitamin pearls in order to suggest a supplementary diet within available 
means.354 
This study of the effects of daily multivitamin supplements upon the health of school 
children constituted the start of Rockefeller’s involvement in the Singur Nutrition Survey. 
In the first year of the study, researchers concluded that the experimental groups receiving 
the multivitamin pearls “showed a decided improvement after treatment,” whereas the 
control group displayed deficiencies of vitamins A, B2, C, B1, and B4, in that order of 
frequency.355 By means of a follow-up to these initial findings, researchers conducted an 
economic survey of the living conditions of the families of the vitamin-deficient children. 
In turn, they found that such families generally displayed deficiencies in total caloric intake 
and total protein present in biochemical analyses. Further, through dietary surveys, they 
observed an absence of milk from the diets of vitamin-deficient children.356  
The methodological gap between the first round of the Singur survey and its 
Oxford-based predecessor appears striking. Where the Oxford Nutrition Survey presented 
an analysis of existing nutritional conditions among its working-class participants, the first 
round of the Singur Nutrition Survey hinged upon the withholding of multivitamin tablets 
from children receiving free lunches in a government-run school lunch program. In the 
case of Singur, nutritional scientists from the All-India Institute created experimental and 
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control groups out of the young population to determine the efficacy of the multivitamins 
tablets, thus bringing clinical methodologies into the field study. 
The move toward clinical experimentation in investigating nutritional deficiencies 
in South India began in the mid-1940s with the opening of a nutrition clinic sponsored by 
the Nutrition Research Laboratories at the Stanley Hospital in Madras.357 V. N. 
Patwardhan, or “Pat” as he was known to his colleagues, rose through the ranks of the 
Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor to succeed Aykroyd as director when the latter 
departed to direct the Nutrition Division of the FAO in 1945.358 Through work directed by 
Patwardhan at the Stanley Hospital, nutritional scientists successfully identified nicotinic 
acid, riboflavin, and pantothenic acid deficiencies as the culprits behind several common 
conditions ranging from diarrhea to ‘burning feet syndrome.’359 Owing to these early 
clinical successes, Patwardhan successful lobbied the Madras government to relocate the 
entire nutrition clinic to Coonoor in 1947. With sample cases of malnutrition now drawn 
from the villages of the Nilgiri mountains surrounding Coonoor, the Nutrition Research 
Laboratories moved forward after independence with a research program that coupled 
laboratory and survey-based research with extensive clinical investigations of deficiency 
diseases and their dietary and socioeconomic causes. 
For Patwardhan, an adequate understanding of India’s nutritional health relied upon 
basic clinical observations and did not need to involve extensive biochemical surveys of 
wide population samples. As he wrote in 1951, “[D]eficiency conditions literally stare in 
one’s face in any survey on school children and hence it becomes a luxury to utilize more 
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elaborate and time consuming methods than a careful clinical appraisal.”360 Patwardhan 
further remarked that the material problems facing India required a focus upon the 
treatment and prevention of manifest deficiency diseases and not the identification of latent 
ones. Considering that reality, he argued that the limited medical resources of India’s public 
institutions should not be syphoned into expensive surveys that relied upon biochemical 
tests and extended laboratory confirmations of obvious facts.361 Patwardhan noted his great 
respect for new innovations in laboratory-based work on dark adaptation, also known as 
night vision, and vitamin A status and saturation and dermal tests for vitamin C nutrition. 
Nevertheless, he concluded that the severity of malnutrition across the subcontinent and 
India’s limited scientific resources demanded that public health officials remain dedicated 
to an observation-driven clinical approach. 
At the same time, the expensive, biochemical analysis-driven studies that 
Patwardhan initially discouraged proved extremely powerful in identifying nutritional 
diseases among specific at-risk groups. For instance, between January 1951 and June 1952, 
Muktha Sen, professor in the Department of Maternity and Child Welfare at the All-India 
Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, conducted a series of hemoglobin surveys of nearly 
1,400 pregnant patients at the Singur Health Centre. Confirming her findings through a 
similar study in Calcutta, she found that anemia and toxemia accounted for roughly half of 
all maternal mortality. As she wrote in reference to the population of Singur Health Unit: 
Anaemia in pregnancy is a very common occurrence, the average haemoglobin 
content of the blood of expectant mothers being about 8.3 g per 100 cc. Among 
the principal cause of maternal deaths, anaemia also has been all along a most 
important cause. Sometimes, it contributes more than 40% towards the total 
deaths.362  
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Sen’s findings drew the attention of the Indian Council of Medical Research and 
contributed to her further work in collaborations between India’s nutritional research 
scientists, the FAO, and the WHO, devoted to the problem of maternal and postnatal 
anemias.363 Patwardhan and the Nutrition Research Laboratories played a key role in the 
resulting coordinated program of the WHO and the FAO and the WHO, offering both 
organizations access to over thirty years’ worth of survey data compiled in Coonoor from 
hematological studies of iron deficiencies and parasitic infections conducted across the 
subcontinent.364 Now collaborating directly with Sen at the All-India Institute, Patwardhan 
would build off her new blood-analysis data to design a set of therapeutic trials involving 
different diets consumed by research subjects at the Coonoor Nutrition Clinic.365 Brought 
together in this collaboration by the FAO and WHO, Patwardhan and Sen’s studies would 
help to clarify the extent to which cases of anemia among rural women could be reversed 
through iron and protein supplements. In this way, the FAO and the WHO harnessed the 
turn toward biochemical analysis and the merger of the clinic and the laboratory in the 
interests of an emerging notion of global health.  
Not to be excluded from these new developments in the nutritional sciences, the 
Rockefeller Foundation began to express greater interest in the work of Nutrition Research 
Laboratories beginning in 1957.366 That year, Richmond K. Anderson, assistant director of 
the Biological and Medical Division, issued a grant for Patwardhan to travel to the 
Nutrition Division of the FAO in Rome, as well as to tour nutritional research laboratories 
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and clinics across the United States, Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, and Colombia.367 Over 
the next few years, Rockefeller cultivated a strong working relationship with Patwardhan 
and his successor as director, C. Gopalan. Through 1961, Rockefeller’s investments in the 
nutritional sciences at Coonoor remained confined to issuing travels grants to aid in the 
professional development and network-building of the institution, notably providing funds 
for collaborations with the FAO and the WHO.368 In 1958, however, Patwardhan and the 
Indian Council of Medical Research organized the relocation of the Nutrition Research 
Laboratories to more ample accommodations at the more centrally-located campus of 
Osmania University in Hyderabad.369 Noting that, “in the expansion and reorganization 
currently taking place at the Nutrition Research Laboratories, an acute need for additional 
equipment is being encountered,” Rockefeller allocated $35,000 for supplies for its 
laboratory and clinic.370 More specifically, Rockefeller financed a significant expansion of 
the Nutrition Research Laboratories’ capacity to undertake “epidemiological and 
experimental studies” related to energy metabolism, protein malnutrition, and 
atherosclerosis.371  
In funding the purchase of top-of-the-line American laboratory and medical 
equipment unavailable in India, Rockefeller substantially shifted the research agenda at the 
institution. Through the early 1960s, Rockefeller would award a number of grants, each 
worth tens of thousands of dollars, to finance an existing research agenda centered on 
malnutrition and remedying diseases of deficiencies. This new relationship would also 
push the nutritional research at Hyderabad in new directions. As will be shown in the next 
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chapter, Rockefeller’s expanded involvement with the Nutrition Research Laboratories 
would also place nutritional scientists in the role of evaluating the new seeds of the coming 
Green Revolution.  
MALNUTRITION, POVERTY, AND INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
 From bases in Coonoor, Hyderabad, and Calcutta, India’s nutrition experts 
increasingly pursued inquiries into the nutritional health of India’s most vulnerable 
populations—including rural women and children, the poor, and agricultural laborers. 
Forwarded by Indian nutritional scientists at the Nutrition Research Laboratories in 
Hyderabad, as well as by researchers at the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health 
in Calcutta, these inquiries demonstrated a firm basis in the research agenda set out by the 
earlier efforts of Robert McCarrison, W. R. Aykroyd, and V. N. Patwardhan. This influence 
also pushed the nutritional sciences to engage increasingly with agronomists, economic 
botanists, and other agricultural scientists through the 1950s and 1960s as India pursued an 
ambitious agenda to increase grain production exponentially. As David Arnold observes, 
“McCarrison’s success in relating nutritional issues to the basic health of the people and to 
the needs of agricultural productivity established the importance of nutritional research in 
in India for decades to come.”372 McCarrison’s successors at the Nutrition Research 
Laboratories would sharpen this focus upon the health of vulnerable populations and clarify 
the relationship between the nutritional and agricultural sciences. As Vernon rightly notes 
in the context of hunger in Britain: 
The most forceful advocates of the new definitions and standards were social 
nutritionists, who, set out to transform political, social, and economic life. Their 
discovery of malnutrition transformed the social problem of the hungry into a 
much larger nutritional problem for society: that is to say, hunger was no longer 
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seen as the particular preserve of the poor, for all society now shared the problem 
of maintaining and improving nutritional health.373  
Much the same could be said of the effect of the advocacy work of nutritional scientists in 
India in the postwar era. At the same time, within the context of the rising paradigms of 
international development, hunger did endure as an object of scientific study very much 
associated with poverty. Inheriting much from older notions of humanitarian relief and 
charitable donation and informed by the nutritional sciences, development institutions 
launched efforts to battle hunger that, in their rhetoric, seemed almost intrinsic to the 
‘developing’ world.  
Through the 1950s and 1960s, the calls of nutritional scientists for the state to 
actively guarantee the access of the rural poor to nutritious foods frequently went 
unheeded. As Renuka Ray observed, the call for a simple but highly nutritious mid-day 
meal for India’s rural schoolchildren had sat on the agenda of the All-India Women’s 
Conference since the early 1930s. She lamented, however, that public health officials and 
politicians failed to enact such a program on a nationwide basis following independence in 
1947.374 Writing in 1951, V. N. Patwardhan echoed these concerns, expressing fears that 
public health officials had not moved quickly enough to counter long-running malnutrition 
at the local level. As he wrote: 
The contribution made by the State Public Health Services in the fight against 
malnutrition has been extremely meagre, so meagre in fact that no remarkable 
achievement can be cited on the credit side of the ledger. This is indeed 
astonishing in view of the fact that laboratory researches and investigations in the 
field have demonstrated the crying need for some action.     375 
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A major problem in mobilizing “some action,” Patwardhan continued, emerged in the 
limited number of organizations dedicated to problems of malnutrition among India’s rural 
poor. Prior to the Second World War, he noted, only three provincial governments funded 
nutrition organizations of any kind.376 Following independence and after the establishment 
of the Republic of India in January 1950, that number shot up to nine, but Patwardhan 
noted that most of these small new organizations could not run laboratories of their own. 
In this way, Patwardhan argued, rural India remained largely excluded from the benefits of 
laboratory and clinic-based nutritional science. This lack of evenly-divided resources 
worked to obscure the nutritional ramifications of poverty in states like Bihar, Orissa, and 
Assam, forcing scientists and government officials to rely upon older data sets and reports, 
like those compiled by W. R. Aykroyd through the 1930s and 1940s.377   
Aykroyd himself had frequently called for greater care to be given to the connection 
between malnutrition and poverty. For instance, citing surveys in rural Bihar and 
Hyderabad conducted in the early 1940s, he wrote in 1944 that, “special attention must be 
drawn to the improvement in diet which is associated with increase of income.”378 Far 
beyond simply eating more food, nutrition surveys found that families and individuals who 
had seen improvements in their economic condition were eating different kinds of food. In 
championing further research into the connections between malnutrition and underlying 
poverty, Aykroyd’s influential role as the director of the Nutrition Division of the FAO 
after 1945 set him in a prime position to bring the work of the Nutrition Research 
Laboratories at Hyderabad to the attention of the global scientific community. At the FAO 
in Rome, Aykroyd also worked to ensure that the practical, laboratory-based research 
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drawn from India would influence international nutrition policies. Toward that goal, he 
attempted to ensure that India won its share of the FAO’s limited resources, arguing, as the 
scientific directors of the Rockefeller Foundation had in 1944, that the subcontinent offered 
an ideal context in which to explore new nutritional theories. 
One of the FAO’s early nutrition programs in independent India took the form of 
an attempt at employing the Singur Health Unit as a platform for training nutritional 
surveyors from across Asia in the methods that the All-India Institute had crafted and 
perfected there through the 1940s. In Calcutta in September 1951, the All-India Institute 
of Hygiene and Public Health launched a fifteen-week-long training course in nutrition, 
directed by Lt. Col. C. K. Lakshmanan, director of the institute.  Originally proposed at a 
conference of the WHO Regional Committee for South-East Asia in Colombo the previous 
year, Aykroyd’s Nutrition Division of the FAO and the WHO sponsored the training course 
with the specific aim of educating public health workers and program administrators across 
South and Southeast Asia in the “principles of nutrition.”379 The training course 
emphasized skills in the design of nutritional surveys and the best practices of data 
collection that could then be disseminated once trainees returned to their home countries.  
R. C. Burgess and K. Rajagopal, the FAO scientists who coordinated the training 
course, reported that the All-India Institute took the trainees directly into the field, giving 
them firsthand insights into the living conditions and research methodologies at play in the 
Singur Health Unit. Following an extensive program of lectures in food sanitation, clinical 
nutrition, dietetics and family budget planning, the trainees spent ten days in Singur, honing 
their skills in conducting nutrition fieldwork. In Singur, they also paid visits to industrial 
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canteens, office canteens, milk distribution centers, and schools to observe the 
administration of midday feeding programs. As they remarked: 
The field survey was an extremely valuable part of this course. The students were 
all drawn from rice growing countries and knew something of the way of life and 
problems of their own peasants. The differences they saw in the Singur 
households stimulated much discussion and established contacts between students 
from different countries.380 
In their final reports on the experience of conducting fieldwork in the Singur Health Unit, 
many of the trainees expressed a hesitation about engaging the rural population under 
study. As Burgess and Rajagopal noted, some trainees had expected the Indian staff of the 
Singur Field Centre to accompany them on their visits to local families, whether to facilitate 
conversation or simply to translate their nutritional health questions into Bengali. 
Nevertheless, Burgess and Rajagopal dismissed these concerns, concluding: “Our view is 
that under ordinary circumstances nutrition surveys are beset with difficulties and that the 
student should at least surmount some of them himself.”381 In the name of global health, 
this trial by fire approach thus sent unprepared nutritionists from Thailand, Indonesia, 
Burma, and across India scrambling to interrogate puzzled families in Singur about their 
dietary habits.  
That said, residents of the Singur Health Unit could expect such intimate queries 
from foreigners and Indian physicians alike. As will be shown in the next chapter, Singur 
served as the experimental area for the Population Council’s long-running study in family 
planning education beginning in 1957.382 Coordinated by the All-India Institute’s new 
director, Muktha Sen, and statistician K. K. Mathen, the study sought to lower birth rates 
in the experimental area by employing a wide-range of instructional tools to educate both 
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women and men in contraceptive techniques and family planning methods. Through such 
interventions, the residents of Singur and surrounding townships would see a shift in the 
All-India Institute’s research priorities for the Health Unit through the 1950s. In this way, 
the initial Rockefeller-financed nutritional survey of the area would blossom into an 
influential population management initiative by the early 1960s. In the meantime, however, 
the quest to prevent malnutrition and diseases of deficiency competed with the 
philanthropic imperatives to increase food grain outputs exponentially and to restrict 
population growth significantly. Improvements within the nutritional sciences also inspired 
concerns regarding India’s growing population and how demographic changes might 
contribute to widespread hunger and malnutrition. 
By the end of the 1950s, the debate over the connection between hunger and 
population growth had begun to reference the earlier work of nutritional scientists in 
advancing calls for growing substantially more food grains and restricting population 
growth. One early example of this avenue of argumentation came from S. K. Kelavkar, the 
former judicial minister of Kolhapur State, who published a treatise in 1946 with the 
succinct title, Our Food Problem. In it, Kelavkar lamented India’s high population growth 
rates. Turning to an analysis of the food supply, he argued “the problem has always been 
treated as one of poverty and never been considered to be one of shortage,” and 
subsequently made the case for greatly extending India’s production of food grains.383 In 
his work, Kelavkar applauded McCarrison and Aykroyd’s work in Coonoor and  made 
reference to the caloric requirement estimates for healthy Indian adult males (2,600 calories 
per day) in determining that India faced an urgent shortage of foods.384 He further called 
for immediate large-scale investments by the Government of India in increasing 
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agricultural production, concluding, “Just as in a war one does not reckon the expense when 
the enemy must be beaten at all costs, here also we have to beat an enemy who if we do 
not beat him, will beat us and destroy us.”385 Kelavkar’s impassioned call for immediate 
action, without regard to cost, aptly captured the sentiments that would drive the 
agricultural sciences forward in India through the 1950s and 1960s. In particularly, such 
concerns, grounded in earlier scientific explorations of the nature of malnutrition in South 
Asia, bolstered increasingly vocal calls for harnessing the agricultural sciences to generate 
exponentially larger food grain harvests. 
Fifteen years later, this tension became apparent at the National Institutes of 
Sciences of India’s Symposium on Food Needs and Resources held at Mysore in May 1961. 
A gathering of India’s top nutritional and agricultural scientists, the meeting’s convener, 
the wheat geneticist Benjamin Peary Pal, hoped that the gathering would facilitate 
coordination between the various fields of food science upon the inauguration of the Third 
Five-Year Plan.386 At the symposium, the complex relationship between the wider 
objectives of nutritional and agricultural sciences became apparent. For instance, 
demographer C. Chandrasekaran cautioned that improvements in the nutritional health of 
India’s population might inadvertently prompt an increase in population growth rates. As 
he wrote: 
The relatively low level of Indian fertility as compared with many pre-industrial 
population and a study of some of the biological factors connected with Indian 
fertility make it plausible that better nutrition may operate towards increasing the 
birth rate. While the existence of this factor does not necessarily imply there will 
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be a definite rise in the birth rate […] food planners should play safe and be 
prepared for larger increases in India’s population in the near future…387 
Representing the nutritional sciences at the Mysore Symposium, nutritionists V. 
Subrahmanyan, A. Sreenivasan, and M. Swaminathan of the recently-established Central 
Food Technology Research Institute also argued that India’s population growth rates 
demanded prompt action in expanding the nation’s food supply.388 That said, they also 
stressed that increases in the food grain supply alone would fail to reverse “nutritional 
deficiency states” if not coupled with wider supplies of protective foods like milk, eggs, 
pulses, oilseeds, green leaves, and other vitamins and minerals. They observed that 
woefully inadequate supplies of nutritious food had left broad swaths of the population 
susceptible to deficiencies, noting, “the penalty is heaviest in infants, mothers and young 
children.”389 Further, Subrahmanyan, Sreenivasan, and Swaminathan remarked that, since 
earlier surveys of malnutrition in India had consistently demonstrated protein deficiencies 
among India’s at-risk populations, particularly children, the Government of India should 
pursue increases in the production of protein-rich foods.390 In this way, the effective 
application of the findings derived from efforts in the nutritional sciences relied chiefly 
upon the willingness of public health officials and politicians to support active public 
education and welfare policies 
For his part, W. R. Aykroyd remained concerned that the arguments made by 
nutritional scientist for improving the nutritional quality and diversity of the diets of India’s 
rural poor and most vulnerable populations had been obscured by the oversized rhetoric of 
the double-crisis of overpopulation and food shortage.  In his correspondence with 
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Canadian economic botanist L. E. Kirk, Aykroyd proved especially frank in offering his 
assessments of contemporary nutritional health challenges and the capacity of the FAO to 
address them. As he wrote to Kirk in September 1959:  
FAO has never made a statement to the effect that half the world is hungry or 
undernourished. It is true that, especially in the earlier days of FAO, some rather 
sweeping statements were made in FAO publications on undernutrition and 
malnutrition, but within recent years’ statements on this subject have been made 
with due caution and in general terms, and percentage estimates have been 
avoided.391  
In this light, as they faced difficult battles in convincing local governments to implement 
the simple and relatively inexpensive measures that would diversify diets and improve the 
nutritional outcomes of the world’s poor, nutritional scientists had framed malnutrition as 
a global crisis that could only be solved through massive interventions. Now, with 
agricultural science-driven efforts to vastly increase global grain production proceeding at 
full-speed into the 1960s, the nutritional sciences would struggle to find an effective place 
in advocating for the kinds of public health interventions that could immediately and 
effectively ameliorate the problems of malnutrition facing South Asia. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing in 1982, Renuka Ray expressed dismay at the deficiency diseases still 
widely endured by rural India’s schoolchildren. Two decades after she had served as chair 
of the School Health Committee, the vision forwarded by India’s most influential 
nutritional sciences for dramatically improving the health of children across the nation 
remained largely unrealized. Over a decade before the centrally-sponsored Midday Meal 
Scheme would be launched in 1995 and the right to food would be recognized by India’s 
Supreme Court in 2001, the nation continued to grapple with some of the highest levels of 
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childhood malnutrition in the world.392 Lamenting the intransigence of the Government of 
India in fully implementing the measures proposed by the committee, Ray wrote: 
Today we find that the recommendations of the School Health Committee which 
had been accepted as far back as 1965 […] are not yet implemented on a 
countrywide scale. In some States, such as Gujarat, a beginning has been made 
but in others, such as West Bengal, the work still lags behind, and in some States 
it has hardly been introduced.393 
In this way, the expansive new knowledge generated by the efforts of nutritional scientists 
and dietitians in the decades following Partition remained constrained by the limitations of 
public policy. Though successive governments had devoted vast resources toward the 
pursuit of the agricultural production increases of the Green Revolution of the late 1960s 
and 1970s, the simple improvements in food provision and access championed by Ray 
remained elusive. These lingering failures could be traced back to the disconnect between 
preventive techniques promoted by nutritionists and the curative promise implied by the 
sweeping innovations promised by the agricultural sciences. In some sense, hunger could 
not simply be prevented. The innovation-driven nature of the agricultural sciences 
demanded that it needed to be cured. 
Through the 1950s and 1960s, while agricultural scientists and development 
planners sought to launch large-scale, capital-intensive initiatives across the subcontinent, 
the nutritional sciences engaged South Asia’s food situation in intimate ways. In these 
efforts, dietitians, physicians, and surveyors worked along local lines, seeking preventive 
solutions tailored to specific communities. Their resulting diet and nutrition surveys drew 
socioeconomic, physiological, and biochemical data from India’s most vulnerable 
populations. Laboratory scientists pursued investigations into the nutritional content of 
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common Indian foods, producing compendiums that suggested the “proper” ways of 
preparing and eating meals to enable adequate self-care. International organizations like 
the FAO and the WHO worked to facilitate an exchange of new nutritional research and 
population data between India and the broader world. All the while, these interventions 
featured a constant negotiation between the intimate realm of individual care on the one 
hand and the wider, abstracted realm of public health surveillance on the other. The ever-
present tension between these two relations transformed patients into unwitting research 
subjects, inserting the laboratory into the clinic and unfolding the clinic into the field. At 
the same time, these forces also led nutritionists and dietitians to engage more directly with 
the concerns of the agricultural sciences, pursuing improvements in the nutritional quality 
of India’s rapidly expanding food supply through the late 1960s and 1970s. 
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Chapter Four: Into the Fertile Future 
On January 2, 1952, Warren Weaver and John D. Rockefeller III met for dinner at 
the Century Club in Midtown Manhattan. Joined by businessman Lewis L. Strauss, 
biophysicist Detlev Bronk, and attorney Donald H. McLean, Jr., they discussed a problem 
that had recently begun to plague the mind of the forty-five-year-old Rockefeller. Heir to 
his grandfather’s fortune and to his father’s legacy as one of the world’s leading 
philanthropists, Rockefeller explained that he had developed a concern for the issue of 
“population and resources” on a global level.394 As they ate, the group discussed the 
prospect of organizing a conference of fifteen to twenty of the nation’s top experts in 
demography, population control, and the agricultural sciences to inform Rockefeller’s 
thinking on such topics. Already busy with preparations for an upcoming fact-finding 
mission to India to plot a possible Rockefeller Foundation intervention in agriculture, 
Weaver insisted he had little time for a new project.395 Nevertheless, Rockefeller would 
summon him frequently through 1952, distilling Rockefeller’s vague concerns into clear 
plans for a new philanthropic organization: The Population Council. 
After consulting experts at the conference hosted by the National Academy of 
Sciences in Williamsburg, Virginia in late June, Rockefeller moved enthusiastically toward 
the idea of a new non-profit organization that would open population offices around the 
world. Its objective would be to gather data and raise local awareness of the threat of 
overpopulation.396 The new agency would be at once socially-engaged and invested in 
increasing food resources, tackling population issues in the broadest sense possible.397 
Alarmed by the broad scope of this proposal, Weaver pressed his employer to confine the 
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organization’s attention to fertility restriction as a matter of public health.398 Rockefeller 
pushed back. As Weaver recorded in his Rockefeller Foundation officer’s diary on 
September 4, 1952:  
It would be WW’s own personal recommendation that JDR III undertake activity 
in the field of control of human fertility, on the grounds that this is obviously an 
exceedingly important and pressing problem, […] that no one else seems to be 
working actively or completely in this particular area, and finally that this is an 
area in which the RF itself is very unlikely to work. It is fairly clear that JDR III is 
not very happy about this suggestion.399 
Through the second half of the year, Weaver observed Rockefeller at first resisting and, 
gradually, accepting a strict focus on the control of human fertility. As Matthew Connelly 
notes, Rockefeller’s conclusion that the Population Council should emerge as a separate 
institution came in part at the  behest of Frank Notestein and Frederick Osborn, the 
influential Princeton eugenics-embracing demographers who argued that a new institution 
could become “a nexus for all other major players in the field,” including the International 
Planned Parenthood Foundation (IPPF), the Ford Foundation, and others.400 By December, 
the new Population Council, endowed with an initial $100,000, stood poised to join the 
Rockefeller Foundation in India, exploiting the latter’s institutional connections in public 
health and complementing the foundation’s emerging investments in the agricultural 
sciences.401  
This chapter tracks how Indian and American scientists working with the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Population Council linked the concepts of seed and soil 
fertility to overarching concerns regarding overpopulation as they advanced down the road 
to the Green Revolution. Eugenic conceptions of fertility regulation took center stage in 
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the strategic thinking and planning efforts of the agricultural scientists of the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the physicians of the Population Council as they launched their operations 
in India during the 1950s. At the same time, rural extension work and nutritional research 
sank into subsidiary roles in the quest to increase South Asian grain production drastically 
and to restrict population growth. Inevitably, tensions emerged between these sciences, as 
well as between scientists and administrators tasked by governments and philanthropic 
organizations with addressing the apparent challenges of food shortage and 
overpopulation. Rockefeller’s top officials and strategists, for example, approached the 
efforts of India’s nascent community development and rural extension programs with deep 
skepticism, if not outright contempt. In their view, the dual crisis of food shortage and 
overpopulation could not be approached through tedious social restructuring or costly 
economic redistribution. Only rapid and momentous innovations in the agricultural 
sciences could reverse rural India’s perceived backwardness, raise standards of living, and 
deliver food security to “millions enslaved by centuries of tradition.”402 
To that end, the Rockefeller Foundation reoriented its programming in India toward 
the goal of increasing food grain production through field and laboratory investigations 
into the development of high-yielding, hybrid seed varieties in 1956.403 At the same time, 
the Rockefeller Foundation remained heavily invested in public health in India and, most 
prominently, through studies of the efficacy of contraceptive practices in Punjab and West 
Bengal, maintained a corresponding interest in direct population control through the 1950s. 
Indeed, after its establishment as a separate Rockefeller-funded agency in late 1952, the 
Population Council sponsored studies undertaken in India by American universities and 
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domestic public health institutions, most notably the All-India Institute of Hygiene and 
Public Health under the leadership of Indian scientists Muktha Sen and K. K. Mathen in 
Calcutta. The decade-old Singur Study Unit, already the site of Rockefeller-funded 
nutritional research, would be recast as a test site for the assessment of family planning 
methods and experiments on the efficacy of oral contraceptives which had recently become 
more readily available. In this way, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Population Council 
pursed intertwined agendas through the 1950s, both working closely with the Government 
of India and supporting its political agenda to deliver on planning promises of increased 
food production and steady economic growth through modernization and industrialization. 
Toward a future dimmed by the prospect of Malthusian catastrophe, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Population Council advanced down parallel paths, pursuing 
complementary goals — one to augment the fertility of India’s countryside, the other to 
rein in the fertility of India’s population. 
‘THE INDIAN CULTIVATOR DOES NOT FARM’ 
In December 1951, the scientific planning staff of the Rockefeller Foundation in 
New York concluded their initial discussions of a possible intervention in Indian 
agriculture, resolving to send a team of high-ranking investigators to assess the viability of 
work in the subcontinent. This team, consisting of J. George Harrar, Paul C. Mangelsdorf, 
and Weaver, now in his new role as the foundation’s Director of Agriculture, spent four 
weeks in India through February 1952, meeting with Indian officials and touring farm sites 
and rural extension centers across the country. The three had performed a similar survey 
of Mexico’s agricultural needs for the Rockefeller Foundation in 1939.404  
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Complementing Weaver’s background in mathematics and research administration, 
the plant pathologist Harrar had directed Rockefeller’s Mexican Agricultural Program 
since 1943, overseeing rapid progress in the hybridization of wheat and other food grains. 
Indeed, Rockefeller officials and the Mexican government viewed the program as an 
unprecedented success and Harrar’s protégé, Norman E. Borlaug, would be awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his work in developing high-yielding, disease-resistant 
wheat varieties.405 Under Harrar’s leadership, the Mexican Agricultural Program’s 
research model of identifying and hybridizing high-yielding grain varieties would prove 
central to the foundation’s work in Indian agriculture.406 Trained at Harvard, the fifty-two-
year-old botanist Mangelsdorf boasted a distinguished career in maize research and had 
also conducted extensive fieldwork in Mexico as a member of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Survey Commission in 1941. His broader work, in part, sought to identify 
the genetic origins of American corn varieties and to develop new varieties through 
hybridization.407  
As Nick Cullather writes of the assumptions of Rockefeller officials as they 
approached the question of intervention in India: “Agriculture was the key to the entire 
development equation, the regulator of fertility, catalyst for breaking down social and 
familial customs, and stimulant for a general expansion of national wealth.”408 With that 
assumption firmly in mind, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver’s report, entitled simply 
“Notes on Indian Agriculture,” laid out the prospects for the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
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agricultural programming in India. While emphasizing the scientific and technical 
dimensions of an effort to improve Indian food production capacity, the report began with 
an acknowledgement of the social and economic issues then being addressed by the work 
of community development and rural extension advocates in north India like Albert Mayer, 
S. K. Dey, and Arthur T. Mosher, whose work was examined in Chapter Two. As the 
Rockefeller team wrote:  
The most serious problem faced by agriculture in India is not a technical one, but 
a cultural one. The greatest handicaps which agricultural development must 
overcome are those imposed by the caste system, by ignorance, by religious 
prejudices, by multiplicity of languages, by the many stifling customs, and by 
habits of thought which prize tradition over improvement.409  
With that acknowledgment of the challenges facing post-Partition India, Harrar, 
Mangelsdorf, and Weaver assessed and critiqued existing efforts at jump-starting Indian 
food production and laid out a case for Rockefeller to invest conservatively and selectively 
in strengthening the new nation’s scientific capacity. The report resounds with a mix of 
fatalism, hopelessness, and notes of optimism drawn from the prospect that the wide 
cultivation of improved grain varieties, like those already developed by Rockefeller 
scientists in Mexico, might generate the boost in food grain production needed to avoid a 
famine. 
In their report, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver proved wary of the rural extension 
and community development initiatives supported by the Ford Foundation and supported 
by Point Four through the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA). They noted 
that the Ford Foundation had awarded Allahabad Agricultural Institute two grants during 
the previous year, amounting to $500,000 and $440,000 for the construction of facilities 
and the expansion of the nascent rural extension program, respectively.410 Under the 
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direction of Arthur Mosher, Sam Higginbottom’s old missionary project had emerged as 
an important national center for agricultural education, as shown in Chapters One and Two. 
The Rockefeller team applauded the Allahabad Agricultural Institute’s development as an 
independent center for rural extension and agricultural education under Mosher, 
recommending that future foundation support keep pace with the Ford Foundation’s recent 
investments.  
Albert Mayer’s Etawah pilot project, on the other hand, involving 97 villages and 
costing roughly $48,000 a year, could simply not be replicated to address cost-effectively 
the joint problems of overpopulation and food shortage.411 The Rockefeller team 
considered Mayer’s initiative too expensive and unwieldy to provide a realistic blueprint 
for a potential intervention in agriculture.  That said, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver 
acknowledged that the community development work at Etawah had correctly emphasized 
improved farming methods and the cultivation of high-yielding wheat varieties. Like the 
Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Etawah operated from the lauded assumption that 
agricultural improvement needed “to occur on a broad social front and at a simple level, 
and that there has to be a departure from old ways and customs.”412 By their own estimates, 
food production in the Etawah district rose some fifteen to thirty per cent over the course 
of Mayer’s initiatives to farm hybrid wheat varieties in conjunction with the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) and the Ford Foundation.  
The “inspiring show” at Etawah, however, with its technical limitations and 
tolerance for unscientific practices, could not be replicated on a national, much less a global 
scale.413 Regarding the Ford Foundation’s “frightening” proposals to replicate Etawah 
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across India, Weaver simply advised, “The RF should stay away from this particular plan, 
and pray.”414 Moreover, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver speculated that the Etawah 
model of community development would not fare well in the face of inadequate staffing, 
restricted water resources, and the low-yielding rice and sorghum varieties typically 
cultivated by farmers across the subcontinent.415 Following Weaver’s advice, the 
foundation would not finance any such nationwide programs in village-level intervention. 
The Rockefeller team subsequently turned to address the evolving relationship between the 
TCA and the Government of India’s nascent community development initiative evolving 
from the model of S. K. Dey’s project at Nilokheri. Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver 
observed that the TCA’s investments sought to address two major areas of concern in rural 
India. First, the program would support the launch of development centers to coordinate 
projects in villages across India. Second, with an initial investment of $18 million, the TCA 
would irrigate large swaths of north Indian farmland through the installation of tube wells, 
Persian wheels, and electric pumps.416 Here again, Rockefeller’s fact-finding mission 
declined to endorse an approach that involved vast infrastructural investments and that 
relied upon the recruitment of thousands of village-level workers to serve as foot soldiers 
in the community development crusade.  
With TCA officials confidentially relaying that their joint Indo-American venture 
would expand to 320 project areas by 1955, the Rockefeller team estimated the community 
development initiative’s needs at roughly 9,000 college-trained supervisors and specialists 
— 1,500 of whom would need to be recruited from the United States and the rest drawn 
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from India’s own universities.417 For Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver, the numbers 
appeared staggering, rendering the TCA’s approach to rural development woefully 
impractical. The Rockefeller team was especially skeptical of the officials at the helm of 
this expanding community development movement, still in its heyday. As they observed: 
“Some of them [India’s community development administrators] are essentially small 
persons who have been lifted up into positions of tremendous responsibility for which they 
are unequipped, intellectually or in any other way.”418 Indeed, as S. K. Dey, the director of 
India’s community development program, had boasted on numerous occasions, 
enthusiastic amateurs and not farming experts led India’s rural movement.419  
The Rockefeller team interpreted this type of engagement as a profound liability 
that not only foreshadowed poor returns on the foundation’s potential investment, but that 
could also delay India in its quest to increase food production. Beyond its core staffing 
requirements, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver further estimated that India’s community 
development push would need to recruit between 18,000 and 40,000 village level workers 
to fan out across an estimated 600 project sites to serve a rural population of about 120 
million, or roughly one-third the population of India. These daunting figures aside, they 
remained most troubled by the outlook and approach of those already involved in Indian 
community development at the highest levels. As they wrote: 
[T]he situation is characterized by a frightening mixture of almost fanatic 
devotion, optimism based on the supposed accuracy of technical information 
which has in many instances passed through incompetent hands, and an 
administrative confusion which would be found congenial only by the Mad 
Hatter.420 
                                                
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid., 22. 
419 Dey, 88. 
420 Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver, p. 22. 
 156 
Indeed, as shown in Chapter Two, India’s community development initiative would buckle 
under the weight of its internal bureaucracy and its failure, in the eyes of government 
investigators, to meet the needs of the rural populations it served. Casting aside the prospect 
of reshaping India at the village level, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver instead viewed 
India’s agricultural problems as a strict function of inadequate resources for a ceaselessly 
growing population. As they wrote: “Not only is there too little land, but the land has too 
little water, too little fertility, and is divided into far too many small holdings. The Indian 
cultivator does not farm — he gardens — and he does so under innumerable handicaps.”421 
Harrar himself would later indicate that the foundation’s explicit emphasis on food 
production increases over a concerted initiative in population control frustrated him 
through the 1950s. As he noted of Rockefeller’s eventual turn toward a direct engagement 
of population issues in the 1960s: “After what I thought was a too long delay, the 
foundation decided to participate more actively in the problems of population 
stabilization.”422 In the meantime, however, the Rockefeller fact-finding mission to India 
concluded that human fertility simply outpaced the prolific capacity of local seeds, the 
natural fertility of the soil, and the productivity of the nation’s ill-equipped and poorly-
educated farmers.  
This bleak picture of backward farming, exhausted soil, and a rapidly reproducing 
peasantry seemed to confirm foundation officials’ initial assumption that South Asia faced 
a population crisis. In some sense, the fact-finding mission’s analysis took these conditions 
to be the natural features of the Indian subcontinent — a place burdened by these forces 
since time immemorial. Such an assessment did little, if anything, to investigate any 
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connections between hunger and poverty, much less poverty and colonialism. Instead, the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s first agricultural fact-finding mission interpreted the challenges 
facing Indian agriculture firmly in the context of overpopulation coupled with the infertility 
of the nation’s farmland. Beyond advocating for improvements in graduate-level education 
in agriculture and centralized training in rural extension, the team advised against costly 
and tedious projects to remake rural Indian society. Instead, they recommended that the 
Rockefeller Foundation move ahead with a program focused on financing promising 
scientific research into raising grain yields and improving soil fertility.423 Over the next 
four years, the foundation would do precisely that. In the meantime, the Population Council 
independently began to attend to the other side of the overpopulation-food shortage 
equation. 
SITUATING POPULATION CONTROL WITHIN PUBLIC HEALTH 
There was, of course, a connection between nutrition and population regulation in 
the minds of demographers in the 1940s and 1950s. Articulated and promoted stridently by 
Frank Notestein, the demographer at the Office of Population Research at Princeton 
University and who would later lead the Population Council, demographic transition theory 
proposed that birth rates would decrease as industrialization took place.424 As Cullather 
writes: “Transition theory suggested a strategy. Higher levels of consumption, particularly 
of food, would trigger a drop in the birthrate. Advances in agriculture would also improve 
health, incomes, and productivity.”425 At the same time, however, with Rockefeller 
Foundation’s top agricultural scientists speculating that dramatic increases in food 
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production in South Asia could take decades to achieve, a dual strategy of population 
restriction and production increase unfolded into the early 1960s.  
Field research on monitoring and, more importantly, influencing the family 
planning strategies of villages and farmers across the Indian countryside played a critical 
role on one side of this effort. Through this period, the United States was also engaged in 
its own domestic discussion surrounding the potentials and perils of birth control efforts. 
As Matthew Connelly shows, this debate was also reflected in its foreign policy, as the 
United States government remained officially opposed to advocating for global population 
control efforts from the launch of Point Four, well into the Kennedy Administration.426 
While the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID did not “risk venturing 
into such treacherous terrain” through the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy himself 
suggested that the UN and American philanthropic organizations address the issue at an 
international level without involving the American government directly.427 In a similar 
way, British officials hesitated to embrace family planning efforts both internationally and 
within Britain's remaining colonies as they "worried about invoking the wrath of religious 
leaders (particularly the Roman Catholics)" both at home and abroad.428 Colonial aid for 
family planning efforts in the Caribbean were also inhibited by concerns over race politics 
well into the 1950s.429 Direct U.S. foreign aid for broadly-defined family planning 
initiatives and population research would commence under Kennedy in April 1963, 
accelerating gradually during the Johnson Administration.430 As Connelly shows, this aid-
driven age of global population control efforts on the part of the United States would prove 
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short — interrupted with the so-called Mexico City Policy of 1984, which banned U.S. 
federal funding for organizations providing or promoting abortions.431 
Rockefeller’s concerns regarding India’s population growth did not abate when the 
1952 fact-finding mission recommended a turn toward the agricultural sciences in South 
Asia. Warren Weaver’s long-standing optimism that scientific intervention could lead 
independent India to self-sufficiency in food production masked a persistent institutional 
interest in a population control agenda. While Rockefeller’s top scientists prepared for a 
major intervention in the agricultural sciences in India through 1953 and 1954, the 
Population Council entered India to exploit the foundation’s existing assets and networks 
in medicine and public health. In this way, two Rockefeller agencies forwarded two parallel 
programs in India through the 1950s, each addressing both fronts of the perceived “double 
crisis” of overpopulation and food shortage, articulated by Aldous Huxley in his 1949 
paper published by UNESCO, then under the direction of his brother Julian.432 
In addition to Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver’s critical appraisal of Indian 
agriculture, Marshall C. Balfour, a physician and one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s top 
malaria control experts, also reported on India’s demographic situation during the 
Scientific Division’s meetings on South Asia in spring 1952.433 Balfour painted a bleak 
picture, emphasizing that, while only half the geographical size of the United States, India’s 
population stood at three times that of its American counterpart. He pegged India’s growth 
rate at roughly thirteen per cent over the previous decade and touted the reliability of the 
decadal census scheme initiated by the British in 1871.434 Regarding population control 
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programming in India, Balfour described meeting with Indian Health Minister Rajkumari 
Amrit Kaur, a devoted Gandhian, in 1949. Of the meeting, Balfour reported, “We discussed 
population, and I felt that she comprehended the problems. But Gandhi believed only in 
continence. In no country that I know of has continence ever been popular!”435 In his view, 
a more practical route needed to be taken. 
Balfour went on to indicate that a committee of demographers, including two 
former Rockefeller fellows, had recommended that India’s Planning Commission establish 
a dedicated agency to monitor population growth. Fortunately, he noted, the Commission 
was considering the proposal seriously. Further, he mentioned that the WHO and the 
Government of India had just begun a study that year to investigate population control 
efforts in Mysore. Beginning in 1952 and the first of its kind in India, the WHO-funded 
study in Mysore involved an investigation of the use of the rhythm method of contraception 
in the village of Ramanagaram.436 The investigation’s later, comparative stages would 
involve a second urban site in Lodi Colony in New Delhi.437 Balfour speculated that 
opportunities for further studies might emerge from this work.438 Indeed, new research 
opportunities for Balfour and his public health team would soon spring from the Mysore 
study, albeit without the involvement of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Launched in November 1952, the Population Council entered India as a grant-
making agency just eight months after Balfour’s presentation and a full four years before 
the main foundation would launch its Indian Agricultural Program (IAP) in 1956.439 The 
organization found an almost immediate opening for its programming in India when, on 
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December 7, 1952, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru presented the Lok Sabha with plans 
to launch “the world’s first explicit policy of population limitation” as an addition to India’s 
First Five-Year Plan.440 Considered by officials of the Ford Foundation as a comparatively 
cautious investment for its national scope, the Government of India allocated the equivalent 
of $1.3 million toward research-focused programming across the subcontinent.441 Perhaps 
more significantly, India’s emerging population control initiative inspired an enthusiastic 
John D. Rockefeller III to make a matching $1.3 million donation to the new Population 
Council’s field research initiatives in India.442  
Selected as the Population Council’s associate director and first liaison in India, 
Balfour arrived back in New Delhi in 1953 to draw up plans for the organization’s 
programming in the country. During one of the first field visits of his tenure, the fifty-eight-
year-old physician met with maternity and child welfare researchers at the All-India 
Institute of Hygiene and Public Health (AIIH&PH) in Calcutta in October 1954.443 
Interested in forging institutional collaborations within India, Balfour evaluated the 
research capacity of the Institute to determine whether the Population Council might enlist 
it to investigate family planning methods in rural India. As shown in Chapter Two, the 
AIIH&PH had already received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation for its research 
in nutrition and other public health programming. The Institute also managed an extensive 
field study site, the Singur Health Unit, in the villages of the Singur District, just 40 
kilometers north of Calcutta. 
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Initially, Balfour proposed that the AIIH&PH coordinate a new field study on 
contraceptive use in rural Mysore, where the joint study run by the WHO and the 
Government of India was already underway. However, K. S. Viswanathan, an AIIH&PH 
administrator and professor of public health, balked at the prospect of fielding a study so 
far afield from the Institute’s home base in West Bengal. Viswanathan consulted with the 
AIIH&PH’s section of Maternity and Child Welfare and proposed that the requested study 
be conducted within the existing Singur Health Unit instead.444 The Population Council in 
New York approved the AIIH&PH’s “request” to collaborate on a study of family planning 
education on February 22, 1956 and the project began to take shape in April of that year. 
For its part, the Government of India contributed an annual Rs. 7,500, while the Population 
Council pledged the larger sum of $48,000 for three years.445 
While the Singur Study marked one of the earliest investigations into family 
planning launched by the Population Council, the AIIH&PH already had an important 
connection to the population control movement in India. As Rahul Nair has shown, John 
Megaw, who founded the AIIH&PH in the 1920s, went on to define India’s “population 
problem” as a major crisis within public health following his rise to the directorship of the 
Indian Medical Service (IMS) in 1930.446 Indeed, India itself had a long history of state-
sponsored family planning, particularly through the late colonial era, as Sarah Hodges, 
David Arnold, Anshu Malhotra, and others have shown.447 In 1925, for instance, R. D. 
Karve opened India’s first birth control clinic in Bombay and the Government of Mysore 
launched a similar clinic in 1930 that Moye W. Freymann of the Ford Foundation later 
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speculated was the world’s first state-run birth control clinic.448 During that decade, the 
movement reached something of a heyday in India, with the idea of family limitation 
through abstinence receiving the support of Gandhi, Margaret Sanger touring the country, 
and the All-India Women’s Conference proposing the teaching of birth control methods.449 
As Sarah Hodges and others have shown, the eugenics movement also had a long history 
in India, with eugenics associations emerging rapidly across the subcontinent through the 
1920s and 1930s.450 Citing enthusiastic advocates such as N. S. Phadke, Hodges shows that 
eugenic thinking appealed particularly well to the concerns of “the ruling classes” of India. 
More specifically, such ideas offered the prospect of recapturing India's “glorious eugenic 
past” through promises of productive marriages, racial purity, and national vitality through 
family planning measures.451 In this way, eugenic thought helped to stoke interest in 
population control and fertility regulation across the subcontinent 
Elsewhere in Asia, eugenic discussions during the 1920s and 1930s reappeared 
after the Second World War, repackaged within investigations of fertility regulation and 
birth control practices. An innovative field study of family planning launched in 1950 by 
Yoshio Koya in Japan, for instance, served as the chief model for population fieldwork in 
rural India after independence in 1947.452 Koya’s work drew comparisons between 
practices across three villages — one rice-growing, another in a mountainous region, and 
a final in a fishing village. The study came in the wake of Japan’s Eugenic Protection Law 
of 1948 and the Japanese Diet’s rejection of the removal of all restrictions on family 
planning, which had the effect of increasing the frequency of induced abortions while 
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discouraging the use of contraceptives.453 Koya’s study involved instructing villagers in the 
use of contraceptives. Over its six-year run, test areas observed a fifty percent reduction in 
abortion rates when compared with the control.454  
Drawing upon Koya’s comparative methodology, C. P. Blacker worked with the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Government of India to launch the first Indian 
field study of family planning in rural Mysore at Ramanagaram and Lodi Colony in Delhi 
in 1952.455 Blacker, who studied under Julian Huxley at Oxford and served as secretary of 
the British Eugenics Society, had been selected by Margaret Sanger that same year to head 
up the new International Planned Parenthood Federation.456 Blacker’s study of 
contraceptive use in India lasted for two years, but ran up against  design limitations and 
ended too early to publish results. Nevertheless, this first family planning study showed 
public health experts in India that rural populations might indeed be receptive to instruction 
in family planning and contraceptive methods on a wider scale.457 More importantly, 
Koya’s earlier work in Japan influenced the design and methodologies of the first two 
longitudinal studies of rural fertility supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Population Council in India: the Khanna Study, conducted in conjunction with Harvard 
University in rural Punjab from 1953 to 1960, and the Singur Study managed by the 
AIIH&PH in West Bengal from 1956 to 1964. As will be shown in the next section, similar 
concerns regarding fertility also influenced the agendas of Rockefeller-financed seed 
scientists working in South Asia during this period. Like their colleagues at the helm of 
projects of population regulation and surveillance, Rockefeller Foundation officials and 
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Indian seed scientists approached the issue of plant fertility and the hybridization of new, 
high-yielding strains of food crops as areas of prime concern for the security and longevity 
of the new nation. In this way, the regulation of both plant and human fertility proved 
critical within conceptions of national integrity and health. 
HYBRIDIZATION AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF INDIA’S GERMPLASM  
Ensuring the productivity of food grains emerged as a prime concern of Indian 
nationalists in the late colonial era, evolving through distinctly transnational exchanges. 
For instance, the October 1929 issue of the journal of the Sociedad Científica Antonio 
Alzate, one of Mexico’s premier agricultural scientific societies, carried an article by the 
Marathi agronomist Pandurang Sadashiv Khankhoje. In it, he described new varieties of 
high-yielding maize under development at the Agricultural Research Station at Chapingo 
near Texcoco in the State of Mexico, highlighting recent crossbreeding work conducted by 
his research team to improve yields of the grain that was "of prime importance" in Mexican 
diets.458 As a founding member of the Ghadr Movement, Khankhoje had left India in 1905 
for Japan and then the United States.459 There, he studied the agricultural sciences while 
organizing Indians on the West Coast of the United States, coordinating militant resistance 
efforts against the British Empire with Har Dayal, Lala Lajpat Rai, M. N. Roy, and other 
Indian nationalists exiled in North America.460 While in the United States, he also worked 
toward graduate degrees in the agricultural sciences at the Oregon Agricultural College, 
the University of Minnesota, and State College of Washington. During the First World 
War, Khankhoje fought alongside German and Ottoman troops against British forces in the 
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Middle East and subsequently relocated to Mexico where he resumed his career as an 
agronomist for the Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture. Through the 1930s, he served as 
chief of the Office of Genetics, Ecology, and Botany in the Mexican Secretariat, directing 
research into high-yielding maize and wheat varieties at various agricultural experiment 
stations and research institutes across the country. He personally developed three varieties 
of high-yielding maize and four new rust-resistant wheat hybrids during his career in 
Mexico, directing the federal government's experiment station in Veracruz.461 Nearly three 
decades after Khankhoje reported on the work being conducted at Chapingo, maize 
hybridization became the Rockefeller Foundation's first focus in crop improvement in 
South Asia. Building upon research conducted at Mexico's Centro Internacional de 
Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (CIMMYT), not far from the same research station where 
Khankhoje worked on maize hybridization in the 1920s and 1930s, the Rockefeller 
Foundation launched its Indian maize improvement program after entering a formal 
memorandum of understanding with the Government of India on April 12, 1956. In 
welcoming Rockefeller's intervention in South Asian agriculture, India became the fourth 
nation to enter such an agreement with the Foundation.462 Programs in Mexico, Colombia, 
and Chile preceded Rockefeller’s Indian Agricultural Program (IAP), but the Indian 
investment would mark the foundation’s largest project in the agricultural sciences to 
date.463 With the Population Council already active in India for three years, the inauguration 
of Rockefeller’s program to feed the subcontinent occurred against the backdrop of fully 
mature efforts to control the nation’s population growth. Nick Cullather argues that 
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Rockefeller’s launch of the IAP in 1956 set the stage for the food grain production increases 
of the Green Revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s. Motivated in part by Cold War 
politics, Rockefeller’s introduction of new seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, and 
mechanized farming practices would ultimately triple wheat, and later rice, yields across 
South Asia.464 For the time being, however, Rockefeller scientists would focus instead on 
gathering a genetic catalogue for the improvement of maize (corn) and sorghum (jowar), 
simultaneously building a scientific research network in India. Sorghum represented an 
important feed grain in India. Maize, however, had only been cultivated modestly as a food 
grain by Indian farmers — grown on just 7.6 of some 212 million acres.465 
To serve as its new field director in India, the Rockefeller Foundation selected 
Ralph W. Cummings, an agronomist, soil scientist, and former head of the North Carolina 
Agricultural Experimental Station in 1956. Cummings arrived in Delhi with the primary 
goal of establishing a graduate school as part of the existing Indian Agricultural Research 
Institute (IARI) and, more generally, strengthening select agricultural education 
institutions, including the Allahabad Agricultural Institute. Working with these institutions, 
the foundation pursued the improvement of cereal crop production through scientific 
research initiatives in maize, sorghum, and millets through the late 1950s, and wheat and 
rice into the early 1960s. In these efforts, Rockefeller collaborated closely with the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), which had been established by the British 
colonial administration in 1929. Further, Cummings also began to evaluate which food 
grains stood the best chance for improvement through hybridization across India.466 
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With a dedicated shift toward research-capacity building and improvements in food 
grain production, Cummings’ small staff in Delhi moved to identify and finance ICAR and 
IARI research that would crossbreed high-yielding grain varieties which had already been 
identified in Mexico with local strains. The Rockefeller IAP thus set aside the social and 
economic concerns at the heart of debates surrounding rural development in India, 
approaching the problem as a clean equation that would pair improved seed varieties with 
fertile soil. Accordingly, Rockefeller’s direct investments in Indian agricultural 
development proved relatively modest — a mere $7.9 million between 1953 and 1974, 
never involving more than twenty American scientists or foundation officials stationed in 
India at a time.467 Comparable initiatives in India, led variously by the central government, 
the Ford Foundation, and the TCA, proved far more expensive for their emphasis on large-
scale rural extension training and community development initiatives.  
Rockefeller’s on-going work in wheat, corn, and sorghum improvement in Mexico 
provided a clear model for the new IAP’s work. There, Rockefeller’s operations centered 
around CIMMYT, established at El Batán in the State of Mexico for its proximity to the 
Mexican government’s premiere agricultural studies program at the Chapingo 
Autonomous University. Launched in 1943, CIMMYT served as Rockefeller’s base of 
scientific operations in Mexico and focused on the study and improvement of maize and 
wheat varieties. The Mexican program involved about one hundred overseas staff and 
roughly twice that number of Mexican scientists and technicians.468 Through the 1940s, 
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Rockefeller-sponsored research in Mexico had shown real potential in creating hybrid 
varieties of wheat that were both high-yielding and rust resistant.  
Despite these successes in Mexico, the challenge of adapting the new hybrids to 
grow prolifically in the face of local pests and parasites, not to mention the subcontinent’s 
infertile soil with its low moisture retention, appeared to be an insurmountable obstacle.469 
Agronomists Albert and Gabrielle Howard had worked on developing high-yield Indian 
varieties in collaboration with H. R. Khan at the Imperial Institute of Agricultural Research 
as early as 1905.470 Still, the varieties developed by the Howards and Khan at the IARI 
proved to be too tall, leaving them vulnerable to wind, rain, and a host of parasites. As 
Harrar, Mangelsdorf, and Weaver observed in 1952: 
There is this situation with regard to wheat in India: Some excellent breeding 
work has been done, producing some good-looking plants. However, these 
varieties are not successful in terms of wheat production in India because they are 
not smut resistant, nor rust resistant, and are very susceptible to lodging. They 
even plant mustard in wheat to give the wheat something to lean against.471 
In the face of these obstacles, the IAP would need time to build institutional capacity and 
to develop its relationships with the ICAR and the IARI before launching a domestic wheat 
improvement program that would rely upon a variety of field stations and experimental 
sites across India. Though work on improving domestic wheat varieties would continue at 
the IARI, the Rockefeller Foundation and the ICAR did not move to create a coordinated 
All-India wheat breeding program until late 1965, after the introduction of the hybrid wheat 
varieties developed under Norman Borlaug’s supervision in Mexico.472 
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In much the same way, rice, by far the most cultivated and consumed grain in India, 
seemed to offer only difficult prospects for improvement as the Rockefeller IAP began its 
work in 1956.473 Yet British colonial scientists had successfully isolated and cataloged 
high-yielding native strains of rice years before Rockefeller turned to seed hybridization in 
India. In 1929, for instance, Albert Howard reported that the agricultural scientists of the 
British administration had indeed been working on the problem of rice improvement: 
At practically all the rice stations, the Economic Botanists are actively engaged in 
the isolation of high-yielding unit species from the mixtures grown, in the testing 
of promising types, and in growing seed for distribution to the cultivators. This 
method of improvement is possible, as the amount of natural cross-fertilization in 
rice is small. 474  
Despite  Howard’s optimistic assessment two decades earlier, Harrar, Mangelsdorf, 
and Weaver reported to the contrary in 1952: “[W]e have been unable to discover any 
evidence of successful improvement of rice in India through hybridization.”475 Indeed, 
while the FAO’s global program of rice improvement built from the notion of crossing 
Japanese varieties with the high-yielding rice varieties in other Asian nations, as would be 
accomplished at Los Baños in the Philippines by the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) after 1960, daunting technical challenges remained in creating new hybrids.476 
Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation, owing in part to its conservative tendency to invest only 
when few other institutions tended to the problem and while dramatic gains seemed 
possible, did not launch a dedicated rice improvement program in India until the next 
decade, 
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Instead, the IAP invested in sorghum and maize improvement. In India, this work 
sought to produce hybrids by crossing high-yielding Mexican strains of maize and jowar 
with local varieties that had grown up in South Asia over several hundred years.477 The 
development of high-yielding maize varieties through hybridization relied upon a laborious 
process of isolating strains with prolific characteristics, and then the cross-pollination of 
thousands of varieties exhibiting the desired traits. Even at the highly successful CIMMYT 
program in Mexico, work on one strain could span several growing seasons with no 
guarantee of ultimate success.478 As CIMMYT’s report for 1948 concluded: 
A student of genetics can readily see why the development of better corn is a long 
time, step by step process. The perfect corn with its maximum yield potential, 
with maximum efficiency in the utilization of soil fertility and moisture and high 
resistance to insects and disease and with its maximum nutritive value is a goal to 
attain over a long period of years.479 
Through its rigorous “application of modern principles of genetics,” however, the maize 
program in Mexico boasted great gains in generating new, high-yielding hybrids.480 The 
same process would be attempted in India, Cummings explained. The IAP, collaborating 
with the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), sought to connect Indian 
agricultural field stations and test farms with maize germplasm from around the world.481  
While the move toward maize hybridization using a large germplasm collection 
marked a shift in agricultural research in India, Dr. Boshi Sen had already attempted to 
hybridize Indian varieties with one another throughout the 1940s and 1950s in Uttar 
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Pradesh.482 Around the same time, province and state-level programs in Mysore and Punjab 
had worked to create two and three-way hybrids of Indian maize varieties. The IARI also 
launched its own maize breeding program in the early 1950s, but Rockefeller officials 
theorized that any substantial improvements in Indian maize yields via hybridization would 
require the introduction of genetic samples from North America for cross-breeding 
purposes.483 Observing this, Boshi Sen coordinated with the U.S. Technical Cooperation 
Mission to India (TCM), the working arm of the TCA in the country, to supply the Jammu 
and Kashmir Government with parental stocks of an American variety of maize, US 13, 
which produced a successful test crop in 1955.484  
In 1957, the ICAR and the Rockefeller IAP launched the Coordinated Maize 
Breeding Program, distributing American hybrids to test farms across India. The program 
simultaneously began to arrange for the importation of maize germplasm samples into 
India for the purposes of creating new hybrids. Four years later, the Rockefeller IAP’s 
maize breeding program had released four new hybrid varieties of maize to farmers through 
their field collaborations with the ICAR and state-level agricultural research stations. Four 
more hybrids remained in the testing phase and had been scheduled for sale as seed to 
farmers by 1963.485 This first batch of IAP-commissioned maize hybrids resulted from the 
cross-breeding of existing Indian varieties with “breeding material introduced from all 
parts of the world.”486 The names of the new hybrids conveyed their suitability for 
cultivation by farmers across India’s ecological zones: Ganga 1, Ganga 101, Ranajit, and 
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Deccan.487 Under the right farming conditions the scientists of the ICAR expressed 
confidence that these new hybrid varieties of maize could thrive, becoming a significant 
food source for millions of Indians. As the 1963 survey of the IAP’s work in India 
indicated:  
Under good cultural practices those hybrids have the capacity to yield up to 50% 
more grain than local varieties commonly grown under the same conditions in 
these same areas. Further they have been developed with grain type and quality 
which are acceptable to Indian cultivators and they are developed from inbred 
lines which are sufficiently vigorous and well adapted to permit dependable seed 
production under Indian conditions.488 
The Rockefeller IAP’s collaboration with the ICAR had delivered results suggesting that 
the Mexican model of innovation in food production — namely through a wide-ranging 
program of hybridization — could bear fruit for India. These experiments in crossing 
Indian maize varieties with the germplasm of Mexican and American maize strains 
produced new types of corn, well-adapted to the climate and soil conditions of South Asia. 
Indeed, as early as 1959, Cummings could boast that, “a good sample of the maize germ 
plasm of the world has been assembled for test.”489 Further, with their high-yields the new 
hybrids derived from this imported germplasm held the potential to become a significant 
supplement to the Indian food supply. Considering these successes and with national grain 
production levels still unsteady and fluctuating, the Government of India allocated Rs. 2.3 
crores within 1961’s Third Five-Year Plan to establish the National Seed Corporation to 
regulate the production of high-yielding, hybrid seeds.490 In this way, the collaboration of 
the Rockefeller Foundation with the Government of India would take on an institutional 
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dimension, pursuing permanent abundance through the collection, creation, and 
dissemination of seed material. 
TOWARD A MODEL OF RURAL POPULATION CONTROL  
Designed by a team of demographers and epidemiologists at the Harvard School of 
Public Health, the Khanna Population Study took shape under the direction of John E. 
Gordon and Theodore H. Ingalls of Harvard and Carl E. Taylor of the Christian Medical 
College in Ludhiana.491 The Rockefeller Foundation initially funded the study through a 
grant awarded to Harvard in 1953, providing funds for two years and subsequently 
extending support for an additional five years. The Population Council would also provide 
funds for the project in later years.492 India’s Ministry of Health approved the study site of 
sixteen villages in the Ludhiana District in rural Punjab and enthusiastically endorsed the 
project. Gordon, Ingalls, and Taylor lived in the study area themselves for extended periods 
during their fieldwork, attempting to immerse themselves in the social context of their 
study subjects. The study sought to determine which of five birth control methods proved 
most effective for villagers and, as Population Council officials later reflected, “The over-
all program was designed along the lines of a laboratory experiment.”493 Indeed, the entire 
study area became an oversized laboratory for the Harvard team, with scientists collecting 
vast amounts of detailed data regarding their test subjects and culminating in a 400-page 
publication written by Gordon with John B. Wyon, and published by Harvard in 1971.494 
The Khanna Study’s results proved less significant than the sheer amount of 
information gathered on the villages of the Ludhiana District. In 1963, Gordon and his 
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colleagues reported that 38% of the couples in the experimental area had accepted foam 
tablets distributed by investigators or had indicated that they used either withdrawal or 
rhythm methods. That figure fell to 19% following the end of the study, with few women 
reporting that they used the foam tablets thereafter.495 More importantly, the distribution 
of foam tablets and the instruction in various methods of contraception did not significantly 
affect the birth rate in the study area. As Gordon and Wyon reflected, “The probable 
explanation is that a goodly proportion of persons supposedly practicing contraception 
actually were not.”496 Subsequently, the Harvard scientists speculated that individuals with 
experience living or working outside the villages were more likely to engage in 
contraceptive practices, thus attributing the reluctance of their test subjects to accept their 
program of birth control to their identity as villagers and farmers. Indeed, Gordon and 
Wyon commented that villagers in the Ludhiana District relied upon a farming metaphor 
in their notion of conception, visualizing the woman as the soil and the man as the sower 
of the seed. As they described villagers’ understanding in the published results of the 
Khanna Study: “During sexual intercourse the man puts his seed near the mouth of the 
womb. The woman is the soil; if the mouth of the womb is open and circumstances are 
right, the seed starts to grow and the woman is pregnant.” 497 In this way, the Rockefeller-
funded Khanna Study’s epidemiological experiment in reproductive health education 
amassed a great deal of population data, generating more anecdotes and ethnographical 
observations than it did replicable models for village-level intervention. 
For its part, the Government of India played an important role in facilitating these 
first efforts to study and shape family planning practices in rural India. For instance, Col. 
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Bishen Lal Raina, an officer serving with the Indian Ministry of Health, took the lead in 
coordinating efforts between the Population Council and the Government of India to 
support field studies of rural family planning. For instance, he spearheaded government 
efforts to provide the Khanna and Ramanagaram studies with supplies, including 100,000 
Durafoam contraceptive tablets in 1957.498 That same year and also with the field studies 
in mind, Raina secured agreements from Johnson & Johnson in the US and Durex in the 
UK to begin producing condoms in India, as prophylactics of Indian manufacture proved 
inferior.499 Raina expressed enthusiasm for the family planning education work of the 
Population Council in his regular correspondence with the organization’s top scientists, 
including Balfour and also Douglas Ensminger, director of the Ford Foundation in India. 
In 1957, for instance, Raina proposed that the Population Council support the Indian 
Directorate General of Health Services in launching a pilot education scheme in rural 
family planning. As he wrote: “At present time it is considered necessary to initiate a few 
schemes at least at soon as possible. These units will be tried in regions where the family 
planning programme is being actively pursued.”500 In response, the Population Council 
awarded Raina funds for film strips, books, and jeeps to support mobile education units 
that would travel from village to village, espousing the virtues of family planning.501 
Meanwhile in West Bengal, the Singur Population Control Study, as it came to be 
known by officials of the AIIH&PH and the Population Council, began in 1956. Unlike the 
Khanna Study, the investigation at Singur was designed by an Indian institution, though its 
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objectives were shaped by the priorities of the Population Council funding it from New 
Delhi. Muktha Sen, who had directed WHO and FAO-supported investigations of 
nutritional and maternal health in the Singur Study Unit. took an active role in organizing 
the new population control study. She would ultimately lead the project, also rising to the 
directorship of the AIIH&PH by the end of the decade.502 The study involved three villages: 
an experimental site, a control site, and a test site. Far more than its ultimate findings, the 
study’s “family planning action research” methodology, involving the experimental 
deployment of different birth control programs, marked a new development within public 
health in independent India.503 Supported by the Government of India, the work of this 
Population Council-financed project ran in parallel with the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
simultaneous efforts to improve Indian food grains through hybridization. 
In the West Bengali villages of the Singur Study Unit, what had begun as a series 
of Rockefeller-funded nutritional health surveys in 1944 evolved rapidly into an intricate 
investigation of family planning practices among the women of the Singur Health Unit. 
Muktha Sen, who had launched a broad survey of maternal mortality in 1951, now headed 
the new Population Council-funded investigation of family planning practices.504 Around 
the Singur Study Unit, fifteen hamlets of the Gopalnagar Union served as the experimental 
area, with a similar number of sites used as the control within the Bandipur Union. The test 
site, the village of Mirzapur, was chosen as a venue in which the AIIH&PH field staff could 
refine their methods of sharing information about family planning while simultaneously 
developing a sense of current norms and common. 505 Sen and Mathen defined their study 
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as “family planning action research,” meaning that, unlike conventional demographic 
research, their work sought to address a pressing public health problem directly.506 
Indeed, the eight-year-long Population Council-funded project sought to determine 
which methods of birth control proved most effective in reducing birth rates across the 
study area. Along with the distribution of contraceptive foam tablets and condoms, this 
work involved instructing villagers in contraceptive methods and tracking the sex and 
reproductive lives of the study’s subjects through regular follow-up interviews. 507 
Recognizing the area’s low literacy rate, Sen and Mathen designed instructional materials 
that relied upon visual teaching aids, including flip charts, flash cards, and even wall 
calendars “with the picture of the national leader and their messages on family 
planning.”508 At the same time, Sen and Mathen noted that their methods of visual 
instruction ran into problems when deployed. As they wrote:  
To make the teaching of the ‘rhythm method’ simple, and at the same time 
thorough, charts to illustrate the physiology of human reproduction were 
prepared. Even these charts, in themselves, were found to be not so simple as they 
were supposed to be, and therefore at a later stage, models depicting the human 
anatomy and physiology were made.509  
In this way, the field researchers of the Singur Study devised methods for convincing 
villagers to “accept family planning” that closely resembled the teaching materials widely 
deployed by the Ford-sponsored community development initiatives of S. K. Dey and rural 
extension trainings of Arthur T. Mosher, as shown in Chapter Two.510 Indeed, covering a 
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target population of 7,423, the educational dimension of the Singur Study and its broad 
effort to reduce birth rates through practical instruction closely resembled the intricate 
social interventions that the Rockefeller Foundation had earlier sought to avoid.511 In some 
sense, such interventions were simply inevitable, given the outsized aims of any endeavor 
to change people’s lives in the most intimate of ways. In pursuing the goal of fertility 
reduction, the Population Council could hardly maintain the pretense of tending strictly to 
scientific research as could the Rockefeller Foundation.  
Working with AIIH&PH demographers C. Chankrasekaran and R. N. Basu, the 
physicians at the helm of the Singur Study recruited six male and female fieldworkers from 
the villages surrounding the study sites to support the project. They served as interviewers 
and monitors of the villagers in the study area, following up with women who failed to 
report to study centers, similar to practices employed by physicians and medical 
investigators in field studies of family planning conducted in Trinidad, Jamaica, and 
Barbados, during the 1940s and 1950s, as Nicole Bourbonnais has shown.512 These 
fieldworkers also served as educators, carrying flipcharts and flannel cutouts with which 
they were expected to explain human reproductive processes to reluctant villagers.513 To 
facilitate their work, Muktha Sen and K. K. Mathen composed a handbook setting out the 
objects of the study and detailing the methods they might employ in their work. As the 
fieldworkers’ guide explained: 
We want to see that everybody had got a child [sic]. But the number of children 
and interval of pregnancy should be such as you can make your family happy and 
prosperous. We are increasing in number but our land remains the same. Land is 
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the only source for supplying us food. The same amount of land cannot feed the 
increasing number of mouths. So it is not desirable to have many children.514 
The short, frank sentences of the guide to field workers distilled the enormous issue of 
overpopulation, reframing it in practical terms deemed digestible by villagers and 
fieldworkers alike. In this way, the Singur study presented family planning as a matter of 
sheer common sense in the face of the scarce land and low income in the villages. The land 
itself simply could not feed villagers' numerous children. At the same time, this simple 
message ran into trouble, especially when the family planning methods — restricted by the 
study design to the use of condoms, contraceptive foaming tablets, and the rhythm method 
as the only strategies acceptable to villagers — did not achieve their desired results. As Sen 
and Mathen observed: “One of the most difficult problems the study faced was due to cases 
of genuine failure of methods advised and practised. There were a number of cases when 
people blamed the field workers for ‘misleading’ them, and asked for remedies by 
abortion.”515  In spite of the flaws within its methodologies, the Singur Study demonstrated 
a small but consistent decline in pregnancies in the experimental area.516 It maintained the 
full support of the Population Council through the end of its data collection stage in 1963. 
Indeed, the Population Council featured the Singur Study prominently in the first edition 
of its bulletin, Studies in Family Planning, alongside the Khanna Study and the Emko 
Program in Puerto Rico.517  
The Khanna and Singur studies do much to show that the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the Population Council forwarded their public health agenda — an unambiguous plan 
of rural population control — under the guise of objective demographic research. In doing 
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so, the two organizations worked closely with the Government of India and local public 
health institutions. The major focus of these efforts at controlling India’s population fell 
upon the nation’s rural poor. As Sarah Hodges argues: “The neo-Malthusianism that 
undergirded population control projects in newly independent India sought to eradicate 
poverty by intervening directly and robustly in the reproductive practices of all Indians.”518 
That said, as she further notes, “it was the poor whose bodies bore the brunt of the state’s 
attempts to reduce the aggregate rates of population growth.”519 In much the same way, as 
it emerged as an influential force in public health in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
Population Council worked through Indian institutions to focus its fertility regulation 
efforts on Indian villagers struggling with the effects of food shortage and malnutrition. 
CONCLUSION  
At the eleventh annual meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations in Rome on November 6, 1961, John D. Rockefeller III delivered a keynote 
address to the agricultural and nutritional scientists of the UN agency. In it, Rockefeller 
reviewed the successes of his family’s foundation in improving agriculture in Mexico and 
outlined ongoing efforts to diversify the food supply through scientific innovation in India 
and across Asia. As the founder of the Population Council, he also underscored the need to 
address the global problem of overpopulation, which he ranked as “second only to atomic 
weapons” as the most pressing issue of the day.520 He called for addressing the problem 
head-on through candid family planning initiatives tailored to each nation’s needs.521 
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Strikingly, he also reflected upon a rush to abstraction in the scientific effort to strike a 
balance between food production and population growth. He remarked: 
[I]t is essential that we see in its full and true dimensions the problem of numbers 
of people versus quantities of food. From the days of Malthus, we have inherited a 
tendency to feel that the answer lies in striking a healthy balance between these 
two. To the difficult question “How much is enough?” this allows a simple 
answer, but too often the wrong one, because it equates man with animal and food 
with fodder.522 
To avoid dehumanizing the populations in the race to counter the crisis, Rockefeller 
proposed that private foundations, governments, and international agencies like the FAO 
and the WHO remember that “all these basic needs — food, health, education, economic 
betterment, and population stabilization — are bound together.”523 Further, Rockefeller 
asked whether work on these inherently connected issues had perhaps neglected social and 
educational development.  
Indeed, the previous year, Rockefeller had delivered a very similar speech to the 
Dallas Council on World Affairs in April 1960. In it, he remarked that, “Our constant goal 
must be the enrichment of human life, not its restriction,” and reflecting that, despite all of 
his family’s organizations work to the contrary, “Large populations are not necessarily 
undesirable.”524 In this way, Rockefeller presented very serious ethical questions regarding 
the quest his own organization had undertaken to address the perceived double crisis of 
food shortage and overpopulation. He also demonstrated how such vast programs 
intimately affecting the lives of millions of people hinged upon the mercurial whims of a 
handful of powerful individuals.  
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Rockefeller Foundation officials had rejected the prospect of vast social and 
economic interventions in India during their initial discussions in 1951 and 1952. Instead, 
the foundation’s approach to agricultural intervention and investment in India drew directly 
from a scathing critique of the socially-oriented designs of the nascent community 
development movement that had emerged in part from post-Partition rehabilitation efforts, 
as shown in the previous chapter. Community development and rural extension, while 
supported staunchly by the Government of India, the Ford Foundation, and the TCA 
through the early 1950s, embodied a resource-intensive model focused on social 
intervention that the foundation sought to avoid.  
At the same time, Rockefeller’s decision to invest in the agricultural sciences in 
India hardly meant that the organization would abandon its running concern for public 
health or its postwar fixation upon overpopulation. Instead, Rockefeller organizations 
simply pursued social interventions of a different, more invasive, and clinical nature. 
Indeed, the new focus on the agricultural sciences in India represented a social experiment 
itself, transplanting the model that had successfully improved Mexican grain yields into a 
newer, larger national context. The deep concern for overpopulation expressed by 
Rockefeller’s top administrators and scientists was simply channeled into its sister 
organization, the Population Council, which from 1952 aimed to evaluate and regulate 
fertility across India.  
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Chapter Five: Pursuing Permanent Abundance 
After leading two lives as a freedom fighter within the Ghadr Movement and as an 
accomplished agronomist of Mexico's Secretariat of Agriculture, Pandurang Khankhoje 
finally returned to an independent India in April 1949.525 His work on maize hybridization 
during his forty year exile brought him esteem and recognition within the Indian 
agricultural science community, but his advanced age kept him from assuming a powerful 
role within the Indian Ministry of Agriculture.526 Upon his return to South Asia, he and his 
family took up residence in Nagpur where he continued to write regularly on topics in 
Indian agricultural development. In 1949, he headed an agricultural advisory committee to 
the state government of Madhya Pradesh, helping to assess the quality of agricultural 
education programs and experimental farms and stations in the region.527 Khankhoje 
recommended the wider mechanization of Indian agriculture, lending support to the 
expansion of India's agricultural education and rural extension programs.528 He wrote in 
support of India's community development program, stressing the need for practical 
scientific research that "lead to more yields with minimum expense to the farmer."529 He 
also expressed dismay at the lack of attention the agricultural sciences had paid to soil 
fertility in India, speculating that low crop yields derived from a lack of attention to the 
soil. As he wrote in 1958: 
Thousands of years of agriculture have made the soil less fertile or unfertile. Our 
land erosion is so great that the present fertility of the soil is reduced to the 
minimum, and in our general practice we have practically ignored the 
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fundamental principles of fertilizer, seed selection, introduction of new crops and 
up-to-date modern agricultural methods.530 
Indeed, the former Ghadri was not alone in his concern that soil erosion and infertility stood 
in the way of agricultural production increases. Just as Khankhoje argued, scientists of the 
international agencies and American philanthropic organizations now deeply involved in 
reshaping Indian agriculture came to contend that high-yielding seeds would not, on their 
own, generate dramatic increases in food grain production. Their concern over soil health 
and crop yields would play out most vividly in the partitioned Punjab. 
 In the two decades following independence, the Indian and Pakistani governments 
coordinated with new international institutions like the World Bank to codify their shared 
borders and to secure the water and soil resources needed to expand agricultural production 
in South Asia. During the 1950s and 1960s, the World Bank’s component institutions — 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA) — sent prominent bankers, lawyers, hydrologists, and 
economists to the South Asia to assist in defining the international boundary. These Bank 
representatives also worked to gather data to inform institutional lending and publically 
advocated for population management and agricultural investment. In attempting to define 
and regulate national spaces and populations, such as World Bank projects, they 
endeavored to integrate India and Pakistan into an emerging international political and 
economic order.  
This chapter examines projects launched by the Government of India in conjunction 
with the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the World Bank to permanently 
sustain food grain production increases across South Asia. It examines the World Bank’s 
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mediation of the Indus River Basin dispute of the 1950s and subsequent economic missions 
that supported the framing of the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan in 1960. 
As emissaries of international development schooled in the public works projects of New 
Deal and resource-sharing agreements across the Americas, World Bank representatives 
framed proposals for South Asia firmly in the context of a postwar population crisis. Rather 
than focusing exclusively upon the hydro-political and legal implications of these 
negotiations, this chapter emphasizes concerns over fertile soil as a vital national resource 
that dominated the discussions. World Bank economists and hydrologists intent on 
securing a permanent settlement of water rights in the Indus River Basin paid particular 
attention to issues of soil fertility and the long-term productivity of the land. These 
considerations drove the negotiations between India and Pakistan, reflecting a broader 
thinking on the connections between soil health, agricultural vitality, and national integrity.  
In their negotiations, World Bank officials and the legal teams representing both 
nations also drew upon international boundary and resource-sharing agreements between 
the United States and Mexico as models for dividing the natural resources of the Indus 
River Valley. In this way, a rising class of international development experts and elites 
worked to codify the exchange relationships of South Asia's new border regions, 
systematizing the international border between two nations. For Indian, Pakistani, 
American, and British officials involved in the discussion, a final settlement of the 
boundary and resource disputes between India and Pakistan facilitated rapid agricultural 
development and offered a solution to the perceived population crisis.  
During the same period, the Rockefeller Foundation collaborated with the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) to launch the National Seeds Corporation, a 
company that would have long-term rights over managing India's existing seed resources 
and newly-developed hybridized varieties. Rockefeller and the ICAR thus attempted to 
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establish lasting legal and economic institutions that would secure high crop-yields despite 
the relative infertility of regional soils. Finally, after the launch of the Rockefeller 
Foundation's Indian Agricultural Program (IAP) in 1956, the foundation took on a powerful 
role within the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI). Notably, the IAP advocated 
for the establishment of graduate programs in agriculture, such as the Punjab Agricultural 
University in Ludhiana, and the advancement of soil science in India through investments 
in field research. Crafted in the image of the agricultural programs of the American land-
grant universities, these new institutions would work to train agricultural experts who 
would maintain the nation's seed and soil resources for generations to come.  In this way, 
these global institutions collaborated with the Indian and Pakistani states to articulate 
distinctly national conceptions of fertility in the form of soil and seed resources. As will be 
shown, only after these efforts in establishing institutions and networks intended to guard 
and maintain these resources would the Rockefeller Foundation turn to intensive efforts to 
develop high-yielding wheat and rice varieties across South Asia.   
A DIVISION OF WATER AND SOIL 
During the summer of 1947, the British barrister Cyril Radcliffe famously labored 
in a guest cottage on the grounds of the Viceroy’s House in New Delhi, hastily drawing 
the border between two emerging nations. On his first and only visit to South Asia, the line 
his pen left across the map of the subcontinent delimited the national territories of India 
and Pakistan.531 Situated in the northwestern quarter of the Indian subcontinent and 
spanning much of modern-day Pakistan, the Indus River system consists of two major 
rivers in the west: the Jhelum and Chenab, and three to the east: the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi. 
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The five rivers are tributaries to the larger Indus River.532 The Radcliffe Line bisected the 
Indus River system in 1947, leaving the rivers’ headwaters largely in Indian-administered 
Himalayan regions. Both nations subsequently laid claim to much of the water flowing 
through the Indus Basin and, in the view of World Bank officials, threatened agricultural 
production on both sides of the new border.533 As Vazira Zamindar has shown, however, 
Partition did not represent a final territorial and economic settlement between India and 
Pakistan.534 The political barrier cutting through the agricultural heartland of Punjab cut 
irrigation canals off from their headwaters, disrupted the flow of food grains to markets, 
and determined the movement of agrarian laborers. In this way, decolonization left the 
future of Indian and Pakistani agriculture uncertain. Like their counterparts at the Ford and 
Rockefeller foundations, World Bank officials contended that South Asia faced a 
population crisis, with the collective population of both nations projected to exceed one 
billion by 1990.535 
The dispute remained unresolved through the first four years following Partition. 
The need for a final settlement over resources in the wake of Partition also drew immediate 
attention from international development experts, but the situation seemed to demand 
diplomatic as well as economic expertise. As Norris E. Dodd, the director of the FAO, 
wrote in February 1953: "The partition between Pakistan and India has created very serious 
problems in international water rights for the control and use of the Indus River and its 
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affluents."536 In 1951, David E. Lilienthal, the American attorney who directed the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 1930s and had more recently chaired the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, attempted to broker a water-sharing deal between India and 
Pakistan.537 As Daniel Haines has shown, Lilienthal’s proposal proved significant in that it 
defined the Indus River Basin as a “natural” feature of the local environment — a discrete 
geographical unit that could be divided.538 It also attempted to establish a cooperative 
agricultural development project between India and Pakistan. For all its potential, and in 
spite of Lilienthal’s years of engineering and management experience with the TVA, 
negotiations collapsed within the year. Following the failure of the Lilienthal’s cooperative 
development plan, World Bank President Eugene Black took an interest in the dispute and, 
in 1952, secured dedicated resources for the IBRD to adjudicate a settlement treaty between 
India and Pakistan. The World Bank’s effort in resolving the dispute would involve 
engagement with former British colonial officials and bureaucrats, as well as development 
experts, such as Lilienthal, drawn from large infrastructural projects in the United States 
and Latin America. William A. B. Iliff, for instance, represented the former category. Iliff 
departed a long career with the British Treasury to join the World Bank Group in February 
1948, where he served as vice president of the International Development Association 
(IDA) from 1956 to 1962.539 
 In his experience with the British Government, Iliff had worked as financial 
counselor to the British embassies in Teheran, Cairo, and Addis Ababa, and also as the 
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financial advisor to the Governor of Burma at Simla during the Second World War.540 Now 
in his new role with the IDA, Iliff's extensive British colonial and overseas experience 
made him the World Bank’s choice to serve as its chief financial representative in South 
Asia during the mediation of the Indus River Basin dispute. For Iliff, the World Bank’s 
decision to work on resolving the dispute stemmed from concerns regarding population 
growth and development. As he reflected in a 1960 interview: “We had been interested in 
the development of both India and Pakistan, who together, population-wise anyway, 
probably comprise about half the total population of the underdeveloped world.”541 In this 
way, the World Bank could test its plans for global economic growth to the world’s largest 
populations and, in turn, produce the greatest impact.  
At the same time, Iliff believed that the resource dispute between India and Pakistan 
and the lack of a firm resolution regarding resource-sharing in the subcontinent’s most 
productive agricultural region could permanently hinder economic growth for both nations: 
“If development was to go ahead, it was very necessary that we should find a situation 
where there were not matters such as serious disputes with economic consequences 
between the two countries.”542 In short, the Indus River Basin dispute threatened economic 
stability in one of the world’s most heavily populated regions. World Bank officials 
justified their unprecedented involvement in arbitrating the bilateral treaty on these 
grounds, firmly framing the dispute as a hindrance to agricultural development and, by 
extension, a contributor to broader food and population crises. 
After entering discussions with both India and Pakistan in 1952, the IBRD’s 
mediation of the Indus River Basin dispute unfolded over the course of a decade. It would 
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involve the submission and resubmission of numerous proposals from the Indian and 
Pakistani delegations, as well the revision of comprehensive plans compiled by World 
Bank staff. In these successive negotiations, officials representing both nations and the 
World Bank turned to a handful of international precedents in justifying their proposals. 
They also emphasized the fertility of the soil, and not merely the security of water 
resources, within the two national domains that shared the Indus River Basin. Critically, 
the division of the Indus River system would mean sharing its rich soil as well.  
THE QUEST FOR HEALTHY SOIL 
In cooperation with Indian and Pakistani legal teams, the experts of the World Bank 
drew upon the model of the U.S.-Mexico border to formalize the British-authored boundary 
cutting through the Indus River Basin. In doing so, they assumed the adjudication of 
boundary and water disputes between the United States and Mexico as standard protocol 
in international disagreements over resources, replicating institutions and practices 
developed in the North American context. Further, all three parties sought the advice of 
experts who had worked to resolve international resource disputes arising along the U.S.-
Mexico border.  
In October 1953, for instance, American engineer R. J. Tipton reviewed India’s 
initial proposal for the settlement of the Indus River Basin dispute and delivered his 
assessment of the plan to the IBRD. Working at the behest of the IBRD, Tipton drew upon 
three decades of experience in evaluating interstate and international water disputes. As 
principal of the hydrological consulting firm, Tipton and Kalmbach, Tipton had helped to 
negotiate the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty, which determined international water rights on 
the Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana rivers. Now, as Tipton assessed dueling national 
claims over rights to the Indus River Basin, he concluded that India’s proposal would 
 192 
shortchange West Pakistan. Indian planners, he argued, had overstated West Pakistan’s 
capacity for drawing irrigation water from tube wells. Reviewing several decades of British 
colonial data collected in surveys of the capacity of the river system, Tipton concluded that 
the Indian proposal greatly underestimated the amount of Himalayan river water that would 
be needed to support Pakistani agriculture. India, he contended, proposed to draw far too 
much water for its own agricultural use, threatening West Pakistan’s food security.543 In 
concluding his report, Tipton cited his qualifications in assessing hydrological claims, 
emphasizing that his model had been proven accurate through tests across Latin America. 
As he wrote in late 1953: 
It is the method being used by the Ministry of Public Works of Venezuela, for 
whom we are consultants, in all of its planning with respect to river development, 
and has also been used in connection with other river developments in South 
America and in Mexico with which I have been identified.544 
In this way, Tipton’s assessment represented the voice of international development 
expertise, promoting a set of norms formulated through similar negotiations between the 
U.S. and Mexico and a broader professional expertise built in Latin America. It also marked 
the beginning of a long relationship between Tipton and the IBRD. In effect, the World 
Bank tasked Tipton with the evaluation of the proposals and estimates of both nations 
through the conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. In contracting his firm, the 
IBRD took a one-size-fits-all approach to settling the international dispute, drawing upon 
expert knowledge in border and resource management, taken largely from experience in 
the United States and Latin America. This emerging body of international development 
expertise would be deployed in South Asia, evolving in a pattern shaped in part by the 
priorities of the new Indian and Pakistani states. 
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Similarly, the legal representatives of India and Pakistan themselves turned to 
earlier examples of river management along the U.S.-Mexico border in formulating their 
proposals for the Indus River Basin. By 1957, Pakistani officials began to express concern 
over the effects of India’s proposed hydroelectric dams on the Indus River system. They 
argued that, in addition to affecting the flow of water reaching West Pakistan, India’s dams 
would permanently alter the channels of the rivers downstream.545 In justifying their 
concerns, the Pakistani delegation petitioned the IBRD, citing the effects of dams 
constructed upon river systems spanning the United States and Mexico. Pakistani officials 
pointed to instances of channel degradation observed on the Rio Grande after the 
construction of New Mexico’s Elephant Butte Dam in 1927 and following the completion 
of Boulder Dam on the Colorado River in 1935.546  
Pakistani reports showed that in both cases on the U.S.-Mexico border, dams on the 
river systems spurred a rapid build-up of sediment, causing a narrowing of river channels 
downstream and a degradation of river banks. These changes, observed by American and 
Mexican geophysicists and hydrologists over several decades, reduced the carrying 
capacity of both rivers, increased the frequency of flooding, and promoted soil erosion and 
degradation in agricultural areas. The potential for Indian dam construction in the 
Himalayas to facilitate flooding across West Pakistan proved particularly sobering for the 
Pakistani delegation, especially considering the similarities between the arid climate of the 
mountainous American Southwest and that of West Pakistan. As their report concluded: 
“If India’s flood storage is inadequate to contain flood waters and peak floods are permitted 
to pass into Pakistan from time to time, aggradation of river channels would be greatly 
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increased.”547 This process could result in the increased deposition of nutrient-rich 
materials into the beds of the rivers flowing into Pakistan from the Himalayas. Without this 
nutrient-rich soil overflowing or deposited into West Pakistan's farmlands, India could thus 
wield the power to degrade West Pakistan’s soil and derail the nation’s food economy.  
Beyond such fears of agricultural sabotage, the Pakistani delegation also 
preoccupied itself with determining the costs of the unintended consequences of water 
development projects upstream in northern India. The Pakistani team turned to historical 
examples from international water management in North America to demand, in October 
1957, that preventative measures be built into the final Indus River Basin settlement with 
India.548 Indeed, American and Mexican experience on the Rio Grande and Colorado River 
systems lent an air of urgency to Pakistan’s claims. In both historical examples, the 
degraded river channels required emergency restructuring, costing both governments tens 
of millions of dollars.549 American engineers eliminated bends in the Rio Grande, 
increasing the river’s gradient to force out sediment and reduce the build-up of vegetation 
along the riverbanks, while simultaneously making efforts to prevent soil erosion. The 
Pakistani delegation noted that engineers from the United States and Mexico also 
scrambled in the wake of the construction of Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico to 
construct canals, levees, and auxiliary dams to salvage the rapidly deteriorating 
channels.550 In particular, the construction of the Hoover Dam and the Parker Dam on the 
Colorado River system also drew the attention of Pakistan’s representatives. In that case, 
dam construction on the American side of the border had severely degraded the rich 
farmlands of the Colorado River Delta in Sonora, prompting the cooperative International 
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Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) to compel both governments to invest in a 
restorative levee system. Considering these examples, the Pakistani delegation argued for 
access to World Bank loans to fund river channel construction downstream from the Indian 
dams. Pakistani officials also successfully lobbied for provisions in the final treaty that 
prohibited India from undertaking disruptive alterations to their upstream portion of the 
rivers entering Pakistan. In this way, the Indus Waters Treaty protected Pakistani 
agriculture and ensured the nation’s food security. 
In late 1959, the IBRD’s legal team submitted a proposal for the mutual inspection 
of water management projects in response to Pakistani concerns regarding the regulation 
of international river flow. This proposal included a selected survey of existing water 
treaties, justifying exchanges of inspectors to counter abuses and ensure the proper 
maintenance of international river systems. Here again, agreements between the United 
States and Mexico featured prominently. First referenced among them was the Rio Grande 
Rectification Convention of 1933, which established the International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IBWC) as the bilateral entity tasked with inspecting hydrological projects in 
both nations.551 The IBRD entered provisions for a similar cooperative monitoring 
institution, the Permanent Indus Commission, into the final Indus Waters Treaty. 
Referencing the Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana Treaty of 1944, representatives of the 
Bank also argued for provisions enabling India and Pakistan to engage in the construction 
of joint waterworks, as well as providing funding and personnel for regular inspections of 
the river system on both sides of the border. In this way, negotiations between India, 
Pakistan, and the World Bank served to create a formalized international boundary between 
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the two nations, replete with the institutions and practices derived from relations between 
the United States and Mexico. 
HEALTHY SOIL, HEALTHY NATION 
Contained within discussions and plans surrounding water rights in the Indus River 
Basin, concerns over soil fertility shaped the negotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty of 
1960. More broadly, the notion that securing fertile soil would be critical to the survival of 
the two new nations dominated the thinking of the scientific experts of the World Bank and 
the Ford and Rockefeller foundations through the 1950s and into the early 1960s. 
Evaluating and promoting the quality of the subcontinent's soil had been, of course, an 
important focus of colonial agricultural science as well. The imperial economic botanist 
Albert Howard, for instance, understood a clear connection between soil health and the 
dual problem of population growth and food supply. As he wrote in 1924, “The 
development of agriculture in India demands three conditions — water, combined nitrogen, 
and better cultivation.”552 Specifically in the context of wheat cultivation in river basins of 
northern India, he observed: 
The immediate problem in wheat-production on the alluvium is the development 
of the means by which the present extensive system of agriculture can be 
intensified. For intensive cultivation the indigenous varieties are quite unsuitable. 
The new varieties, however, respond successfully to better soil conditions. 
Besides a suitable variety, two other things are required, namely, water and 
organic matter.553 
In this way, the balance between the right kind of soil and the appropriate quantity of water 
would directly determine the amount of food grains that could be produced in a given 
region. Howard's influential thinking on the matter held that certain kinds of soil could 
produce particular varieties of wheat. Over time, water could alter the balance of the soil, 
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making it difficult for cultivators to grow particular strains in certain areas. Further, the 
alluvial soils of the Indus Basin within the "canal colonies" of the province of Punjab could 
be expected to support vast quantities of wheat, provided the soil was properly fertilized.554  
Another colonial agronomist, John Russell, who directed the Rothamsted 
Experimental Station in Hertfordshire, evaluated the capacity of imperial research in 
agriculture across the Sind and Punjab through 1936 and 1937. As part of a wider 
assessment of the workings of agricultural research in India, he issued a 1939 report on the 
work of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) in "applying science to crop 
production" in India..555 He observed that the complex relationship between soil fertility 
and water supply in the canal colonies of the Punjab presented real difficulties in estimating 
the productive capacity of the land. As he wrote: 
The problem of explaining soil fertility on chemical and physical grounds is 
extremely difficult, because of the profound effect of water supply and of climate, 
and if any future investigation on the subject is started, it should from the outset 
be associated with an elaborate system of carefully planned field experiments. 
The work would, however, be costly and troublesome and I doubt very much 
whether it would be worth the expense.556 
As Russell indicated, a thorough analysis of soil fertility in Punjab province proved to be 
prohibitively expensive, if not entirely impossible in the late colonial period. Nevertheless, 
the colonial concern over soil health in connection to population issues was an enduring 
one. As Alison Bashford writes: "Symbolically, politically, economically, and literally, soil 
was the substrata of the population problem. It makes sense, then, that agricultural science 
was the expertise base for many population commentators."557 As Bashford explains, the 
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nitrogen and phosphate content of soils evolved as a central area of concern for global 
population experts through the early twentieth century.558 As soil experts noted, nutrient-
rich soils could generate higher quality food grains in higher yields, thus sustaining 
healthier populations. In the Indian context, the former colonial agronomist G. A. Haig 
observed that the use of chemical fertilizers by farmers in pre-Partition India had been 
virtually nonexistent. This apparent lack of concern for soil health on the part of India 
cultivators, he reasoned, stemmed from superstition. As he wrote after retiring from his 
post in the Punjab following independence: 
My impression is that when I left India in 1947 most of the administrative and 
district officers (who really run the agriculture of the country) belonged to the 
“Muck and Mysticism” School and were frightened of artificial fertilizers. […] 
Modern informed ones seem to be strongly in favour of artificial fertilizers and I 
think it can be taken that it is now most desirable that these should be “pushed” in 
India and Pakistan.559 
Inheriting Haig's concern for soil health and advocacy for the expanded use of "artificial" 
fertilizers, the Rockefeller-financed Punjab Agricultural University in Ludhiana took up 
the cause of soil health advocacy in the region. Proposed by the IARI in 1959 and opened 
with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1962, the new university emphasized 
both undergraduate education and graduate-level research, devoting extensive resources 
toward work in soil science and supporting the expanded use of chemical fertilizers.560 
New projects to be carried out by the university under the Third Five-Year Plan included 
the establishment of five regional soil testing laboratories, the launch of a land use soil 
survey, and the construction of ten soil conservation demonstration farms to focus upon 
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arid farming methods. Further, a dedicated soil conservation wing would be added to the 
university to support the expansion fertilizer trial being carried out on the fields of local 
cultivators.561 
SHAPING THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE 
Divisions ran among the representatives of the World Bank and the Ford 
Foundation and Indian and Pakistani government officials over how best to address the 
division of water — and, by extension, soil — resources in light of the postwar population 
boom. Conflicts emerged, however, not between imperialist and nationalist or even 
between Indian and Pakistani interests, but rather between those who understood famine 
as resulting from inadequate food supply and others who saw it as a failure of distribution. 
For many of the development experts of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, as well as 
the economists of the World Bank, the outbreak of famine signified the necessary, albeit 
regrettable, outcome of overpopulation. It came as the total breakdown of a nation’s food 
economy — the logical result of inefficient agricultural production stretched to its limits. 
Yet, in estimating the agricultural needs of India and Pakistan while negotiating the Indus 
Waters Treaty, clear tensions emerged among officials over how best to prevent future food 
crises.  
Retired U.S. Army General Raymond “Speck” Wheeler, for instance, served as the 
chief engineering advisor to the Indus Waters Project. In this capacity, Wheeler oversaw 
estimates of the agricultural production capacity of the Indian and West Pakistani border 
regions. The Illinois-born general had served on Admiral Louis Mountbatten’s staff within 
the South East Asia Command during the Second World War. After the war, Wheeler 
served as Chief of Engineers for the Army Corps of Engineers and managed the clearing 
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of the Suez Canal following the crisis of 1956. An accomplished engineer and a respected 
officer, Wheeler worked through the late 1950s to connect the need for a resolution to the 
Indus Basin dispute to the urgency of food and population crises. In April 1959, Wheeler 
chaired discussions between representatives of India and Pakistan held in London to 
finalize each nation’s claims to the portions of the Indus River system.  
During these discussions, Wheeler emphasized the need for both nations to invest 
in increased agricultural output, regardless of what water resources they would ultimately 
be awarded.562 During the subsequent weeks spent negotiating the treaty, Wheeler secured 
Pakistan’s relinquishment of all claims to the eastern rivers of the Indus Basin — the Sutlej, 
Beas, and Ravi — in exchange for guaranteed total usage rights on the remaining three 
rivers within Pakistani territory. To secure this deal, Wheeler offered, on behalf of the 
IBRD, extensive loans to Pakistan for the development of the nation’s food production 
capacity in the Indus River Basin. On principle, whatever water volume West Pakistan lost 
to India would be redeemed through a large surplus derived from investments in new 
canals, tube wells, and alterations to the existing river channels in Pakistan to promote 
agricultural usage. India, in turn, would enjoy a freer hand to pursue hydroelectric projects 
in the Himalayan regions and agricultural reclamation schemes in Rajasthan with the three 
rivers reserved for its exclusive use. In this way, the ability of both nations to feed their 
populations through the promise of increased agricultural production emerged as the major 
bargaining chip during the negotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty. 
At the same time, the IBRD coordinated with the Ford Foundation to offer both 
India and Pakistan loans for investments in American-made chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides, with the promise that they would improve soil and crop quality, delivering 
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vastly increased food grain yields. Further, Harry Curran, the World Bank’s resident 
representative in New Delhi, regularly coordinated with Ford Foundation officials in 
determining the approach both organizations would take to the Government of India's 
proposed development investments. In February 1960, for instance, Curran reported back 
to his superiors in Washington, relaying the findings of a recent Ford Foundation report 
entitled, "India's Food Crisis."563 Curran wrote that Ford's agricultural experts had 
determined that, given recent rates of population growth and food production, "there would 
be a deficiency of 28 million tons of food grains by 1966 which could not be covered by 
any conceivable program of imports or rationing."564 Ford's experts, he noted, urged an 
"all-out emergency food production program" that would gear the Government of India's 
upcoming Third Five-Year Plan toward meeting that predicted shortfall.565 
The Ford Foundation’s emerging plans for preventing a potential food crisis 
through the promotion of high-yielding seeds and chemic fertilizers did not go 
unchallenged, however. In July 1960, Curran wrote once again to IBRD Loan Officer 
Stewart Mason in Washington, expressing his frustration with the Indian Planning 
Commission’s apparently wrongheaded approach to the nation’s food problem. Curran 
speculated that Penderel Moon, the former British colonial civil servant who had remained 
in India as the economic adviser to the Planning Commission, exerted disproportionate 
influence in turning commissioners against investments in increased production. As he 
wrote: 
Doug (Ensminger) is depressed in general about the Planning Commission. Like 
many others, he feels it has become a tired body, badly in need of an injection of 
fresh red blood. In particular he is naturally depressed by the Planning 
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Commission’s hostility to his ideas on food production and he blames especially 
(Penderel) Moon whose influence on V.T. (Krishnamachari) and Tarlock [sic] 
Singh has been, he believes, considerable and disastrous.566  
Further, Curran continued: “Whenever I have discussed food production with Moon, he 
has argued that all this expenditure on fertilizers is unreasonable and a North American 
racket. His own solution is simply that better use should first be made of existing 
resources.”567 Here, tension emerged between officials championing increased food 
production and those advocating for greater efficiency. While Curran and Ensminger 
argued for growing exponentially more grain with the aid of fertilizers purchased by the 
Government of India through the Ford Foundation, Moon recommended waste reduction 
and the full employment of existing resources. Moon’s storied career in the Indian Civil 
Service (ICS) spanned Partition, establishing him in some sense as a fixture of continuity 
with the old imperial administration. Curran noted that Moon’s views on population 
management held sway with certain members of the Indian Planning Commission, 
including Punjabi economist Tarlok Singh. At the same time, Curran observed that the 
aging British civil servant served only as an advisor to the Commission and would finally 
retire from his service to the Government of India the following summer, some fourteen 
years after Partition. Indeed, as Curran wrote, Nehru himself had indicated his personal 
support for the rapid grain production increases promised by the Ford Foundation and its 
fertilizers and pesticides. He only needed wider support on the Planning Commission to 
bankroll the expensive enterprise within the Third Five-Year Plan.568 In this way, by 1960, 
the argument for a distributive solution to India’s food woes seemed a lost cause. The goal 
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of dramatically increased production would come to dominate policy discussions in both 
India and Pakistan through the 1960s. 
The Indus Waters Treaty, and its associated agricultural development projects 
bankrolled by the World Bank, emerged in the midst of the debate between increased food 
production and more efficient food storage, pricing, and distribution. An heir to the 
Guinness brewing fortune and a distinguished hydrological engineer in his own right, 
Kenelm Guinness was hired by Walker and the IBRD to estimate the potential of the Indus 
Waters Project for generating a food grains surplus in South Asia. In February 1960, 
Guinness estimated in his report to the IBRD that the Project would provide 15 million 
acre-feet (MAF) and 13 MAF of additional irrigation water for India and Pakistan, 
respectively.569 These new water resources would be drawn from a new network of dams, 
canals, and wells funded by the World Bank at an expense of some $1.1 billion. On the 
Indian side of the border, the IBRD projected that this additional water would allow for an 
additional 4.4 million acres of productive farmland in the Thar Desert regions of Rajasthan 
alone, with an annual water surplus that could be utilized for future agricultural 
development. 
All told, Guinness estimated that the Indus Waters Project would sustain an 
additional 9.2 million acres of fertile new farmland across the Indus River Basin, in both 
India and Pakistan. In this way, far from a mere adjudication of an international boundary 
dispute, World Bank officials promoted the project as a groundbreaking development 
initiative that would restore the fertility of the region's soil and dramatically improve 
agricultural production. Rather than share existing resources through a cooperative 
agreement, both the Indian and Pakistani delegations could leave the negotiating table with 
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a concrete plan to launch separate agricultural development projects that would generate 
millions of acres of new farming land. Almost as an afterthought, the IBRD noted that 
existing cost estimates did not include a reliable projection for the private investment 
needed to productively farm these millions of acres of land. With public investment in 
excess of $1 billion, the Guinness estimate meant that the value of new agricultural output 
across both India and Pakistan would amount to about $277 million. As the IBRD report 
concluded, “The cost/output ratio, therefore, closely approximates to 4 to 1. This could be 
considered as reasonably satisfactory from the economic aspect.”570 In this way, the Indus 
Waters Project would increase grain yields, but at definite cost to the Indian and Pakistani 
states, not to mention individual farmers and investors in the border region 
PROTECTING THE FERTILITY INVESTMENT 
Three bankers arrived in Delhi on February 24, 1960 as part of an eight-week 
mission to make a “detailed assessment of economic conditions” in both India and Pakistan 
and to reemphasize the need for increased food production in the Indus River Basin.571 A 
crowd of reporters and representatives of the Government of India stood on-hand at 
Safdarjung Airport to greet Hermann J. Abs, chair of Deutsche Bank, Sir Oliver Franks, 
chair of Lloyds Bank Ltd., and Allan Sproul, chair of the New York Federal Reserve.572 
Fresh from their month-long tour of West Pakistan, the bankers represented the IBRD’s 
latest effort at jumpstarting economic growth in South Asia. Organized by IBRD chairman 
Eugene Black at the behest of United States senators John F. Kennedy and John Sherman 
Cooper, the visit had already accomplished its implicit objective of building publicity for 
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Western aid to South Asia in that the Pakistani press labeled the tour a visit of the “Three 
Wise Men.”573 The name stuck and the three experts bore the moniker with them into India.  
The Bankers’ Mission served the related goal, articulated by Kennedy, of building 
upon the successes of the Indus Waters negotiations by “performing a public guidance 
function in the United States and other nations.”574 Further, Kennedy highlighted the 
importance of the bankers' mission in setting the economic agenda of India's upcoming 
Third Five-Year plan. As he wrote to World Bank president Eugene Black in October 1959: 
"I know we share fully an awareness of both the practical and symbolic influence of India 
and the vital importance of setting her Third Plan on a clear and calculable course."575 In 
this way, the World Bank would involve itself in steering the Third Five-Year Plan toward 
an emphasis on producing substantial and calculable increases in agricultural production. 
In addition to heralding this proposed emphasis, the bankers' mission of early 1960 also 
provided an opportunity for building international awareness of the economic development 
work of the World Bank. It also served as an opportunity for these three eminent 
international economists to offer spot diagnoses of the causes of underdevelopment in 
South Asia. In West Pakistan, for instance, Abs, Franks, and Sproul announced that they 
had identified the new nation’s chief obstacle to growth: the limitations of its natural 
environment.576 
Echoing the concerns over maintaining the health and fertility of the nation's soil 
expressed by their colleagues working to finalize the Indus Waters Treaty, the three 
                                                
573 G. Stewart Mason to Harry G. Curran, January 14, 1960, Folder 1837568, India – General – Missions – 
Three Wise Men – Correspondence, Vol. 1., WBG. 
574 John F. Kennedy to Eugene Black, October 17, 1959, Folder 1837568, India – General – Missions – 
Three Wise Men – Correspondence, Vol. 1., WBG. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Allan Sproul to Eugene Black, 1959, Folder 1837568, India – General – Missions – Three Wise Men –
Correspondence, Vol 1, WBG. 
 206 
bankers stressed that West Pakistan must address the “loss of good agricultural land 
through waterlogging and salinity” to meet the food consumption demands of an expanding 
population.577 They also cited a high birth rate, lower mortality, and Pakistan’s absorption 
of “many millions of refugees” during Partition in 1947 as contributing factors in the 
nation’s burgeoning population crisis, but soil health represented their central concern.578 
To meet the challenges posed by rapid population growth, Pakistan must agree to a water 
resources settlement with India and invest heavily in increasing grain yields through the 
widespread use of new fertilizers and pesticides. The World Bank, they noted, could fund 
just that sort of endeavor. The Wise Men had indeed arrived in South Asia, bearing not 
gifts but loans. 
In New Delhi, as in Karachi, the bankers spoke of soil degradation, the limits of 
South Asia’s food production capacity, and the eagerness of the World Bank to provide 
loans for projects deemed necessary in averting a Malthusian catastrophe. In their report to 
the World Bank President Eugene Black, the bankers evaluated the fiscal allocations of the 
Nehru government’s Third Five-Year Plan. Out of some $20 billion in proposed spending, 
the bankers lamented the fact that only $3 billion had been slated for agricultural 
development.579 More would be needed, they stressed, to reclaim land, restore soil fertility, 
and secure increases in food grain production the bankers argued would avoid an 
impending calamity. At the same time, they applauded Nehru's willingness to invest in new 
agricultural technologies — including fertilizers, pesticides, and high-yielding seeds being 
advocated through the projects of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. To develop the 
agricultural regions along the border between India and West Pakistan, the three bankers 
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recommended that the IBRD offer capital development loans to both governments. They 
also concluded that the IBRD would need to lobby both governments to remove barriers to 
private and foreign direct investment.580 The border region, on the verge of a permanent 
settlement in the Indus River Basin dispute could prove to be the central venue for a 
revolution in agricultural production. With the proper infrastructure, they noted, it might 
also become prime real estate for international investment. 
Seven months after the "Three Wise Men" paid their visit to South Asia, Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan signed 
the Indus Waters Treaty in Karachi, West Pakistan on September 19, 1960.581 IDA Vice 
President Bill Iliff signed on behalf of the World Bank, finalizing the three-party compact 
and completing the international agreement that to this day governs hydrological and 
agricultural resources along the Indo-Pakistani border. The connection between water, soil 
fertility, and the potential of new high-yielding seed varieties to increase Indian food 
production proved clear within the negotiations surrounding the treaty. Greater food grain 
production could simply not be attained if one element of this equation proved faulty.  
CONCLUSION 
In April 1964, the agricultural scientist Norman Borlaug of CIMMYT in El Batán, 
Mexico reported to the Rockefeller Foundation's field office in New Delhi on his recent 
inspection of the IARI's progress in wheat research in Punjab. Borlaug wrote that he had 
observed significant progress by Indian scientists at research stations in Ludhiana and 
Karnal. At both sites, IARI scientists had made significant progress in cultivating high-
yielding Indian wheat at levels of fertilization and in successfully growing Mexican hybrid 
wheat varieties developed at CIMMYT. In particular, the Sonora 63 and 64 and Lerma 
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Rojo 64A wheat varieties, which demanded heavily-fertilized, well-irrigated soil, had been 
"beautifully adapted" to conditions in Punjab.582 As he wrote:  
During the past year the advances in varietal improvement have catalyzed 
advances in soil fertility and agronomic research. […] The overall stimulating 
effect of these discoveries should propel the research program forward with vigor 
during the next several years. If this is done and if research results are extended 
aggressively to the cultivator's plots, a revolution in irrigated wheat production 
will result within the next five to seven years.583 
 In this way, the water supply increases promised by the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 and 
the emphasis placed upon improving soil health within it would enable the extensive 
cultivation of these high-yielding wheat varieties across Punjab. Further, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the IARI's advocacy for the wider use of chemical fertilizers would enable 
Punjabi farmers to cultivate these varieties extensively. In turn, the extensive cultivation of 
these and other varieties demanding fertile, well-irrigated soils, would enable the rapid 
wheat production increases commonly associated with South Asia's Green Revolution.  
 Over the course of the first twelve years following Partition, representatives of the 
World Bank had furthered a notion of soil health in the context of national integrity. They 
also employed an evolving canon of international development expertise that determined 
how international resource disputes could be adjudicated and how national frontiers could 
be legally defined and administered. Negotiated by the IBRD, the Indus Waters Treaty of 
1960 enabled the new states of India and Pakistan to exert power over both the natural 
environment and their national populations. With the cooperative development plan 
proposed by David Lilienthal in 1951 firmly rejected by both India and Pakistan, only a 
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permanent division of resources could resolve the demographic precariousness Partition 
appeared to have generated.  
In this way, American philanthropic organizations and international institutions 
worked with two national governments to define and administer the border between India 
and West Pakistan through the 1950s and into the 1960s. They divided the subcontinent’s 
hydrological and soil resources, engaging on the international stage to carve out spaces for 
their respective nations. The negotiations between India and Pakistan, as well as the 
prescriptions proffered by the World Bank Group, drew upon the precedents of earlier 
boundary and water rights settlements between Mexico and the United States. Moreover, 
the border itself became a project of the "developmentalist state," evolving through 
exchanges with the "transnational development regime," outlined by Subir Sinha.584 It also 
served as a space in which a long process of decolonization unfolded and interacted with 
international experts and global priorities, setting the stage for the Green Revolution of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. 
The division of South Asia's soil and water resources over the course of the 1950s 
proved to be an important turning point in the work of the Rockefeller and Ford 
foundations, as well. With the flow of irrigation waters across the Indus River Basin 
insured and, by extension, the production of more nutrient-rich soil guaranteed, the 
scientific experts of both philanthropic organizations moved forward with confidence to 
increase their investments in wheat and rice across the region. As this chapter has shown, 
the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 — negotiated by the World Bank Group in conversation 
with both Ford and Rockefeller foundation officials — generated the conditions in which 
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the scientists of these philanthropic organizations believed their agricultural investments 
would thrive. 
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Conclusion: Towards the Obscurity Ahead 
Today, just north of Sonipat in the state of Haryana, the Daawat Foods Limited rice 
mill looms above the traffic on National Highway 1. An image of actor Amitabh Bachchan, 
Daawat’s celebrity spokesperson, beams down proudly from each of the mill’s six massive 
storage drums. Situated on the same road that links what remains of the ambitious 
community development project at Nilokheri to modern-day Delhi, the massive milling 
complex serves as a vivid reminder that the region is now one of South Asia’s largest 
producers of high quality basmati rice — a result, in part, of broad investments made in the 
region’s agriculture by the Government of India in the late 1960s and 1970s.585 One 
hundred kilometers to the north, the village of Nilokheri still hugs the outsized central 
traffic circle designed by B. D. Manda under the direction of S. K. Dey as the rehabilitation 
township became a community development project. The Haryana Institute of Rural 
Development and the Extension Education Institute of the Haryana Agricultural 
University, heirs to the regular extension training programs held in Nilokheri through the 
1950s, remain as important state-wide centers for educating farmers in management skills 
and cultivation practices.586 Indeed, the Extension Education Institute holds multiple 
training seminars each season, playing an important role within the state’s broader 
curriculum of education for farmers and village level workers. A portrait of Dey still hangs 
in the conference room there, a quiet reminder of the institution’s roots in the bold plans 
launched by Dey and Douglas Ensminger of the Ford Foundation. Following the decline 
of India’s community development efforts, however, Nilokheri itself never attained the 
prominence that Dey intended for it. 
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Not unlike the training centers in Karnal, the All-India Institute of Hygiene and 
Public Health (AIIH&PH) remains funded by the Government of India and offers courses 
for public health professionals in topics as varied as epidemiology, maternal and child 
health, biochemistry and nutrition, and environmental sanitation.587 The AIIH&PH also 
continues to manage the Rural Health Unit and Training Centre at Singur, which provides 
a venue for the training of undergraduate and postgraduate students in public health. It also 
offers primary care services to a population of over one lakh still included within the study 
area.588 In Hyderabad, too, the original mission of the Nutrition Research Laboratories at 
Coonoor continues with only minor modifications under the banner of the National 
Institute of Nutrition (NIN). So renamed in 1969 in honor of its fiftieth anniversary, the 
laboratory founded by Robert McCarrison to investigate the causes of beriberi has become 
India’s largest nutrition research institute.589 While the Rockefeller Foundation that had 
invested in the AIIH&PH and the predecessors of the NIN concluded its work in India in 
1973, the Ford Foundation and Population Council both continue to play significant — if 
at times controversial roles — in financing public health, agricultural science, and social 
development projects in South Asia.590 Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, 
for instance, placed restrictions on the work of the Ford Foundation in India during the 
summer of 2015 for allegedly providing a $250,000 grant to a critic of the prime minister. 
The Modi government identified the foundation as a potential threat to national security 
for providing funds to two “anti-India” organizations managed by the activist Teesta 
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Setalvad.591 The Government of India ultimately removed Ford from its threats watch list 
in March 2016 and resumed its sixty-four-year-old relationship with the organization.592 In 
this way, the philanthropic interventions of the 1950s that established new scientific 
networks and institutions and set the terms of postwar international development discourse 
continue to have resonance across South Asia today. 
Beyond long-standing institutions and enduring scientific networks, the 
interventions of the 1950s and 1960s and the Green Revolution that they enabled continue 
to affect millions of lives across rural South Asia. Vandana Shiva, for example, has recently 
argued that, “Instead of abundance, Punjab has been left with diseased soils, pest-infested 
crops, waterlogged deserts and indebted and discontented farmers.”593 The implications of 
the capital-intensive pattern of agricultural development established in part by the Green 
Revolution have been similarly highlighted in the media coverage and scholarly 
examinations of the high rate of suicides among heavily-indebted small farmers over at 
least the past two decades.594 This tragic phenomenon has received attention as a public 
health issue in and of itself, with medical researchers concluding that indebtedness due to 
the high cost of agricultural inputs and relatively low returns on crops leads small farmers 
to take their own lives.595 At the same, Sam Grey, Raj Patel, and other scholars have 
advocated for local movements toward attaining food sovereignty across the developing 
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world as a means by which communities might be able to maintain nutritional health. Such 
movements seek to counter landlessness among rural farmers, the increased cultivation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) at the expense of local crop varieties, and the 
monopolization of seed stocks by international corporations.596 These ongoing debates and 
crises within the global food economy descend directly from the scientifically-driven 
efforts to restructure South Asian agriculture toward dramatically increased production 
during the long period of decolonization. 
The preceding chapters have shown that the quest for greater food production in 
South Asia derived significantly from the priorities of agricultural scientists and rural 
extension advocates of the late colonial era prior to the storm of Partition. The emergent 
nutritional sciences and a rising doctrine of social intervention into the workings of rural 
communities profoundly shaped the agendas of the philanthropic and new international 
organizations that entered India in the aftermath of the Bengal Famine of 1943-44 and the 
Partition of 1947. In the wake of these crises, fears of overpopulation and food shortage 
drove efforts to transform Indian agriculture and regulate populations. The “double crisis” 
of food supply failure and rapid population growth, outlined by the British writer Aldous 
Huxley in 1948, served as a justification for interventions by the Rockefeller and Ford 
foundations, the Population Council, and other international agencies in their initial 
development projects across South Asia during the 1950s. As Nick Cullather has shown, 
the experts employed by American philanthropic organizations would attempt to “restore 
a putatively lost ‘balance’ between food supply and population” in the postwar era.597 The 
assumption of a “double crisis” also set the stage for contemporaneous interventions in 
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rural extension and education, nutritional health, and the management of water and soil as 
vital national resources. In turn, addressing rapid global population growth as a crisis of 
decolonization, such efforts established the point of departure for international 
development theory and practice in the postwar era. 
In problematizing rural India as both excessively fertile in terms of human 
reproduction and desperately underproductive in an agricultural sense, the new 
developmentalist thinking of the postwar era set the stage for broad attempts to reshape 
South Asia’s villages and farming communities. Independent India’s community 
development and rural extension schemes of the 1950s, for instance, emerged in large part 
from the necessities of post-Partition refugee rehabilitation. Building upon the example of 
the state-funded rehabilitation township of Nilokheri in East Punjab, the Ford Foundation 
and the TCA worked closely with the Government of India to launch nationwide 
programming designed to reorder the countryside and stimulate food production. The rural 
extension education programs launched by the Allahabad Agricultural Institute similarly 
sought to extend the influence of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations in South Asia. 
These ambitious initiatives to transform villages and train thousands of novice farmers to 
become extension experts demonstrate the broad appeal of this developmentalist agenda of 
social intervention; this analysis extends upon recent work on community development and 
model villages in South Asia by Nicole Sackley and Daniel Immerwahr. I argue that the 
Indian version of community development emerged in important ways from the priorities 
of India’s Ministry of Rehabilitation in the aftermath of Partition, revealing that this sort 
of intervention also represented a concerted attempt to shape the new nation’s economy 
and define its citizenry. As the bureaucratic weight of the new Ministry of Community 
Development hindered programmatic progress through the early 1960s, the Ford 
Foundation adopted a model of intervention more like that of Rockefeller, financing direct 
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scientific research in agriculture. That said, these initial social interventions helped to shape 
Panchayati Raj and supported the rise of rural extension and agricultural education 
institutions that would endure for decades to come.  
As the Ford Foundation supported experiments in community development and 
rural extension through the 1950s, the Rockefeller Foundation and the FAO also provided 
backing for laboratory and clinical research into nutrition. In transporting laboratory 
methodologies into village clinics and field sites, Indian scientists and FAO experts 
launched investigations into the causes of deficiency diseases and worked to assess the 
nutritional values of common Indian foodstuffs. This research reflected a new intersection 
between developmentalist theories and the nutritional sciences, reflecting a later instance 
of what James Vernon has termed the “humanitarian discovery of hunger” in the context 
of international development.598 Further, investments made by the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the FAO in the work of the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health 
(AIIH&PH) and the Nutrition Research Laboratories at Coonoor and Hyderabad guided 
the research agendas of both institutions through the 1950s. Demonstrated in part by the 
careers of V. N. Patwardhan, W. R. Aykroyd, and Muktha Sen, these investments 
supported the rise of a global scientific network through which the findings of local 
nutritional research might be shared. During that period, while agricultural scientists and 
development experts pursued wide-ranging, capital-intensive initiatives across South Asia, 
the nutritional sciences engaged the food situation at a physiological level, taking the 
human body as the central site of investment, intervention, and experimentation. Diet and 
nutritional health surveys gathered socioeconomic and biochemical data from India’s most 
vulnerable populations. Laboratory scientists and physicians compiled compendia 
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advertising the “proper” ways of choosing, cooking, and eating India’s common foods. As 
I argue, these interventions turned on a constant negotiation between individual care on the 
one hand and the wider realm of public health surveillance on the other. This relation would 
lead nutritionists and dietitians into closer collaborations with the agricultural sciences, as 
both worked to assess the nutritional quality of South Asia’s newly-developed high-
yielding food grain varieties. 
In the face of the perceived postwar population crisis, Indian and American 
scientists associated with the Rockefeller Foundation and the newly-organized Population 
Council also sought to examine and regulate rural populations. In so doing, they connected 
overpopulation concerns to ideas of seed and soil fertility, closely paralleling earlier 
international debates over soil conservation and population growth highlighted by Alison 
Bashford.599 Eugenic notions of fertility regulation, in common currency in late colonial 
India as Sarah Hodges, Maneesha Lal, and others have shown, thus informed the first post-
independence public health projects of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Population 
Council.600 The “family planning action research” initiatives launched in rural 
communities by the Population Council and the Rockefeller Foundation during the 1950s 
paralleled similar efforts undertaken in the context of decolonization in the Caribbean, a 
phenomenon which Nicole C. Bourbonnais has recently examined.601 Inaugurated in 1956, 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s Indian Agricultural Program (IAP), moved rapidly to expand 
and improve India’s maize and sorghum germplasms, investing as well in the hybridization 
of new varieties of both grains to secure higher yields. The Population Council and the 
Rockefeller Foundation collaborated with Indian scientific and medical institutions and the 
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Indian central government to pursue a dual agenda influenced by eugenic notions. On the 
one hand, they sought to restrict human fertility; on the other, they worked to improve the 
fertility of crop plants. In view of promising developments in Rockefeller’s grain 
hybridization initiatives and wider governmental interest in population control 
programming by the early 1960s, the American foundations gradually turned away from 
the capital-intensive social interventions represented by the Ford Foundation’s earlier work 
in community development and rural extension. In the view of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s leaders and top scientists especially, only unprecedented improvements in 
the agricultural sciences could resolve the perceived imbalance between population growth 
and food supply. At the same time, the turn toward coordinated programming in the 
agricultural sciences in India became a vast experiment in and of itself, testing whether the 
research model that had brought Mexico dramatic improvements in grain production could 
lead to similar results for a much larger nation. Considering the rapid gains of this vast 
experiment through the late 1950s, the American foundations and the international 
agencies that worked with them in South Asia would work toward establishing conditions 
aimed at achieving a permanent agricultural abundance. 
The World Bank Group (WBG) would be chief among the international agencies 
to collaborate closely with the Ford and Rockefeller foundation in securing their 
investments in South Asia through the late 1950s and early 1960s. The World Bank’s 
economists and hydrologists worked to establish a permanent settlement of water rights in 
the Indus River Basin, placing special emphasis on ensuring the agricultural productivity 
and fertility of the region divided between India and West Pakistan, and culminating in the 
adjudication of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Through these negotiations, World Bank 
officials advanced a notion of soil health as critical to integrity of the nation. They deployed 
an evolving international development expertise to determine how international resource 
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disputes could be resolved and how international borders might be administered without 
damaging agricultural productivity. Through the same period, the Rockefeller Foundation 
took similar steps to ensure the permanence of the productive gains secured through early 
efforts in grain hybridization. Most notably, Rockefeller scientists collaborated with the 
Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), to test new high-yielding wheat varieties at 
research stations in Ludhiana and Karnal in Punjab. The American foundation also took on 
a powerful role in India, financing graduate programs in the agricultural sciences designed 
to ensure that scientific knowledge would be developed and shared domestically. In these 
ways, agricultural research proved vitally important to the framing of India’s agricultural 
development policies through the 1950s and in advance of the later Green Revolution, just 
as Madhumita Saha has shown in her effort to “recover the history of agriculture in 
independent India before the Green Revolution.”602 Further, global institutions coordinated 
with the Indian and Pakistani states to establish permanent systems to regulate water 
resources, manage soil fertility, and guarantee the long-term profitability of South Asian 
agriculture. These structural changes within South Asia’s food economy would justify the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s ultimate investments in improving local wheat and rice varieties 
beginning in 1964 and culminating in the transfer of high-yielding dwarf wheat varieties 
developed in Mexico to India and Pakistan in 1966.  
In weaving the above narratives together, I have argued that nationalist and colonial 
era concerns over food shortage and population growth profoundly influenced the agendas 
of the philanthropic organizations and international agencies that expanded their influence 
in South Asia after 1947. Following independence, as through the late colonial period, 
Indian agriculture became the subject of investments and interventions on the part of 
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philanthropic scientists and humanitarian agents. I have shown that the careers of Indian 
and British colonial scientists extended across Partition, with many of them assuming roles 
in new international institutions and working closely with emerging American 
philanthropic organizations. Going beyond mere goodwill, however, their eagerness to 
reshape South Asia's food economy and to address overarching concerns regarding global 
population growth also converted the new nations of India and Pakistan the sites of social 
and scientific experimentation through the 1950s and 1960s. Further, this dissertation has 
attempted to set the Green Revolution, commonly viewed as a phenomenon of the late 
1960s and 1970s, firmly in the context of a long era of South Asian decolonization. In turn, 
this analysis has engaged with both colonial and postcolonial historiographies, adding 
significant context to Raj Patel’s recent conceptual sketch of a ‘long’ Green Revolution.603 
 I have tried to demonstrate that the institutions, ideas, and networks that proved 
pivotal within the global Green Revolution emerged in no small way from attempts to 
regulate rural populations and reorganize South Asian agricultural production into the 
1950s and 1960s. This priorities and concerns expressed were expressed through what 
Subir Sinha has termed the "developmentalist state," subsequently engaging with the 
worldwide concerns of the "transnational development regime” that took shape in the 
aftermath of the Second World War and through the first global waves of decolonization.604 
In the final analysis, the fear of an obscure future coupled with a faith in the capacity of 
science to resolve social concerns, pushed and pulled South Asia toward the Green 
Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s in fits and starts. The forces unleashed by 
decolonization contributed significantly to the agricultural changes already underway 
during the mid-twentieth century. Decolonization also provided an opportunity and a 
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justification for the involvement of American philanthropic organizations and international 
agencies in South Asia’s food economy. A wide array of political interests would come to 
celebrate the fruits of these scientific investigations and social interventions, citing them 
as clear improvements to the human condition. For those swept up as unwitting research 
subjects or manipulated as movable pieces on a vast rural chessboard, the changes wrought 
by these developmentalist interventions appeared to be something less than progress. 
Returning at last to Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History, hurled backward by the 
storm called “progress” as he permanently faces the past, it is useful to recall the 
significance of this image for the philosophy of history. As Benjamin writes: “Where we 
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.”605 In this way, the long episode historians 
now view as the Green Revolution could not have been understood as a single event or a 
discrete era by those caught up in it. Instead, unlike the Angel of History, they faced an 
uncertain future. As Benedict Anderson reflects on Benjamin’s celestial metaphor: “[T]his 
angel is immortal, and our faces are turned towards the obscurity ahead.”606 The scientists, 
physicians, and development experts who supported the agendas of the American 
philanthropic foundations and the new international organizations that sought to radically 
transform South Asia struggled to peer into that obscurity, imagining at once scenes of 
societal catastrophe and scientific triumph. Whether these visions were simply delusions 
or accurate predictions of things to come is beside the point. The lasting repercussions of 
their actions and the policies they pursued have proven to be real enough. 
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